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I. DESCENT INTO THE LABYRINTH OF LIABILITY
A male employee sends a female employee signed, unwanted
"love" letters, some of which have obsessive, possibly threatening
overtones. The employer transfers the harassing employee to an-
other facility, but the transferred employee grieves the action.
Rather than fight the grievance, the employer agrees to allow the
transferred employee to return to the original facility, without disci-
pline, after a six-month cooling-off period. Upon learning of the
impending return of the harasser, the victim quits and sues the
employer.1
B Y now it is well established that something called "sexual harass-
ment"2 in the workplace is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
1. This scenario is derived from Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873-75 (9th Cir.
1991), a case best known for holding that the existence of harassment should be deter-
mined from the vantage of a "reasonable woman." Id. at 884; see infra Part II. The
notes and letters did not directly threaten the victim, rather, they contained frighten-
ing, obsessive language, such as "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained,"
and "I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching you. Exper-
iencing you from 0 [sic] so far away." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 874.
2. There is really no set definition of sexual harassment. The concept of sexual
harassment has been evolving since the mid-1970s. Catharine A. MacKinnon, in her
seminal work, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
(1979), defined sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual require-
ments in the context of a relationship of unequal power." Id. at 1. It has also been
described as "unsolicited, nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role
over her function as a worker." Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harass-
ment of Women on the Job 14-15 (1978). More recently, it was broadly defined as
"abusive treatment of an employee, by the employer or by a person or persons under
the employer's control, which would not occur but for the victim's sex." 3 Employ-
ment Discrimination § 46.01.[1], at 44-46 (Lex K. Larson ed., 1998). The quest for a
clear legal definition is also ongoing. While courts almost all uniformly cite the same
elements, there is very little agreement on the meaning behind those elements. In-
deed, the numerous splits in the circuit courts, and the need for more clarity may well
be the driving force behind the Supreme Court's decision to have granted certiorari in
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Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3 When employers recognize that it is
occurring at their workplace,4 or when they substantiate a complaint
of sexual harassment, they must take some action against the harasser
or face almost certain liability for the harassment.5 When employers
take action, however, they run the risk of encountering the wrath of
the "angry man"16 who has been accused of sexual harassment, and
who seeks to turn the tables and characterize himself as the victim.7
a record four sexual harassment cases in the 1997-1998 term. For a detailed discussion
of the legal requirements for a sexual harassment cause of action, see infra Part I.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended
principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1994)). Title VII, which prohibits,
among other things, sex discrimination in employment, does not specifically mention
sexual harassment. The Supreme Court, however, recognized sexual harassment as a
cause of action under Title VII in the seminal case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
4. Recognition of sexual harassment can be a formidable task because of the
ambiguous nature of the term and a legal standard that relies on a case-by-case analy-
sis to determine its existence. See infra Part II.
5. The 1998 Supreme Court cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. 118 S.
Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293
(1998), both make clear that corrective action on the part of an employer is implicated
when the harasser is a supervisory employee (where the absence of corrective activity
will render the employer liable under a theory of vicarious liability), or when the
harasser is a co-worker of the victim (which will render the employer liable under a
negligence theory). See infra Part III.A. (discussing employer liability).
6. As used in this Article, the phrase "angry man" is a variation of the phrase
"angry white man," which has been used to describe a conservative backlash move-
ment against certain aspects of anti-discrimination laws, particularly affirmative ac-
tion. See David Gates, White Male Paranoia, Newsweek, Mar. 29, 1993, at 48. 1 use
the term "angry male" to describe a similar backlash movement by males accused of
sexual harassment.
7. Title VII, of course, protects men from unwanted sexual harassment as well as
women. Harassment cases brought by men have been successfully prosecuted in the
courts and have led to substantial verdicts. See, eg., John L. Mitchell, Man Gets SI-
Million Award in Sexual Harassment Case, L.A. Times, May 20, 1993, at Al (describ-
ing case in which a male plaintiff alleging sexual harassment by his female supervisor
obtained a $1 million verdict). The frequency of such harassment, however, is signifi-
cantly lower in comparison to harassment of women by men. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reports that about 10% of sexual harassment com-
plaints are claims by men. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992-FY 1998 (last
modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http.//wwv.eeoc.govstatslharass.html>. In addition, the
Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") found that harassment of women oc-
curred more than twice as frequently as harassment of men. See Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Trends, Progress,
Continuing Challenges 13 (1994) (noting that 44% of women reported being harassed
within the two-year period preceding the report, while only 19% of men reported
such harassment). This finding is consistent with an earlier MSPB survey concerning
sexual harassment: 42% of women reported harassment in 1980, compared to only
15% of men for the same time period. See Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual
Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem? 36 (1981). Indeed, one need
only peruse the captions of sexual harassment cases to confirm that the vast majority
of such actions are brought by women. Thus, I have chosen to follow the common
path and speak of the alleged harasser as a male and the putative victim as a female.
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"Angry men" who have been dismissed, demoted, or otherwise dis-
ciplined for their harassing conduct are striking back and suing their
employers and former employers under a variety of theories,8 or they
are negotiating "diamond" parachutes to soften their landing.9 These
angry men suits have not been limited to instances where, given the
uncertain state of sexual harassment law, it is disputable that the con-
duct in question constituted harassment. 10 To the contrary, accused
harassers have sued and, in some instances, won, even where there is
no question that egregious sexual harassment took place. Consider
the following scenario:
A male employee reaches around from behind a female co-worker,
grabs her breasts and comments to another male co-worker that the
breasts are real. The employer discharges the male employee
shortly thereafter. The fired employee files a grievance and, after
pursuing the grievance to arbitration, is ordered reinstated. The
employer resists reinstatement, but loses its fight to overturn the
arbitrator's decision in both the district and circuit court. The em-
ployer is ultimately successful in discharging the harassing employee
when additional instances of harassment are uncovered during the
investigation.11
Notwithstanding this usage, the principles are equally applicable when a man is
harassed by a woman.
8. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing the various theories
under which accused harassers have sued their employers or former employers).
9. J.P. Bolduc, former CEO of W.R. Grace, left his position amid allegations of
sexual harassment. Regardless of whether the harassment allegations were a ruse or
the primary reason for his departure, Bolduc left with a $42 million severance pack-
age. See Elizabeth Lesly, Fall from Grace, Bus. Wk., May 29, 1995, at 60, 60.
10. Determining exactly what conduct constitutes actionable sexual harassment is
a difficult task which relies on a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circum-
stances. A hostile environment exists when an employee is subjected to unwelcome
and sufficiently severe or pervasive sexual conduct at the workplace, but suffers no
tangible loss. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme
Court addressed the effect the conduct must have on the plaintiff to be considered
actionable hostile environment harassment (as opposed to an unactionable annoy-
ance). The Court rejected the severe psychological harm standard that had been
adopted by some lower courts at one extreme and noted that Title VII was not a
general civility code at the other extreme. See id. at 21-22. The middle area, however,
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, relying on factors such as the nature and
duration of the conduct, whether it was threatening or humiliating, and whether it
interfered with the victim's ability to work. See id. at 23. The Court reiterated this
approach in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). There,
the Court found that same-sex harassment was actionable, but it emphasized that the
context of the purporting harassing actions, including differences between the way
males and females relate to each other, would be critical in determining whether the
particular charged conduct would be sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain the
cause. Id. at 1002-03; see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (providing a more
detailed discussion of the Oncale decision).
11. This scenario is derived from Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union,
Allied Industrial Workers, 959 F.2d 685, 686 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding the dis-
trict court's refusal to overturn the arbitrator's decision to reinstate the harasser), and
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers, 2 F.3d 760
1520 [Vol. 67
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In this instance, as well as the opening scenario, the employer
sought to act promptly, as it should, to eliminate a sexually hostile
environment. Nonetheless, each employer was subjected to extensive
legal maneuvering and expense, not because of the victim but because
the harasser filed a grievance. Herein lies the paradox that employers
face: they must act promptly and effectively to eliminate a sexually
hostile environment created by their employees, for failure to do so
will subject them to liability under Title VII.12 The consequence of
acting too promptly or too firmly, however, very well may be a griev-
ance or a lawsuit by an angry man. Further, employers seeking to find
the middle ground by imposing less severe discipline may be subjected
to suits by both the alleged harasser, who grieves even the lesser pen-
alty,' 3 and the victim of the harassment, who feels that the hostile en-
vironment has not been eliminated. Employers are thus subjected to
a double-edged sword: potential liability to the victim of the harass-
ment if they fail to take prompt and appropriate corrective action, and
the potential liability to the "angry man victim" if they take such
action.
This labyrinth of activity surrounding sexual harassment charges has
left employers in a quandary: no matter which route they choose,
they subject themselves to potential liability, or, at the very least, to a
costly and protracted legal battle to avoid liability.14 Further, because
(7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's denial of a contempt motion brought for
failure to reinstate alleged harasser).
12. For a full discussion of the law governing employers' liability for harassment,
see infra Part III. While this Article is couched in terms of the paradox created when
Title VII pressures an employer to take corrective action, that pressure may come
from other statutes as well, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994), and sections 804 and 818(b)(1) of the Federal Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994), or even when common law tort actions are filed by mem-
bers of the public. Notably, students may bring actions for damages under Title IX if
they are harassed by teachers or other school employees. See Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). Additionally, the lack of corrective action
may result in employer liability. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
1989, 1999 (1998). For this reason, arbitrations and cases involving school employees
disciplined for harassing students are included in this Article. Further, in instances
where a member of the public has complained to the employer that she was sexually
harassed by an employee, the employer may act so as to avoid future liability to the
public at large.
13. See infra notes 182-93, 213-14, 235 and accompanying text; infra Table 2.
14. A study in the early 1990s estimated the cost to defend a single discrimination
claim at $80,000, and put the cost of sexual harassment complaints to a typical Fortune
500 company at approximately $6.7 million annually. Linda Stamato, Sexual Harass-
ment in the Workplace: Is Mediation an Appropriate Forum?, 10 Mediation Q. 167,
167 (1992). The average cost of defending a sexual harassment lawsuit ranges from
$20,000 to $200,000. Jay Fmegan, Law and Disorder, Inc., April, 1994, at 64, 67. The
cost of employer attorney fees and costs are also sometimes reflected by indemnifica-
tion awards. For example, in Bradley Corp. v. Zurid Insurance Co., 984 F. Supp.
1193 (E.D. Wis. 1997), the insurer was ordered to pay the employer the S232,498.55
plus interest for attorney's fees and costs incurred by the employer in defending a
sexual harassment case. See id at 1205-06.
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employers must respond in some fashion to every complaint of sexual
harassment received,15 and even to instances where no complaint has
been filed but the existence of a sexually hostile environment is appar-
ent,16 there is a compelling need for a system under which the em-
ployer can act quickly and without fear of descending into the
labyrinth of liability.
Alleged harassers have argued a wide variety of theories to chal-
lenge disciplinary action taken against them. Even those without ex-
plicit appeal rights 17 are suing their employers on a variety of theories,
alleging, for example, lack of good faith and fair dealing, 18 negligent
investigation,19 defamations and discrimination.2" Additionally,
some alleged harassers even seek indemnification for attorneys' fees.22
15. See infra notes 146-50 for a discussion of two recent Supreme Court decisions
which created an affirmative defense for employers in sexual harassment suits if they
can show that they had an appropriate policy and procedure in place and either that it
acted reasonably once it knew of the harassment or that the victim of the harassment,
knowing of the procedure, did not attempt to use it.
16. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
17. Generally, private employers may contractually agree to discipline or dis-
charge employees only for just cause or some other articulated standard, and to pro-
vide a method for challenging disciplinary action. Public employers may or may not
have undertaken contractual obligations, but they have additional constraints on em-
ployer actions and forums for resolving those differences. Unless such constraints
exist, however, the employment relationship is said to be "at will," and the employer
is generally free to act as it wishes without any particular justification so long as it
does not violate any laws in the process. In these circumstances, the employee has no
direct internal means to challenge the employer's actions; the employee must proceed
to a judicial forum and rely on statutory or common law.
18. See, e.g., Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280,287 (N.M. 1988) (agreeing
that the employer need only in good faith believe that the employee engaged in inap-
propriate conduct in the workplace); Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 708 P.2d 1385,
1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that an allegation of unfair dealing in a termina-
tion of an at-will contract is not actionable under Colorado law).
19. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(declining to review the appellate court's holding that negligent investigation in the
employment context is not actionable); Lawson v. Boeing Co., 792 P.2d 545, 548
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding insufficient evidence of negligence to create a material
issue of fact as to negligent investigation).
20. See, e.g., Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995)
(alleging that the employer made false accusations of sexual harassment).
21. These cases come in several varieties: allegations that women who participate
in creating hostile environments are treated more leniently than men who do so, see
Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1994); allegations
that the alleged sexual harassment is a pretext for discrimination on some other pro-
tected basis, see Williams v. General Mills, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (N.D. Ill.
1996); and allegations that a college overreacted to charges of sexual harassment by
female students to the detriment of male students, see Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35
F.3d 709, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1994).
22. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 459 (Cal.
1995) (rejecting a claim for indemnification for violations of the Fair Employment and
Housing Acts).
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Alleged harassers are also suing putative victims and sometimes en-
joying more success than when they sue employers.23
The most successful actions for an alleged harasser seem to occur
when he pursues his complaint under a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a just cause provision, or when the employer is otherwise
required to establish just cause for its action before an arbitrator. 24
My research shows that arbitrators grant some form of relief to the
accused harasser, usually by reducing the penalty imposed by the em-
ployer, in nearly half of the reported challenges. - To optimize the
arbitration process for the benefit of employers, victims, and accused
harassers, steps must be taken to modify the arbitration system so that
employers will be encouraged to implement sexual harassment poli-
cies and employees will share responsibility for addressing the prob-
lem of workplace sexual harassment, and will be encouraged to
promptly report all potentially harassing conduct.
In this Article, I explore the paradox facing employers attempting
to eliminate sexually hostile environments while avoiding liability to
"angry men" who use arbitration to appeal disciplinary action for sex-
ual harassment. Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of
hostile environment sexual harassment law, focusing on the confusion
caused by the widely vacillating standards used in defining sexual har-
assment and the problems in determining employer liability. Part III
reports trends in arbitrations derived from the database that I con-
structed of reported arbitrations challenging discipline for sexual har-
assment. In addition, part III contrasts the factors that arbitrators
consider in determining just cause with the factors that courts consider
when determining sexual harassment liability. Finally, part IV pro-
poses a system to relieve, at least partially, the descent into the laby-
rinth of liability for employers whose employees have direct appeal
rights.26 Specifically, part IV proposes that employers develop sexual
harassment policies that: (1) reject the totality of circumstances test
used by courts to determine the existence of sexual harassment and
instead adopt anti-harassment policies that utilize bright lines in the
form of detailed work rules and a table of penalties, and (2) use a dual
responsibility approach under which the employer and employee each
assume responsibility for preventing and remedying harassment.
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Garraghty, 455 S.E.2d 209 (Va. 1995) (awarding compen-
satory and punitive damages to a supervisor accused of sexual harassment). Although
the propriety of such actions is beyond the scope of this Article, they are described
peripherally to complete the picture of the labyrinth of actions surrounding sexual
harassment.
24. Hundreds of claims in arbitration cases are based on the theory that the em-
ployer lacked just cause for the imposed discipline. See infra Table I and accompany-
mg text.
25. To study this issue I compiled a database of some 316 arbitrations of chal-
lenges to discipline for sexual harassment. The arbitrations studied are listed in the
Appendix.
26. See infra Part IV.
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Under this approach, the employer will require that all supervisory
personnel have the duty to report complaints and observations of po-
tentially harassing conduct, and the employee victim will take respon-
sibility by reporting all potentially harassing conduct or be foreclosed
from later raising a complaint.
II. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Background
Because the guiding standards are replete with descriptive phrases
capable of wide variation in their interpretation, recognizing sexual
harassment and the circumstances under which employers are liable
for such harassment is a formidable task for employers and employ-
ees. 7 Nonetheless, despite the definitional problems, sexual harass-
ment in the workplace undoubtedly continues to be a severe problem.
Early studies indicated that between 49% and 92% of women, de-
pending on their occupation, believed that they had been sexually
harassed on the job.2 8 Further, there is no indication that sexual har-
assment is declining; indeed, charges filed with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sexual
harassment have sharply increased over the last decade, finally level-
ing off somewhat during the last few years. 9
That an employer, under certain circumstances, can be held liable
for sexual harassment under Title VII is by now beyond peradven-
27. For example: What is meant by "unwelcome"? Does "conduct of a sexual
nature" impose a limit on the type of conduct considered, or is non-sexual gender-
based conduct included? When is conduct "sufficiently" severe to constitute harass-
ment? How does the employer evaluate whether it "should have known" about
harassment?
28. See MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 25-28.
29. The number of sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC climbed from
5623 in 1989 to 15,889 in 1997. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992-FY 1998 (last
modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>. In 1995, 1996, and
1997, the number of charges averaged around 15,500 per year. See id. The increase
can be attributed to several factors, including the widespread publicity surrounding
several allegations of harassment. Since 1991, there has been an almost non-stop bar-
rage of media publicity and coverage of various instances of sexual harassment allega-
tions. These instances include the confirmation hearings for Justice Clarence Thomas,
who was accused by Professor Anita Hill of sexually harassing her while she worked
for him at the EEOC and the Department of Education; the Tailhook incident, in
which female naval officers were forced to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse by male
naval officers while attending an annual retreat; the allegations of sexual harassment
against Senator Robert Packwood; a sexual harassment lawsuit against President Bill
Clinton; and the court martial of the Army's highest ranking enlisted officer. In addi-
tion to widespread publicity, and perhaps more importantly, the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (1994)), provided, for the first time, monetary relief in the form of compensa-
tory and punitive damages in federal sexual harassment cases. See id. Thus, increased
awareness and increased monetary relief both have contributed to this dramatic in-
crease in charges of sexual harassment.
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ture.30 The exact nature of both the circumstances constituting har-
assment and the basis for imposing liability on the employer, however,
continues to be elusive. Specifically, there are two main areas of con-
fusion: (1) what conduct is actionable, and (2) when employers will be
held liable for the conduct of their employees.
To determine whether particular conduct is actionable, a court must
consider whether under all the circumstances the conduct is "so severe
or pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employ-
ees because of their.., gender."'" This variable scale, however, pro-
vides employers with little firm guidance as to what constitutes
actionable hostile environment harassment.32
Further, defining when employers will be liable for actionable con-
duct has been a source of confusion since the Supreme Court an-
nounced in Meritor that when determining liability courts should be
guided by general agency principles, while recognizing that it might be
necessary to modify the principles' application to this context.3 3 This
confusion persisted until the 1997-1998 Term, when the Supreme
Court specifically addressed the issue in the cases of Burlington Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 4 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.35 While it is
perhaps too early to discern whether the rules laid down in these cases
will fully quell the confusion in this area, this much is clear: employer
response to harassment is a critical part of avoiding liability.3
Thus, in evaluating the first side of the paradox-attempting to
eliminate hostile environment sexual harassment-a two-step analysis
30. This was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1986, in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). As noted earlier, hostile environment sexual
harassment is also prohibited by a number of other statutes, notably Title IX. See
supra note 12. Although there are some differences, actions brought under these stat-
utes generally follow Title VII standards in determining whether sexual harassment
occurred. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997-98 (1998);
Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996); Lipsett v. Univer-
sity of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988). These differences, however, do not
eliminate the employer's paradox as discussed herein.
31. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
32. In his concurring opinion in Harris, Justice Scalia noted:
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing)
does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all
increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reason-
able person['s]" notion of what the vague word means. Today's opinion does
list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness.... but since it neither
says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any
single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude.
510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. The Court noted, "such common-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
34. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
35. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
36. Both cases adopted a standard of vicarious liability for harassment committed
by supervisors while creating an affirmative defense for employers, available under
certain circumstances, that relies in part on a demonstration that the employer acted
promptly and appropriately to end the harassment. See infra Part III.B.2.
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is needed. First, does the conduct at the workplace create a legally
cognizable hostile environment due to sexual harassment? Second, is
the employer liable for such harassment? Unfortunately, for the em-
ployer, victim, and alleged harasser, these are not simple questions to
answer.
B. Recognizing Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment did
not exist until the EEOC issued its Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex ("Guidelines") 37 in 1980 in which it defined sexual har-
assment to include hostile environment under Title VII. The
Guidelines state in part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of
Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or cre-
ating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.38
Subsection 3 of the Guidelines went beyond what courts had previ-
ously held illegal by recognizing that the creation of a sexually hostile
environment was also violative of Title VII. Courts were quick to fol-
low, however, as the first court of appeals case to recognize a hostile
environment based on sexual harassment was decided in 1981. 39
In its 1986 landmark Meritor decision, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the illegality of hostile environment sexual harassment.40 The
Court further clarified the evidence needed to establish a hostile envi-
ronment violation, holding that the harassment "must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997). The EEOC is the agency charged with interpreting
and enforcing Title VII. While not binding, the courts routinely look to the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII for guidance. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
39. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981). While Bundy was
the first circuit court case to recognize a sexually based hostile environment, the no-
tion that a hostile environment violates Title VII had previously been recognized in
the area of national origin and race. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th
Cir. 1971) (stating that a working environment fraught with discrimination may be an
unlawful practice). Other circuits soon followed the Bundy decision. See Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(11th Cir. 1982).
40. 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986).
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ment and create an abusive working environment.' 41  Despite the
clarification provided by the Court, however, lower courts have devel-
oped vastly conflicting standards for determining what constitutes
hostile environment sexual harassment, making it difficult-even for
an employer diligently trying to comply-to know when it will be sub-
jected to liability.
The most commonly accepted statement of the elements of a hostile
environment claim was set out by the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v.
City of Dundee.4' Those elements are: (1) the employee belongs to a
protected class; (2) the employee was subject to harassment, that is,
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment, that is, the conduct was sufficiently severe or per-
vasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for employer liability.4 3
The first four elements pertain to part one of the employer's two-step
analysis: establishing the existence of a hostile environment. Yet, lit-
tle is clear in this area because there are areas of conflict regarding
each of the elements.
41. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). The nature of this showing was
again addressed by the Court in its 1993 decision Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
although this was done in broad and malleable terms. 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). As a
result, employers have few bright lines when evaluating whether a particular situation
will constitute actionable hostile environment harassment. The Court in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998), further muddied the waters,
and the lower courts must now grapple with the question of when threats and/or sub-
mission will constitute a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile environment.
In Burlington, the plaintiff sued her employer under a quid-pro-quo theory based,
among other things, on unrealized threats of an adverse employment action. See id. at
2263. The Court, however, held this type of threatening conduct constituted only a
hostile environment claim and not a Title VII claim, requiring a showing that the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. See id. at 2265. The Court did not dis-
cuss whether the analysis for hostile environment based on threats would be any dif-
ferent than that for other types of offensive conduct, but rather relied on the lower
court's finding that the action at issue was sufficiently severe or pervasive. See id. The
Burlington Court specifically expressed no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled
threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment. See id For reasons discussed in part II.B.4, I submit that a sufficiently severe
hostile environment is created whenever sexual demand is coupled with a threat of
adverse employment action, regardless of whether the victim rejects it or accedes to it.
42. 682 F.2d at 903. Most circuits use the Henson formulation or some variation of
it. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (following
Henson); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); Jones v. Flagship
Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
43. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.
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1. Protected Class/Based on Sex
At first blush, the first and third elements-that the employee be-
long to a protected class and that the harassment be based on sex-
would appear to be non-controversial. These elements are related in
that membership in the class and the basis for the harassment must
coincide for harassment to be actionable. For example, a woman is a
member of a protected class because of her gender (female) and she is
harassed on that same basis-gender (female)." Where heterosexual
conduct was involved, courts had little difficultly in holding that sexual
words or conduct was based on sex.4 5
Problems arose and the circuits split, however, when the alleged ac-
tions occurred among members of the same gender.46 In Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 47 the Supreme Court addressed
this issue of same-sex sexual harassment, and it held that such harass-
ment was indeed actionable.48 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that
sexual harassment must be based on sex and not merely words or con-
duct sexual in nature.49
The Court left unresolved, however, the issue of what role, if any,
sexual orientation of the victim plays in this analysis. While the Court
recognized that an inference of discrimination could be made on a
sexual attraction theory if "there were credible evidence that the har-
asser was homosexual,"5 it did not address the issue of the victim's
sexual orientation, even though there was some evidence that Oncale
was being harassed because he was perceived as being homosexual. 5 '
Since discrimination based on sexual orientation is not a violation of
Title VII,52 and presumably harassment on this basis is similarly not
44. In fact, all individuals have protected group status in several respects: all indi-
viduals have a race, a gender, a national origin, and a religion. Proof of discrimina-
tion, however, necessarily requires a nexus between the particular group membership
and the act of discrimination: the discrimination must be based on the group mem-
bership. Thus, for example, a person may claim protected group membership based
on race, and allege that she was discriminated against because of her race. She may
not, however, claim protected class status based on religion, but then allege race-
based discrimination.
45. See, e.g., Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that the requirement that the discrimination be "because of gender" has not
affected courts in cases of opposite-sex harassment since it is generally accepted that
when a female employee is harassed in explicitly sexual ways by a male worker she
has been discriminated against "because of" her sex), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
46. Compare Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding same-
sex harassment actionable), with McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72
F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding same-sex heterosexual sexual harassment claims
not actionable).
47. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
48. See id. at 1002.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1001.
52. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that homosexuality is not a status protected under Title VII); DeSantis v.
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prohibited, it is unclear whether overt sexual conduct accompanied by
orientation-specific derogatory language would be actionable.5 3
The status of the law leaves an employer relying on a policy that
generally prohibits "sexual harassment" as defined by Title VII in the
precarious position of having to know the employees' sexual orienta-
tion to determine whether the policy is being violated.' Inquiries into
such private matters, however, clearly invade the privacy of the em-
ployees, and invite a collateral action alleging such invasion.5
2. Unwelcomeness
Even greater difficulties exist in determining whether the remaining
elements of a hostile environment claim are present. The simple
phrase "unwelcome sexual advances" is replete with problematic in-
terpretive issues. Indeed, the first word alone-unwelcome-causes
great controversy. 56 Yet, because of the nature of sexuality, it is a
necessary element. Clearly, not all sexual advances are unwelcome,
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (same). But see Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691 (1997) (arguing
that discrimination based on sexual orientation should be a violation of Title VII).
53. Thus, for example, in an all male environment, an individual singled out and
subjected to a campaign of sexually overt harassing conduct could compare his treat-
ment to that of females to establish that the conduct is "based on sex." Nor could he
rely on the sexual nature of the conduct to establish this element, particularly if the
conduct is accompanied by epithets or banter relating to sexual orientation.
Moreover, since Oncale required a showing of difference in treatment based on
gender, further complications arise in cases where the harasser is bisexual. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit long ago recognized these difficulties in Barnes v. Costle,
when it suggested in dicta that harassment by a bisexual would never be actionable.
561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In the case of the bisexual superior, the
insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it
would apply to male and female employees alike."). More recently, the District
Court for the District of Columbia, in Ryczek v. Guest Services, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754
(D.D.C. 1995), commented on the "practical flaw in this Circuit's interpretation of
Title VII": "any defendant could avoid Title VII liability for sexual harassment by
claiming to be a bisexual or by harassing members of both sexes." Id. at 762. Again,
however, it is not clear how this outcome would be affected by Oncale, since it specifi-
cally endorses comparative treatment as proof that the harassment was based on sex
and questions reliance on the mere sexual nature of the words or conduct.
54. The lack of clarity is particularly problematic when the employer's policy sim-
ply bans "sexual harassment" or tracks the language in the EEOC guidelines and
employees have direct appeal rights tied to a requirement of just cause. Because
under just cause the employer bears the burden of proving an actual violation, not just
its good faith belief that there was a violation, see infra Part IV.B., the vagueness of
the law clearly plunges the employer into a quagmire.
55. Of course, employers in states or municipalities which include sexual orienta-
tion as a basis for a charge of discrimination would include such acts in its policy; also
some employers may chose to include this type of harassment on their own, regardless
of federal or state law simply to avoid the privacy issues involved.
56. The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in determining this factor when it
first considered hostile environment sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (noting that the determination of whether the conduct
was unwelcome did not turn on simple voluntariness, but rather presented "difficult
problems of proof").
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and romance in the workplace abounds.5 7 The individual's attitude
towards a sexual advance can range from invited, to uninvited but
welcome, to undesirable but tolerated, to unwelcome.
58
The Supreme Court discussed the concept of unwelcomeness in
Meritor.59 In upholding the appellate court's reversal of the district
court, the Supreme Court held that focusing on "voluntariness" was
improper: "[tihe fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the
sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her
will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title
VII."6 The Court framed the correct inquiry as being whether the
victim "by her conduct indicated" that the sexual advances were un-
welcome, and noted that one relevant consideration was the victim's
"sexually provocative speech or dress."61
The use of the victim's conduct to infer welcomeness is problematic,
however, particularly where the claim does not involve touching, but
rather is based primarily on abusive and offensive language and con-
57. In discussing the complex nature of sexual harassment and its connection to
voluntary romantic relationships, one court commented:
On the one hand, courts are understandably reluctant to chill the incidence
of legitimate romance. People who work closely together and share com-
mon interests often find that sexual attraction ensues. It is not surprising
that those feelings arise even when one of the persons is a superior and the
other is a subordinate.... We spend longer hours at the office or traveling
for job-related purposes, and often discover that our interest and values are
closer to those of our colleagues or fellow employees than to those of people
we meet in connection with other activities. In short, increased proximity
breeds increased volitional sexual activity.
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, according to a survey
published in Psychology Today, 80% of employees have participated in or know of an
office romance. Mary Loftus, Frisky Business, Psychol. Today, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 34,
36.
58. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 999 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The court in Lipsett
v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), was aware of this problem
and noted, "[t]he man must be sensitive to signals from the woman that his comments
are unwelcome, and the woman, conversely, must take responsibility for making those
signals clear." Id. at 898; see also Eleanore K. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An
Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17
N.M. L. Rev. 91, 98-101 (1987) (noting the disparity between men's and women's
perceptions of what constitutes sexual conduct); cf Robin D. Wiener, Note, Shifting
the Communication Burden: A Meaningfid Consent Standard in Rape, 6 Harv. Wo-
men's L.J. 143, 147-49 (1983) (describing the "gender gap in sexual
communications").
59. 477 U.S. at 68-69. The victim alleged that she capitulated to the sexual de-
mands of her supervisor for fear of losing her job. See id. at 60-61. The existence of
the relationship was hotly contested. See id. at 61. Rather than make a determination
as to its existence, however, the district court found that "[i]f [Vinson] and Taylor did
engage in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of [Vinson's] employment
[at the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one by plaintiff having nothing to do
with her continued employment [at the bank] or her advancement or promotions at
that institution." Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C.
1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
60. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
61. Id. at 68-69.
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duct. When the victim is a stereotypically demure woman, who "acts
like a lady," recognition that workplace vulgarities are "unwelcome"
is likely to occur.62 In contrast, a plaintiff who uses sexually oriented
profanity, tells or laughs at sexually oriented jokes, and participates in
general undirected sexual banter is sometimes viewed as having
opened the door to more severe abusive conduct specifically directed
at her.63
62. On the other hand, it may lead the woman to be seen as an outsider who does
not belong. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1515 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (accounting numerous incidents of sexual harassment against a female ship-
fitter and how when she complained to her supervisor his response was that the ship-
yard was a "man's world").
63. For example, in Weinsheimner v. Rockwell International Corp., 754 F. Supp.
1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff (\Vein-
sheimer), a foul-mouthed and aggressive woman, had continuous problems with a
male co-worker whose work she inspected. Among other things, he told her several
times a week to "suck him" and to "give him head." Id. at 1561. He also flashed a
knife he used in his job, and, according to Weinsheimer, once held the knife to her
throat. See id- The court found that the co-worker's language and behavior was
"based not upon sex, but rather upon work or personal disputes." Id. at 1565 n.15.
The plaintiff's many complaints were largely ignored by a supervisor who did not
believe her complaints were serious, in part because of her general demeanor. See id.
at 1564. Astoundingly, the court, instead of viewing Weinsheimer's complaints as evi-
dence that the conduct was unwelcome, viewed the fact that the supervisor did not
take her seriously as evidence that her complaints were not serious. See id. Having
discounted Weinsheimer's complaints, the court then used her participation in shop
banter and boisterous, expletive-filled telephone conversations with her boyfriend as
a basis for finding that she had not sustained her burden of proving that the conduct
was unwelcome. See i& at 1565-67.
A contrary result was reached in Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, General
Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994), where the plaintiff, the first and only
woman tinsmith, regularly used sexual terms and expletives and was receptive to sex-
ually oriented jokes and banter. The plaintiff's male co-workers made numerous
statements, such as, "I won't work with any cunt," id. at 1009, and continually referred
to her as a "'whore,' 'cunt' and 'split tail."' Id. Further, they defaced her toolbox with
sexually oriented graffiti and painted it pink. See id. The Seventh Circuit held that the
males' specifically targeted language and actions crossed the line that separates
"merely vulgar and mildly offensive" shop talk from that which is "deeply offensive
and sexually harassing." Id. at 1010. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that
had the plaintiff been "ladylike," the hostile environment would not have occurred,
finding it difficult to imagine a situation "in which male factory workers sexually har-
ass a lone woman in self-defense" of the woman's use of expletives. Id. at 1011 (em-
phasis omitted). Other courts have also not been so harsh to hard-edged plaintiffs. In
Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987), for example, the plaintiff was
described as "a foul-mouthed individual who often talked about sex." Id. at 557.
Notwithstanding this characterization, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's
holding that a co-worker's use of foul language and singing of lewd limericks was "not
unvelcome." Id. The court noted that Swentek told the co-worker to leave her alone,
and reasoned that the use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting
"does not waive 'her legal protections against unwelcome harassment."' Id. (quoting
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,254 (4th Cir. 1983)). Critical to its holding, however, was a
finding that the alleged harasser did not know of the plaintiff's prior conduct, see id.,
leaving open the possibility that she might not have been able to prove unwelcome-
ness had the same conduct been carried out by a different person.
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Thus, employers relying on Title VII for clarification of the term
"unwelcome" are once again left with confusing and contradictory
standards, in large part because the analysis depends on the victim's
character and background. The "welcomeness" issue would be easier
if all women employees were in fact stereotypically demure and com-
plained immediately. There are women, however, who use profanity
as expletives and enjoy sexual banter and jokes.64 In such cases,
courts have had wide-ranging findings: one found the woman to have
welcomed the conduct; one found the woman not to have welcomed
it; and a third found that its decision apparently depended upon
whether the accused harasser knew of the victim's background.65
Thus, this element can also cause employers great difficulty, particu-
larly if the harassment takes place over a long period of time, is easily
observable, and is never the subject of a complaint.66
3. Conduct of a Sexual Nature
While the phrase "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" appears clear,
complications arise in determining just what type of conduct is cov-
ered by this phrase. One might think that a determination of whether
the conduct at issue is "sexual" is required. It has long been clear,
however, that the use of the term "sexual" is somewhat of a misno-
mer: courts have found that conduct which is not at all sexual in na-
ture can create a hostile environment, particularly when it is mixed
with either sexual or sexist conduct or speech.67 The category of non-
sexual conduct that constitutes actionable harassment-sometimes
64. See, e.g., supra note 63 (discussing several cases in which the women plaintiffs
often acted in "unladylike" ways).
65. See supra note 63 (discussing these cases).
66. Since an employer can be found liable based on conduct about which it
"should have known," see infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text, this situation is
troublesome if the employer's agent fails to perceive the conduct as sexual harass-
ment. In Carr, for example, the plaintiff's supervisor testified that he observed some
of the offensive conduct, but "not being a woman himself he was not sure that the
statements would be considered offensive by a woman." Carr, 32 F.3d at 1010.
67. Thus, when coupled with blatantly sexual conduct or words, courts have found
that acts as diverse as using non-sexual physical force, see McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d
1129, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1985), urinating in the gasoline tank of a female co-worker's car,
see Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988), failing to repair a
woman's equipment, see id., and forcing a woman to sit on a wet seat, see Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1409 (10th Cir. 1987), are appropriately considered
when evaluating whether "sexual" harassment has caused a hostile environment.
I use the term "sexist" speech, as opposed to "sexual" speech, to refer to comments
that denigrate women based on stereotypes about women that are not sexual in na-
ture. For instance, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988),
statements by male residents that women would not make good surgeons because
they spent too much time putting on makeup could be said to be sexist, not sexual,
speech. See generally Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-8 (1990) (discussing several categories of sexist speech).
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still referred to as sexual harassment, but more accurately labeled gen-
der harassment-continues to expand.'
The danger for employers, however, is that supervisors and poten-
tial harassers will fail to recognize non-sexual conduct as being within
the realm of sexual harassment.69 Individuals who engage in such
conduct and are then disciplined for "sexual harassment" may file a
grievance, claiming a lack of fair dealing based on incomplete notice
of what type of conduct is prohibited.
4. Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive
Perhaps the most difficult element in determining whether a hostile
environment constitutes actionable sexual harassment is the require-
ment that the harassment be objectively "sufficiently severe or perva-
sive 'to alter the conditions of... employment and create an abusive
working environment,""'7 and in fact have subjectively done so to the
victim. 71 The objective standard raises the question of perspective-
68. For example, in Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit
reversed an order of summary judgment against a sexual harassment claim based on
false rumors that the plaintiff was having an affair with her supervisor. See id. at 451-
52. The rumors allegedly started because the supervisor spent time alone with the
employee, constantly pressuring her to loan him money. See id. at 442. The court
reasoned that because a male who spent an inordinate amount of private time with a
supervisor would not be viewed by co-workers as using his sexuality to get ahead, the
resulting hostile environment-which included being shunned by her co-workers and
receiving a low rating for ability to get along with co-workers-was based on sex. See
i&. at 448.
In Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale LJ. 1683 (1998), Professor Vicki
Schultz argues that this area should be expanded even further, so that the aggregate
environmental effects of all types discrimination traditionally analyzed as disparate
treatment be simultaneously considered under a hostile environment paradigm. See
id at 1769-74. Accordingly, one's subjection to non-sexual discriminatory conduct
could be the basis of a hostile environment claim in addition to whatever traditional
claim is warranted. I agree that all such harassing conduct should be considered-
alone or in tandem with evidence of sexual misconduct-when determining whether a
work environment is hostile. As noted above, a few courts have acted on that basis.
However, to avoid confusion, such harassment should be considered "gender-based"
harassment actionable to the same extent that similar types of harassment would be
actionable if committed on some other prohibited basis, such as race or ethnicity. To
characterize such conduct as "sexual" is misleading, since most use of the term "sex-
ual" are referring in some way to things related to sexuality, as opposed to gender. To
the extent that such conduct would be actionable, it should be clearly delineated in
the employer's anti-harassment policy.
69. Indeed, requiring that the conduct be "because of sex" and "of a sexual na-
ture" disjunctive, as opposed to conjunctive, not only would result in less ambiguity to
a lay person reading the regulation (or the anti-harassment policy parroting the regu-
lation), but also would resolve many of the issues surrounding same-sex harassment.
Under such a policy, unwelcome conduct that was either (1) of a sexual nature or (2)
based on sex would be prohibited if that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter working conditions and create a hostile environment.
70. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57. 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
71. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc, the Court upheld the requirement that the
conduct be measured both objectively and subjectively, stating:
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from whose perspective is the conduct evaluated. 72 Even if that mat-
ter is resolved, however, the conduct must still be evaluated in light of
the "totality of circumstances"-under which several additional, non-
dispositive factors are considered.73 The additional requirement that
the victim have been subjectively offended by the conduct may put the
employer in the difficult position of having to read the mind of the
victim. As with unwelcomeness,74 the employer's evaluation of this
factor may be based on unfair stereotypes about women.
Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify some of
these issues in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,7 it did not do SO. 7 6 The
Sixth Circuit had required proof that the harassing conduct caused
severe psychological harm to the victim in order to be actionable, and
the court had concluded that Harris, in a close case, had failed to meet
this standard.77 Specifically rejecting that approach, the Supreme
Court has instead approved a "middle path,' 78 defining the threshold
for actionable conduct as falling somewhere between that which is
"merely offensive" and that which causes "tangible psychological in-
jury."79 It further stated that this determination was to be made by
evaluating all the circumstances, including: "the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unrea-
sonably interferes with an employee's work performance."8
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hos-
tile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if
the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment,
and there is no Title VII violation.
510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
72. Reasonable-person, reasonable-victim, and reasonable-woman are all stan-
dards that have been endorsed by various courts. See infra notes 89-90 and accompa-
nying text.
73. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
74. See supra Part II.B.2.
75. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
76. In Harris, the victim, Teresa Harris, was subjected to various sexist comments
by Charles Hardy, her boss and the president of the company. Among the statements
made publicly to Harris were, "You're a woman, what do you know," and "We need a
man as the rental manager." Id. at 19. Further, Hardy suggested to Harris that the
two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris's] raise," and asked Harris if
she had promised a client sex. Id. Finally, Hardy required Harris and other women to
pick up objects he purposefully threw on the floor in front of his desk, and to pick
coins out of his front pockets. Id.
77. See id. at 21-30.
78. Id. at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 23. Notwithstanding these guidelines, it remains difficult to determine
whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.
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When evaluating these various factors, the interrelation between
them must also be considered."' Of particular import is the interrela-
tionship between the severity and pervasiveness (frequency) of the
conduct. Courts have held that the importance of these factors varies
inversely: the more severe (serious) the conduct, the less pervasive
(frequent) it need be to constitute a violation.' Thus, a single suffi-
ciently severe incident may create a hostile environment.Y' Con-
versely, less serious conduct may become actionable if it occurs
frequently enough.' In a sense, less serious but very frequent con-
duct is more problematic, because the employer may fail to recognize
the possibility that seemingly insignificant conduct may be catapulted
into the realm of hostile environment based on its frequency.
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court's "middle path" is akin to a
multi-laned super highway. The extreme boundaries are defined: on
one side, "merely" offensive conduct is not actionable; on the other
side, psychologically debilitating conduct is actionable. What is suffi-
cient between those two points, however, is anybody's guess. Justice
Scalia recognized this ambiguity and commented in his concurring
opinion in Harris: "As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually
unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or
permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award
of damages."8 5
Harris did not resolve from whose perspective the court is to objec-
tively evaluate the conduct.86 The circuits remain fractured on that
81. Viewing all of the circumstances, as directed by the Supreme Court in Harris,
id at 23, necessarily implies viewing the various factors in tandem with one another.
82. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Although a single act can be enough, generally, repeated incidents create a stronger
claim of hostile environment ...." (citation omitted)).
84. While finding the particular conduct at issue not actionable, the court in
Schweitzer-Reschke v. Avnet, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Kan. 1995), noted that less
severe conduct may become actionable if it is so frequent and pervasive that it affects
the employee's environment. See id. at 1193.
85. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). The
tremendous discretion given to the jury was also recognized in Baskerville v. Cdligan
International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995), where the court noted that the "'line
that separates the merely vulgar and mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and
sexually harassing." is "obviously" not bright and that where uncertainty exists, thejury must decide. Id. at 431 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007,
1010 (7th Cir. 1994)).
86. The Court in Harris used the phrase "reasonable person," Harris, 510 U.S. at
22, without comment or analysis. Subsequent lower court cases have continued to
follow the precedent in their circuit or have decided the issue for themselves if no
such precedent exists. See, eg., Currie v. Kowalewski, 842 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D.N.Y.)
(noting that Harris did not decide whether a reasonable person or reasonable woman
standard would apply), affd, 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, Oncale did not
specifically address the question of perspective, but the Court again referred to the
reasonable person "in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.'"
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (quoting Har-
ris, 510 U.S. at 23).
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important issue.8 7 In fact, the range of the perspectives which have
been accepted by the various circuits is quite dramatic: at one end,
the actions have been judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person living in a society where "sexual jokes, sexual conversations
and girlie magazines ... abound";88 at the other end, the conduct is
judged from the perspective of a reasonable woman, which may make
"[w]ell-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors" 89 ac-
tionable conduct if a reasonable woman would consider the comments
sufficiently severe or pervasive. 90
These variations in standards have led to tremendous discrepancies
in the type of conduct found to sufficiently satisfy the objective prong
of the "severe and pervasive" requirement. Clearly, repeated blatant
sexual touching will be sufficient, and infrequent innocuous words will
be insufficient. Aside from that, little can be said. Even blatant sex-
ual touching,91 which one would think would always create a hostile
environment, has been treated inconsistently and is not automatically
deemed sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment. 2 Middle
87. See Leslye M. Fraser, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Conflicts Employ-
ers May Face Between Title VII's Reasonable Woman Standard and Arbitration Princi-
ples, 20 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1, 6-11 (1992-93) (explaining how the
reasonable-woman standard may make it easier for women to sucessfully bring hostile
environment claims).
88. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986). The
Sixth Circuit quickly backed away from that extreme standard the following year in
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). In support of its decision to use a
reasonable-woman standard in determining whether a victim of sexual harassment
was constructively discharged, the court cited Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue and
acknowledged "that men and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by
different behavior." Id. at 637 n.2. Other courts, however, continue to use the reason-
able person standard. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th
Cir. 1989) (considering the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reasonable
person's ability to perform her or his work).
89. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
90. While widely denoted a "reasonable-woman" standard, the standard actually
looks at the reasonable person of the victim's sex. The Ellison court noted that
"where male employees allege that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a
hostile environment, the appropriate victim's perspective would be that of a reason-
able man." 924 F.2d at 879 n.11; see also Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 n.2 (noting that a
reasonable-man standard would apply to case involving harassment of a male). The
paradox of a reasonable "victim" standard, however, is that it creates the danger of
reinforcing stereotypes. Does it mean that a man would lose if he is subjectively of-
fended by on-the-job conduct that would offend a (stereotypically) reasonable wo-
man, but not a (stereotypically) reasonable man? It would seem more logical to have
a unified objective threshold standard based on a reasonable woman's perspective.
Since subjective offense is also an element, employers would still be protected against
frivolous suits, and both men and women could be assured of working in an environ-
ment that is not sexually hostile.
91. By blatant sexual touching, I mean unwelcome, intentional touching of an-
other person's crotch, upper-inner thigh, buttocks, or breasts. I use the term quasi-
sexual touching to refer to touching of another person's knees, and other touching
which is sustained and involves movement (such as massages and rotating hips).
92. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1986), occa-
sional slapping on the buttocks by a co-worker was found insufficient. Similarly, in
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ground cases have fallen on both sides of the line, and management
officials simply cannot predict whether any particular conduct is ac-
tionable harassment or is not actionable because it is "merely offen-
sive" or only "infrequently" hostile.93
Finally, in addition to being sufficiently severe or pervasive from an
objective viewpoint, the harassing conduct must also be subjectively
offensive and abusive-that is, it must have actually offended the vic-
tim. Analysis of this issue frequently involves problems similar to
Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 668 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), several
instances of sexual touching, pestering, and asking for dates was deemed too infre-
quent to be cognizable sexual harassment. See id. at 298-300. Consider the facts of
Hosey v. McDonald's Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 201 (D. Md. 1996), affd,
113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997), in which a teenage male promptly complained when a
female co-worker propositioned him numerous times and pinched or patted him on
the buttocks on approximately ten occasions. See id. at 202. In granting the defendant
summary judgment, the court noted that it was common for teenagers to ask each
other for dates and to use unprofessional language. See id. at 203. The court further
found that the pinching in and of itself was not sufficiently severe to create a hostile
environment, and that the few times such action occurred was not sufficiently perva-
sive. See id Yet the court in Campbell v. Kansas State University, 780 F. Supp. 755 (D.
Kan. 1991), found that slapping the plaintiff on her buttocks and threatening to repeat
that conduct was cognizable, stating that such "patently abusive and offensive" behav-
ior was sufficient even though it occurred only infrequently and for a short period. Id.
at 762.
93. For examples of legally insufficient conduct, see Dellert v. Total Vision, Inc.,
875 F. Supp. 506, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (ruling on a case in which the female employee
of an eyeglass store was told by superior that the glasses would look better if she did
not have a skirt on and that he would have to "jump her" if she ever posed in a
manner depicted in their advertising), and Sdiweitzer-Reschke v. Avnet, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 1187, 1190 (D. Kan. 1995) (ruling on a case in which a female employee was
told to suck-up, kiss-ass, wear shorter skirts, bat eyes, and flirt to get special pricing).
But see Gulden v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1171, 1178-79 (E.D. Va.
1991) (finding that a female employee-who was asked whether she was "going hook-
ing," and told by a co-worker that she was wearing a padded bra and that he wanted
her body-had established sufficiently actionable conduct, even in the absence of any
physical contact).
It is difficult, however, to discern the circumstances under which a single threat
would not constitute action severe enough to constitute an actionable hostile environ-
ment. When a threat is made by a supervisor who has the authority to carry it out, the
victim may react two different ways: she may refuse the demand, or she may, if des-
perate to maintain employment, accede to the demand. If she refuses the demand,
she has no way of knowing whether the threat will be fulfilled; she cannot see into her
harasser's mind to know the threat was empty. Consequently, while the single threat
itself may seem to be an isolated incident, the poisonous environment it creates may
continue for some undefined time until the victim can regain confidence that it will
not be carried out. Moreover, during this time, her work may suffer or she may feel
that legitimate criticism of her work is execution of the threat. In short, while the
threat may take only a moment, the effect of even a single threat is likely to be long-
lasting.
On the other hand, the victim may accede to the threat. Obviously, even a single
unwanted, coerced sexual encounter can have long lasting effects on the victim.
Moreover, as with the unfulfilled threat, the victim will not know if and when another
demand will be forthcoming, so that a single act can poison the victim's work atmos-
phere for a period of time.
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those surrounding the analysis of unwelcomeness:94 if the victim is a
stereotypical woman-a demure, soft-spoken individual-subjective
offense is easily found. Subjective offensiveness, however, becomes
substantially more difficult to establish when the victim does not fit
that stereotype. Unfortunately, the incidence of harassment is highest
in blue collar occupations previously dominated by males. Yet it is in
these fields that a woman is less likely to register a complaint and
more likely to tolerate offensive conduct, or even participate in it, in
an effort to "fit in."95 This "go along to get along" plaintiff will often
find her previous tolerance and efforts to fit in used against her.96
Considering the wide disparity in the courts' treatment of each and
every element of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, em-
ployers may have difficulty in determining whether conduct amount-
ing to legal hostile environment "sexual harassment" has occurred
even in the most obvious and blatant cases. Thus, the use of the term
"sexual harassment," even with reference to the EEOC guidelines, is
quite simply inadequate to put employers and supervisors on notice as
to when they must act. This difficulty for employers in properly han-
dling situations of sexual harassment is further exacerbated by the un-
certain standards of employer liability for sexual harassment.
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY
The second step in determining whether an employer faces the par-
adox which begins the descent into the labyrinth is evaluating em-
ployer liability.97 After all, it is the probability of liability that
prompts the employer, at least in part, to take disciplinary action that
the alleged harasser may later challenge. Moreover, the determina-
tion of what kind of action the employer takes depends upon the em-
ployer's view of liability: if the employer believes that it will not be
held liable for the hostile harassment, it may opt to take less drastic
steps against the alleged harasser in order to avoid an angry man chal-
lenge.98 On the other hand, if the employer is sure that the conduct
constitutes harassment (not necessarily an easy determination), the
probability of liability-which could potentially lead to a multi-million
dollar verdict 99-shifts the balance and could lead to more drastic ac-
94. See supra Part II.B.2.
95. See Laura A. Reese & Karen E. Lindenberg, Implementing Sexual Harass-
ment Policy 64 (1999).
96. See supra note 63.
97. Employer liability is also the fifth element of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. For example, the EEOC procured a $34 million dollar settlement fund to be
shared by 350 women in settling its claims of sexual harassment against Mitsubishi
Motors. See Sexual Harassment: Mitsubishi Settles EEOC Suit for $34 Million, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), June 12, 1998, at AA-1. Further, a six-year legal battle or a single
allegation of sexual harassment cost the law firm Baker and McKenzie $6 million in
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tion against the alleged harasser. With the Supreme Court's creation,
in Burlington and Faragher, of an affirmative defense for employers
for harassment by supervisors against employees-a defense based, in
part, on whether the employer promptly took corrective action to
eliminate the hostile environment-the pressure has increased to take
more drastic action."
A. Standards for Imposing Liability
In the twelve years between the Court's brief pronouncement in
Meritor that liability for sexual harassment should be guided generally
by agency principles,' 0 ' and the 1998 Burlington and Faragher deci-
sions, there has been much confusion over when an employer would
be liable for sexual harassment. 0 2 It is now clear, however, that how
an employer acts in preventing and remedying sexual harassment is
critical to whether it will be held liable.
In Meritor,10 3 the Court gave general approval to the concept of
looking to general agency principles for guidance in assessing liability
damages, fees, and costs. See Sexual Harassment: Law Finn Pays $6 Million in
Awards, Fees, Costs for Sexual Harassment by Ex-Partner, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),
Sept. 14, 1998, at A-8.
100. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
101. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
102. See Frederick J. Lewis and Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for
"Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search
for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 667 (1995); David Benjamin Oppen-
heimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liabili, of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Conunitted by Their Supervisors, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 66 (1995).
103. In Meritor, the plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, alleged that she submitted to de-
mands for sexual favors by her supervisor, a bank branch manager, and thus engaged
in intercourse with him throughout her successful four-year career at Meritor Savings
Bank. 477 U.S. at 59-60. After recognizing both quid-pro-quo and hostile environ-
ment harassment as violations of Title VII, the Court noted that Vinson's claim was
one of hostile environment. See id. at 67. The Court declined to issue a definitive rule
regarding employer liability in sexual harassment cases. See id. at 72. The lower
courts in Meritor had taken opposing views of employer liability. The district court
opined that the employer would not be liable-even if the conduct at issue was har-
assment-because as Vinson had never complained about Taylor to anyone, the bank
was without notice. See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 41
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Further, the district court found
that Taylor's supervisory status was insufficient to serve as a basis for imputing knowl-
edge to the employer. See i. at 41-42. The court reasoned that the evidence showed
only that the alleged harasser made recommendations on personnel decisions, and
that it did not clarify what level of responsibility and relationship to management
Taylor's title of Assistant Vice President accorded him. See id. at 42. Therefore, Vin-
son had not established that notice to the alleged harasser should amount to notice to
the bank, particularly in the "unusual case[ ] of sexual harassment." Id.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that an employer is strictly liable for sexual
harassment perpetrated or created by its supervisors, including hostile environment
harassment. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court
relied on the language in Title VII defining an employer as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." Id. at 148 (quoting
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in hostile environment sexual harassment claims. 10 4 Specifically, the
Court rejected: the court of appeals' imposition of strict liability for
the conduct of supervisors; °5 the district court's suggestion that lack
of notice would insulate an employer;10 6 and the proposed rule that an
employer be protected from liability if the alleged victim of the har-
assment failed to utilize an existing grievance procedure.1 0 7 Further,
the Court declined to definitively decide the scope of the employer's
liability, 08 although it did "agree with the EEOC that Congress
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area."
10 9
Following Meritor, the lower courts, in formulating their positions
on liability, subsequently looked to the Restatement of Agency,110
specifically to section 219, which provides:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants com-
mitted while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the prin-
cipal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation."'
l
In applying these principles, lower courts quickly reached a consensus
on employer liability for sexual harassment in at least two situations:
for quid-pro-quo harassment committed by supervisors, regardless of
the employer's knowledge,"' and for hostile environment harassment
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1982)). Further, reasoned the court of appeals, the supervisor
need only have a "significant degree of influence in vital job decisions," not actual
authority with regard to those decisions, in order to be considered an agent capable of
imposing liability on the employer. Id. at 150.
104. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
105. See id. ("[W]e hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employ-
ers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.").
106. See id. ("[Aibsence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability.").
107. See id. ("[W]e reject petitioner's view that the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent's failure to
invoke that procedure, must insulate petitioner from liability.").
108. See id. (stating that the factual record was not sufficient to make a ruling re-
garding employer liability).
109. Id.
110. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958).
111. Id.
112. Prior to Meritor, courts considering the question of employer liability consist-
ently found liability for quid-pro-quo harassment. See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755
F.2d 599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d
Cir. 1983). Post-Meritor cases continued to do so. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d
503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a request for performance of sexual favors with a
1540 [Vol. 67
1999] MANEUVERING THROUGH THE LABYRINTH 1541
perpetrated by non-supervisory co-workers when the employer knew
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take
prompt, corrective action." 3
This standard for hostile environment claims flows in a rather
straightforward manner from section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement of
Agency, which imposes liability when the master (employer) was neg-
ligent or reckless." 4 With co-worker hostile environment cases, there-
fore, the employer is not vicariously liable for its employees' conduct,
but rather is liable-if at all-only for its own misconduct in delaying
or failing to take corrective action once it knew or should have known
of the employees' misconduct."
5
discussion of job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid-pro-
quo sexual harassment); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569,579 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that in a quid-pro-quo sexual harassment case "the employer is
held strictly liable for its employee's unlawful acts"). For example, when a supervisor
discharges an employee who rebuffed sexual advances, the discharge itself is made
upon the authority delegated to the supervisor by the employer. Thus, the harassing
superior in quid-pro-quo cases "acts as and for the company, holding out the em-
ployer's benefits as an inducement to the employee for sexual favors." Carrero, 890
F.2d at 578. The gravamen of quid-pro-quo harassment, like that of other types of
employment discrimination, is that an employment decision was made on a discrimi-
natory basis. This essay, however, focuses primarily on hostile environment sexual
harassment. For an in-depth analysis of quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, see Eugene
Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid-Pro-Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J.L & Pub.
Pol'y 307 (1998).
113. Many courts used the term "respondeat superior" liability. See, e.g., Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the burden of
proof for the plaintiff is to "demonstrate respondeat superior liability"); Jones v. Flag-
ship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1986) (defining respondeat superior liability);
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that except in some circum-
stances a plaintiff must prove the "employer liable under some theory of respondeat
superior"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (defining
respondeat superior liability). However, the use of the phrase -respondeat superior"
is somewhat of a misnomer in this context. As explained in Guess t% Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990), under a true theory of respondeat superior, the
employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees regardless of
whether it had knowledge of the conduct. Id. at 465; see also Hirschfeld v. New Mex-
ico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that the -negli-
gence standard for employer liability occasionally has been mislabeled as 'respondeat
superior"'). However, the knowledge/correction standard is a rather straightforward
application of section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement of Agency, which imposes liability
when the master was negligent or reckless. With co-worker hostile environment
cases, therefore, the employer is not vicariously liable for its employees' conduct, but
rather is liable-if at all-only for its own misconduct in delaying or failing to take
corrective action once it knew or should have known of the employees' misconduct.
See Guess, 913 F.2d at 464-65. Even courts imposing "respondeat superior" liability
define the phrase in terms identical to or very similar to the standard cited in the
text-to cover cases where the employer knew or should have known of the miscon-
duct and failed to take appropriate corrective action. See Mackey v. Milam, 154 F.3d
648, 651 (6th Cir. 1998).
114. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b) (1958).
115. See Ronald Turner, litle VII and Hostile Environment Se-rual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. Det. Mercy L Rev. 817, 833
(1994).
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Lower courts, however, failed to agree on a single standard for em-
ployer liability for hostile environments created by supervisors,
although several loosely related standards emerged. Generally, all cir-
cuits, at least under some circumstances, applied the knowledge/cor-
rection standard described above for co-workers, or some variation of
that standard. The variations, however, were plentiful and
confusing.' 16
For example, the Fifth Circuit adopted the knowledge/correction
standard, even when the supervisor invoked his authority during the
course of the harassment. 1 7 The Sixth Circuit used a standard focus-
ing on (1) whether the harasser's actions were foreseeable or fell
within the scope of his employment, and (2) if they were, whether the
employer responded adequately and effectively to negate liability." 8
The scope of employment was determined by looking at when and
where the harassment took place and whether it was foreseeable."t 9
This was not, however, strict application of the Restatement in that
subsequent corrective action usually does not relieve the employer
from liability if the tort was committed "within the scope of employ-
ment"; in such cases, the employer is strictly liable under section
219(1).12 ° As such, the Tenth Circuit disregarded section 219(1) alto-
116. I do not purport to be providing an exhaustive review of the various standards
used by the 13 federal circuits. My examples are intended to illustrate the breadth of
the variation which existed among courts prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Faragher and Burlington. For a thorough review, including a circuit-by-circuit analy-
sis, see Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile
Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an
Appropriate Standard, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 667, 687-730 (1995).
117. See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1992)
(adopting the knowledge/correction standard as an element of a claim).
118. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir. 1992). Addi-
tionally, if the tortious act was foreseeable, the employer could be liable for its own
negligence in not taking steps to prevent it. To this extent, it seems that the existence
of a sexual harassment policy, along with diligent efforts to educate all employees as
to its content and to strictly enforce it, would be appropriate factors to consider in
determining negligence and foreseeability. Under tort law, however, the subsequent
conduct of the employer is irrelevant once the employee commits a foreseeable tort
while acting in the scope of employment. It is therefore surprising that the court in
Kauffman found that the harasser's conduct was within the scope of his employment,
but then excused the company from liability based on its subsequent corrective action.
Id. at 185. The court did not explain why the employer's corrective action negated
liability; one can only assume that it was making a less-than-complete use of agency
law based on the Supreme Court's admonishment in Meritor that agency law may not
be transferable in all aspects.
Ironically, the court in Kauffman used the existence of the sexual harassment policy
as evidence that sexual harassment was foreseeable, and thus within the scope of em-
ployment. Id. at 184. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the recent practice in
some jurisdictions to limit liability in cases where the employer has a well-executed
plan. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
119. See Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 183.
120. The Restatement of Agency plainly states that "A master is subject to liability
for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment."
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1958). Thus, once the Sixth Circuit in
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gether, on the theory that sexual harassment would never be within
the job description of any supervisor or worker in a reputable busi-
ness.121 Relying on section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement, however,
the Tenth Circuit held a company strictly liable for harassment by
high-level supervisors, even in the absence of notice. 1" The Second
Circuit also applied dual standards depending on the harassing super-
visor's rank in the employer's hierarchy and whether the supervisor
used his actual or apparent authority in furthering the harassment."z
Finally, a few circuit courts, such as the Third Circuit in Bouton v.
BMW of North America, Inc.,124 shielded the employer from liability
for a sexually hostile environment on the basis of the employer's con-
sistently enforced policy against sexual harassment.12- Considering
this vast array of approaches, it is not surprising that the en banc cir-
cuit court decisions in Burlington and Faragher generated fifteen sepa-
rate opinions. 26 It is against this backdrop of confusion that the
Supreme Court decided these cases.
In Burlington, the plaintiff, Ellerth, alleged that she was subjected
to threats of adverse job consequences by Ted Slowik, her second line
supervisor and the vice president of the division in which she
worked. 27 Ellerth claimed quid-pro-quo harassment, 12 under which
Kauffman found the acts were within the scope of employment, 970 F.2d at 184, it is
unclear how subsequent action could excuse the employer. The Supreme Court later
struggled with this very problem in Burlington, but it concluded that sexual harass-
ment would never be within the scope of employment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. El-
lerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2260 (1998).
121. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987).
122. See id. at 1418.
123. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding em-
ployees liable if they use their actual or apparent authority to further the harassment
or if they are aided in accomplishing harassment by the existence of the agency rela-
tionship); see also Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir.
1992) (recognizing that the actions of a supervisor at a sufficiently high level in the
hierarchy would necessarily be imputed to the company, yet refusing to do so in this
case where the home office was in one city and the harassment took place in another).
124. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).
125. See id. at 110. The reasoning is that in light of a well-publicized and consist-
ently applied anti-harassment policy, the victim's belief that the supervisor acted upon
delegated authority was unreasonable. See also Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1553 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no liability based on constructive
knowledge because of the well known and vigorously enforced anti-harassment policy
which plaintiff knew of but failed to use).
126. Burlington, decided by the en banc Seventh Circuit, generated ten separate
opinions. 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), affd, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). Faragher, decided
by the en banc Eleventh Circuit, generated five different opinions. 111 F.3d 1530 (11th
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
127. Slowik was a mid-level manager, a vice president in one of five business units
within one of Burlington's eight divisions. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. Ellerth
worked in a two-person office in Chicago; she reported directly to her only colleague
at that location, who in turn answered directly to Slowik. See id. Ellerth also had
occasional direct contacts with Slowik. See id. While on a business trip, Slowik invited
Ellerth to a hotel lounge, which she felt compelled to accept. See id. While there,
Slowik made comments about her breasts, told her she needed to "loosen up" and
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courts had uniformly held employers strictly liable for the actions of
their employees. The Supreme Court, however, found her claim to be
one for hostile environment and recast the question to reflect the real
concern: whether the employer was liable in the absence of knowl-
edge. "The question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth can
state a claim of quid-pro-quo harassment, but the issue of real concern
to the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik's
alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own
negligence.' 9
The Court analyzed the issues under the Restatement of Agency,
focusing on section 219.130 The Court first concluded that section
219(1), which pertains to acts committed while acting in the scope of
employment, was not applicable, since in committing sexual harass-
ment the supervisor is not in any way furthering the employers busi-
ness."' The Court affirmatively stated, "[t]he general rule is that
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
employment.' 1 32 The Court then turned to subsection (2) of section
219, which relates to employer liability for acts committed by its em-
ployees while acting outside of the scope of employment. 33 It found
two provisions applicable: subsection 219(2)(b), setting forth stan-
dards for negligence liability, and subsection 219(2)(d), setting forth
standards for vicarious liability under certain circumstances.1
34
The Court found that section 219(2)(b) sets a minimum negligence
standard for employer liability and noted:
[A]lthough a supervisor's sexual harassment is outside the scope of
employment because the conduct was for personal motives, an em-
ployer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own negligence is a
cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to
warned her that he could make her life at Burlington very hard or very easy. See id.
During a promotion interview, he again told her she was not "loose enough" and then
rubbed her knee. See id. Ellerth ultimately got the promotion. See id. On another
occasion when Ellerth telephoned him on a business matter, Slowik told her that he
did not have time for her unless she told him what she was wearing. See id. Shortly
after Ellerth's immediate supervisor began cautioning her about her work perform-
ance, Ellerth quit. See id.
128. See id. at 2263-64.
129. Id. at 2265.
130. See id. at 2266.
131. See id. (stating "[t]he harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, mo-
tives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer").
132. Id. at 2267. A much more detailed discussion of why sexual harassment is
outside of the scope of employment appears in the Faragher opinion. See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2289-91 (1998).
133. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
134. The Court briefly reviewed and found inapplicable subsections (a) where the
employer acts with tortious intent or the employee's high rank makes him or her the
company's alter ego, and (c) which involves nondelegable duties. See id.
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sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the con-
duct and failed to stop it.135
The Court also discussed the circumstances under which an employer
would be vicariously liable, without regard to knowledge of the
harassing conduct, under section 219(2)(d), focusing specifically on
whether the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relationship.' 36
The Court concluded that although proximity and contact may af-
ford a captive pool of potential victims, more was needed because that
standard could be satisfied even where non-supervisory co-workers
were the harassers.'37 Thus, the "aided in" agency standard "requires
the existence of something more than the employment relation it-
self."' 38 The most obvious class of cases where this "something more"
factor exists "beyond question," according to the Court, is those
where the supervisor takes a tangible employment action1 39 against
the subordinate victim."4
Beyond tangible employment actions, however, the Court also rec-
ognized that supervisors can be aided in committing their harassment
merely by their supervisory status.14' This concept, however, was
135. 1& Negligence liability, which depends on the employer's failure to act in the
face of actual or constructive knowledge, would not have helped Ellerth, since there
was no basis for actual or constructive knowledge; Ellerth had not complained about
Slowik's conduct, and that conduct took place only when the two were alone. See id.
at 2262.
136. The Court found the first clause of § 219(d)(2), relating to apparent authority,
would not normally be applicable because "[i]n the usual case, a supervisor's harass-
ment involves the misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence,"
which would be more appropriately analyzed under the Restatement's "aided in"
agency relation [219(2)(d)] rule. Id. at 2268.
137. See id.
138. Id
139. The Court explained that tangible employment action meant "a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits." Id. This narrow definition appears to be a retrenchment from the old
quid-pro-quo standard, which reached less severe adverse actions taken by the super-
visor. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Under the standard announced in
Burlington, reassignment to a more inconvenient job would be insufficient. See 118 S.
Ct. at 2269 (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.
1994)). In my view, a clearer standard would find vicarious liability if the supervisor
took any adverse action by virtue of his supervisory power, regardless of the severity
of such action. A supervisor cannot reassign an employee to a more inconvenient job
but for the exercise of delegated employer authority. In Faragher, for example, the
harasser, Terry, told Faragher, "'Date me or clean the toilets for a year.'" Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998). Had this threat been acted on, it is
not clear that it would constitute an "employer action" as defined in Burlington.
Terry could not have assigned Faragher to clean toilets, or any other unpleasant as-
signment, however, except through use of his delegated authority. Thus, I cannot see
how any work-related adverse action would not constitute an action "aided by" the
agency relationship.
140. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
141. See id
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more fully developed in Faragher,142 where, in addressing the inherent
assistance the agency relationship gives sexual harassment, the Court
stated:
When a person with supervisory authority discriminates in the terms
and conditions of subordinates' employment, his actions necessarily
draw upon his superior position over the people who report to him,
or those under them, whereas an employee generally cannot check a
supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with
abuse from a co-worker. When a fellow employee harasses, the vic-
tim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be
difficult to offer such responses to a supervisor, whose "power to
supervise-[which may be] to hire and fire, and to set work sched-
ules and pay rates-does not disappear... when he chooses to har-
ass through insult and offensive gestures rather than directly with
threats of firing or promises of promotion.,'
143
The Court thus found that employers were vicariously liable "to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by
a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
the employee.' 1 44 In doing so, the Court did not overturn Meritor's
holding that employers are automatically liable for harassment by its
supervisors.' 45 The Court did create, however, an affirmative defense
for employers which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of
evidence.14
6
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending em-
ployer may raise an affirmative defense .... The defense comprises
two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behav-
ior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
4 "
142. There the petitioners worked as ocean lifeguards at a remote beach location.
See 118 S. Ct. at 2280. They were verbally and physically harassed by two supervi-
sors, including one of their immediate supervisors and the individual in charge of the
location. See id. at 2281. One harasser, Bill Terry, served as the Chief of the Marine
Safety division, had power to hire lifeguards (subject to approval by higher manage-
ment), and had authority to supervise all aspects of lifeguards work and training. See
id. at 2280. The other harasser, David Silverman, was a lieutenant who was promoted
to captain during Faragher's employ. See id. Silverman was responsible, in part, for
making lifeguards' daily assignments. See id. Lifeguards reported to lieutenants and
captains, who in turn reported to the chief. See id.
143. Id. at 2291 (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 854
(1991)).
144. Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
145. The Court specifically noted, "we are bound by our holding in Meritor that
agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory
harassment." Id. (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
146. See id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
147. Id. The Court noted that it was satisfying the dual purposes of using agency
principles and Title VII policy of encouraging forethought by employers. See id.
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The Court also commented on what might normally satisfy the em-
ployers obligation under this test: "While proof that an employer had
promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is
not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropri-
ately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the
defense."'"
In sum, employer liability for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment is in large part determined by whether the employer took
prompt and appropriate corrective action once it knew or should have
known of the harassment. Such remedial action has long prevented
employer liability in cases involving non-supervisory co-workers, 14 9
and the defense is now available for hostile environment harassment
created by the employee's supervisor. Thus, the employer's response
to the harassment will always have some impact on its liability, and
the employer seeking to avoid or limit liability will always be under
some compulsion to act.15 0
148. Id.
149. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2289 (1998) (noting that
lower courts uniformly judge co-worker harassment by a negligence standard, under
which the employer was liable if it knew or should have known of the conduct, unless
it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action).
150. This discussion has focused on Title VII standards. Standards for determining
liability under other relevant statutes, such as Title X, were similarly unsettled and
thus also contributed to the employer's paradox. See e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Sch.
Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the proper
standard for Title IX liability is actual knowledge and failure to take action), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2367 (1998); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648,
660 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the standard of liability under Title IX is actual
knowledge of a substantial threat). The Supreme Court, however, in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (1998), implemented a signifi-
cantly stricter standard for employer liability for teacher-student harassment under
Title IX than exists for co-worker harassment under Title VII. Title IX generally
prohibits educational institutions receiving federal funds from discriminating on the
basis of sex. The Court first distinguished the remedial schemes of Title IX and Title
VII, noting that while Title VII is focused on compensating victims, Title IX is focused
on protecting individuals from discriminatory practices. See id. at 1997. It further
pointed out that Title IX's express remedies operate only on actual notice and provide
for the recipient of federal funds an opportunity to come into compliance following
actual notice. See id. at 1998. With those differences in mind, the Court concluded
that liability for the implied right of action for individual damages should similarly be
predicated on actual knowledge. Thus, it adopted a standard of actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference. See id. at 2000.
The application of this standard likely will diminish the employer's paradox insofar
as employee-on-student harassment because individual victims ill be unlikely to pre-
vail so long as the employer takes some action so as not to demonstrate deliberate
indifference. Nonetheless, an employer who metes out different discipline for similar
conduct may create yet another problem: employee actions seeking reversal of disci-
pline because of inconsistent responses to sexual harassment.
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B. Standards for Avoiding Liability
1. Effective Policies and Complaint Procedures
Although the lower courts have for years agreed that negligence
liability for sexual harassment about which the employer knew or
should have known can be avoided by taking prompt and appropriate
corrective action,15' the Burlington and Faragher cases have added a
new affirmative defense, applicable to vicarious liability and poten-
tially applicable to negligence liability based on constructive, as op-
posed to actual, knowledge. 152
Under the announced defenses, an employer may avoid vicarious
liability by showing, among other things, that it had an effective anti-
sexual harassment policy which identified persons to whom com-
plaints are to be made, and that the victim did not take advantage of
that complaint mechanism. 15
3
This defense may also curtail an employer's liability via constructive
knowledge. In a case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit after its Faragher decision, the court specifically held that
a failure to complain negated the possibility of constructive knowl-
edge. 154 The court reasoned that having a well-enforced policy met
the employer's obligation to know what was going on at its workplace
because the standard for constructive knowledge requires action only
for what the employer should, with reasonable diligence, have
known.155 The court similarly acknowledged, however, that an inef-
fective or incomplete policy would not insulate the employer and that
under those circumstances, there could be harassment so pervasive
that the employer will be charged with knowledge.156
151. See supra note 112. I suggest that the lower courts are uniform in recognizing
this language as representing the standard. As discussed in the next section, however,
I do not suggest that there has been uniform application or results using this standard.
152. Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93. Constructive
knowledge, however, presents problems which could be resolved by requiring com-
plaints to be filed. T'pically, courts will find constructive knowledge when the con-
duct is extremely pervasive. Pervasiveness sufficient to satisfy the "severe or
pervasive" standard is not enough in and of itself to show constructive knowledge
because employers would then have constructive knowledge of all conduct constitut-
ing a hostile environment. See Lockhard v. Pizza Hut, 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir.
1998) (finding a single incident of physically threatening conduct sufficiently severe
and pervasive to create an actionable hostile work environment). If this conduct is
taking place at a remote location, or is innocuous conduct, employers may have diffi-
culty in determining whether a hostile environment exists. A complaint requirement
(or at least an affirmative defense in the absence of a complaint), therefore, makes
sense in this context.
153. The second part of the defense relates to how the employer responds to such
complaints. Employer response issues are addressed in the next section. Although
the affirmative defense is new, the propriety and effect of how employers respond has
been subject to numerous interpretations.
154. Farley v. American Cast Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1553 (11th Cir. 1997).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 1553-54.
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2. Prompt and Appropriate Corrective Action
Although the central concept-that prompt and appropriate correc-
tive action bars employer liability-is easily articulated, it is difficult
to discern exactly how quickly and how harshly an employer must act
in order to be deemed to have acted "promptly" and "appropriately."
Again, the inquiry is highly fact-dependant, and what has been ac-
cepted as shielding an employer in one case may be deemed insuffi-
cient in a similar case. 15
7
a. Promptness
Although courts have varied in terms of what they consider prompt
corrective action, they generally have found the promptness criteria
satisfied when the employer conducts an investigation within hours or
days after actually learning of the harassment' 5 and when corrective
action follows within a reasonable period of time."5 9 On the other
hand, even a moderate delay in initiating an investigation may lead to
a finding that prompt action has not occurred, 6 and lengthy delays
are clearly unacceptable.' 6 ' Promptness is measured from the time
157. See, eg., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that the promptness and adequacy of the employer's response to correct instances
of alleged sexual harassment must be evaluated upon a case-by-case basis). These
cases all discuss the requirements of prompt and appropriate corrective action in the
context of the plaintiff having the burden of persuasion on the issue of the non-exist-
ence of appropriate corrective action. Under the affirmative defenses created by
Faragher and Burlington, the employer bears the burden of proving that it took such
action. This subtle difference may not have any impact on cases where the employer
took clear and decisive action. Where less decisive action is taken, however, the em-
ployer may not be able to sustain its burden. Should cases develop in this manner,
this would constitute one more pressure point for the employer seeking to avoid the
labyrinth of liability.
158. For a discussion of the complications resulting from requests for confidential-
ity or complaints made to the "wrong" supervisor, see infra Part III.B2.a.
159. See, e-g., Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting
that an investigation started the same day); Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401,
403 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the investigation and remedy occurred within one
week); Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that an investigation
started the next day, a report was issued in two weeks, and a remedy within five
weeks); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the one-day time lapse between the complaint and the remedy was rea-
sonable); Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting
that an investigation commenced the same day the complaint was made); Tunis v.
Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the em-
ployer "took immediate corrective measures"), affd men., 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.
1991).
160. See, e.g., Bennett v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that a delay of four weeks was too long and, thus, denying a
motion by the employer for summary judgement).
161. See, e.g., Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding that over six months with no action is too long).
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the employer has knowledge of the hostile environment. 162 Thus, an
employer with actual knowledge of such misconduct can be held liable
even in the absence of a complaint if the employer fails to take correc-
tive action. 163
While a determination of whether the employer's corrective action
was sufficiently prompt is a simple matter where there is a specific
complaint of sexual harassment or other evidence of actual employer
knowledge, questions remain as to when the clock begins to run in a
number of situations: when complaints are made on an "unofficial"
basis, that is, with a specific request that no action be taken;"6 or
when they are made to a low-level supervisor or employee not desig-
nated in the company's sexual harassment policy.165
In the latter scenario, complaints to a non-designated supervisor or
to an employee who is not high enough in the employer's hierarchy
may be insufficient to give notice to the employer and, therefore, may
not be relevant in measuring the promptness of the employer's ac-
tion.' 66 Where the supervisor ranks high enough to be considered an
agent for purposes of imputing knowledge to the company, however,
liability may be based on the failure to take prompt action.' 67
162. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 411 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that an
employer is liable for an employee's behavior under a negligence theory of agency if
"management-level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the exist-
ence of a sexually hostile work environment and failed to take prompt and adequate
remedial action" (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d
Cir. 1990)).
163. For example, in Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.
1988), the Court of Appeals found clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that the
employer had acted promptly, despite the fact that they immediately investigated and
took corrective action upon receiving the plaintiff's complaint about an offensive car-
toon with her name posted in the men's room. The court's decision hinged on the fact
that the CEO of the company had seen the cartoon prior to the complaint and failed
to act.
164. See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the
confidential complainant as creating a "catch-22" situation for the employer: if the
employer honors the victim's request, it "risks liability for not quickly and effectively
remedying the situation").
165. See id. (quoting Torres v. Pasano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 563 (1997)).
166. For instance, in Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.
1995), the Seventh Circuit refused to consider the plaintiff's earlier complaints to the
alleged harasser's supervisor, noting that those complaints were "not . . . going
through proper channels," since the company's harassment policy required that com-
plaints be made to the human resources department. Id. at 432. Similarly, in Hosey v.
McDonald's Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 201 (D. Md. 1996), affld, 113 F.3d
1232 (4th Cir. 1997), the court discounted the teenage victim's complaints to a variety
of lower level personnel whose titles included the word supervisor or manager, but
who had no actual authority to discipline the alleged harasser. See id. at 202, 204.
167. See Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1998), in which the
court stated:
An official's knowledge will be imputed to an employer when: (A) the offi-
cial is at a sufficiently high level in the company's management hierarchy to
qualify as a proxy for the company; or (B) the official is charged with a duty
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Courts, though, are not always sympathetic to employer claims that
complaints were made outside of proper channels. In Davis v. Tri-
State Mack Distributors, Inc.,"6 the Eighth Circuit rejected the com-
pany's contention that it had acted promptly following a complaint to
the comptroller. Instead, the court focused on the lack of adequate
action taken following the plaintiff's complaint to the branch man-
ager-the alleged harasser's immediate supervisor.169
This pliable notion-that complaints to some supervisors place the
company on notice for purposes of, among other things, determining
promptness, while complaints to others do not-causes difficulties for
both the victim and the company. Victims-particularly less sophisti-
cated victims-may be reluctant to lodge a complaint with "top
brass," with whom they have little contact. Those same victims, how-
ever, may, in many instances, be able to locate and raise the issue with
a particular supervisor with whom they feel comfortable. 10 Such
complaints should not be deemed meaningless.'
to act on the knowledge and stop the harassment; or (C) the official is
charged with a duty to inform the company of the harassment.
Id. at 64 (quoting Torres, 116 F.3d at 636-37).
168. 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992).
169. See id. at 343-44. More recently, in Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94
F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit again refused to absolve an employer of
liability when a complaint was made to an individual who had "undisputed supervi-
sory authority" but who was not officially designated in the employer's policy on sex-
ual harassment. Id at 1213. Under the policy, any supervisor receiving complaints of
sexual harassment was to direct the victim to a specified individual and not take any
action himself. See it at 1212. The court noted that a procedure which "does not
require a supervisor who has knowledge of an incident of sexual harassment to report
that information to those who are in a position to take appropriate action" is flawed
and will not shield the employer from liability. Id. at 1214.
170. In Coates v. Sundor Brands, Izc., No. 97-9102, 1999 WL 12822 (11th Cir. Jan.
14, 1999), the victim initially revealed her complaint to a co-worker who was also an
ordained minister. See id. at *1. The co-worker acted as a go-between, and presented
her complaint, confidentially, to upper management. See id.
171. Judge Barkett, concurring in Coates, clearly explained the victim's dilemma
and the consequences of allowing non-designated supervisors to ignore victims
complaints:
[T]he legitimately complaining employee, having received no relief, is left
feeling chastened and even less inclined to press her complaint, and thus
even more compromised in her ability to perform unimpeded the tasks and
responsibilities for which she was hired. Just as it is difficult for an employee
to protect herself from harassment by a supervisor because of the power he
wields over her in the employment hierarchy, so too is it difficult for an
employee-who may have been extremely reluctant to confide in a manager
in the first place-to demand that a supervisor provide a prompt and effec-
tive response to her complaint.
Id. at *8 (Barkett, J., concurring). He further noted:
A supervisor's failure to act when that supervisor has knowledge of the har-
assment and the authority to prevent it inflicts harm on the victim that is as
real as if the supervisor were doing the harassing. The victimized employee
in this situation thus suffers two distinct, discriminatory harms: the co-
worker's initial harassment; and the supervisor's implicit approval of the har-
assment, which changes and intensifies the quality of the injury.
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More importantly, there is no reason to treat violations of the com-
pany's sexual harassment policy differently than violation of other
work rules. Simply put, all supervisors should have the same responsi-
bility vis-A-vis sexual harassment as they have regarding other types of
misconduct. A supervisor, at any level, who observed or received
complaints about theft or destruction of company property, fighting,
drug use on company premises, or falsification of time cards without
taking action or reporting it to the proper authority would be consid-
ered remiss. Similarly, supervisors should not simply ignore incidents
of sexual harassment that they observe or about which they receive
complaints. They should, instead, be officially charged with the re-
sponsibility of reporting all such incidents to the appropriate person.
A completely different problem exists, however, when a complaint
is "unofficially" lodged with an appropriate person, since the em-
ployer clearly has actual knowledge at that point. Logically, an em-
ployer who fails to take appropriate corrective action in response to
such a complaint does so at its own risk. The employer's duty to cor-
rect a hostile environment arises when it knows of the existence of
that environment, and the existence or non-existence of its legal re-
sponsibility to comply with anti-discrimination laws does not rest with
its employees' preferences. Nonetheless, employers routinely honor
employees' requests that no action be taken. 172
While an employee who makes such a request would likely be pre-
cluded under an estoppel theory from receiving damages for sexual
harassment during the interceding time period, that individual's re-
quest for confidentiality logically has no impact on a claim by any
other person affected by the hostile environment. A different person
later victimized by the same harasser would be free to argue that the
employer knew of the earlier harassment, took no action, and, thus,
should be liable for the subsequent illegal conduct committed by the
same individual.'73 Furthermore, action taken in response to the sub-
sequent victim's complaints, no matter how quickly taken, should not
Id.
172. For example, in Karibian v. Cohmbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1994), the plaintiff initially complained in 1988 to the University's Panel on Sexual
Harassment. At that time, she met with a panel member and also with the Univer-
sity's Equal Opportunity Coordinator. See id. At Karibian's request, however, both
meetings were confidential and the University took no action. See id. Indeed, it was
not until almost two years later, when Karibian dropped her confidentiality request,
that Columbia acted. See id. Notwithstanding the confidentiality request, however,
under these facts Columbia would be hard-pressed to argue that it was without notice
of the harassment in 1988, or that it acted promptly upon receiving such notice.
173. In Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. IlI. 1994), the
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs claim, holding that the company could be held
liable for the sexual assault on the plaintiff based on its earlier failure to take correc-
tive action against a known "womanizer." Id. at 1108. In that instance, the employee
sexually assaulted the plaintiff on the first day he met her. See id. Although the plain-
tiff obviously had not complained, the company's failure to act on earlier complaints
from other victims was used as the basis for liability. See id. at 1111. In short, its
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be considered prompt. An employer is required to act promptly to
correct a sexually offensive environment whenever it has actual
knowledge of the environment, even in the absence of an "official"
complaint. 74
As demonstrated above, promptness is a pliable concept even
where there is direct evidence that the employer had actual notice of
the harassment. The ambiguities are even greater in cases when the
employer is charged with constructive notice because an official repre-
senting the employer "upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have
known" of the harassing environment. 75 Constructive knowledge is
judged by the pervasiveness, severity, and openness of the harass-
ment.176 Openness is important because no matter how severe or per-
vasive the conduct is, it cannot be the basis for constructive
knowledge if it is secretive. Similarly, the more severe the conduct,
the more likely a management level supervisor observing it or hearing
about it would (and should) recognize it as hostile environment har-
assment mandating employer action. Thus, conduct that is observed
or heard on only a few occasions would have to be more severe, and
more innocuous conduct would have to be more pervasive, to demon-
strate constructive knowledge and generate a duty to take corrective
action absent a complaint. Where the conduct is pervasive enough to
support a finding of constructive knowledge, any corrective action
taken by the employer should not be deemed "prompt," because the
pervasiveness of the conduct means that it must have been
longstanding. 77
previous failure to act rendered any later corrective action untimely. Thus, the em-
ployer's response to AI-Dabbagh's complaint did not shield it from liability.
174. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987), is on point here. In that case,
one of several women harassed in 1980 complained to a mid-level manager "as a
friend," but out of fear for her job she did not want to make a formal complaint to the
Director of Personnel or the Director of EEO Compliance. Id. at 635. Two years
later, two additional employees harassed by the same individual did make formal
complaints, which resulted in an investigation and ultimately the demotion of the har-
asser. See id. at 633. In finding the company liable despite its quick action, the court
concluded that even though it would be difficult to say unequivocally that the com-
pany had notice of the earlier harassment, the factual finding that it knew or upon
reasonable diligence should have known of the harassment was not clearly erroneous.
See i. at 636. In light of its earlier knowledge, the court reasoned that, "although
Avco took remedial action once the plaintiffs registered complaints, its duty to rem-
edy the problem, or at a minimum, inquire, was created earlier when the initial allega-
tions of harassment were reported." Id. at 636; see also Bennett v. Corroon & Black
Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding notice where the employer "saw ...
offensive cartoons and allowed them to remain where they were" for a week even
though the employee did not formally complain).
175. Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis omitted).
176. See id. at 1553 (rejecting alleged constructive knowledge because, among other
things, the alleged harassment was not common knowledge and there was no first-
hand corroboration of the harassment).
177. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 996
(N.D. Ala. 1991) (discussing the relationship between promptness, pervasiveness, and
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In sum, an employer can be assured that it will escape liability only
if it takes appropriate corrective action within hours of discovering
severely harassing conduct or within days of discovering subtly harass-
ing or questionable conduct. It can be assured of having corrective
action deemed prompt absent a complaint only if it acts with similar
haste after observing severe, overtly sexual conduct and if it affirma-
tively investigates after observing more innocuous conduct to ensure
that it is not creating a hostile environment.
b. Appropriateness
Ascertaining whether the employer's corrective action is "appropri-
ate" is even more problematic than determining whether the action is
"prompt." The most widely accepted standard for making this deter-
mination requires that the employer's action must be "reasonably cal-
culated to end the harassment."'17 8
The problem with the "reasonably calculated" standard is that it is
difficult for an employer seeking to avoid liability to determine what
level of action will later be deemed to have been sufficiently reason-
able to end the harassment. As with other aspects of sexual harass-
ment law, the outside parameters are clear but there is a substantial
gray area in between. At one end of the spectrum, employers who
take no action will be held liable,'179 even if the harassment stops.180
the inference of constructive knowledge), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th
Cir. 1995).
178. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468,478-79 (5th
Cir. 1989). This standard, however, is not universal. Some courts have held that the
appropriate inquiry is what a reasonable employer would have done to remedy the
sexual harassment. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989).
179. A surprising number of employers take no action, even in the face of a direct,
unqualified complaint. For example, complainants have been told to "get used to it,"
"not make a stink about it," and "ignore it" in response to direct, unqualified com-
plaints. See, e.g., Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt and Effective Remedial Action?" What
Must an Employer Do to Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Har-
assment?, 8 Lab. Law. 181, 185-86 (1992) (citing Evans v. Ford Motor Co., 768 F.
Supp. 1318, 1326 (D. Minn. 1991); Wall v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1084, 1088
(M.D. N.C. 1990); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)). In some instances the response is dismissive. In Varner v. National Super
Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff was told in response to her
complaint that "That's just Bob being himself." Id. at 1211 (internal quotations omit-
ted). One of the most baffling responses was that of the human resources manager in
Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co, 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992). After being told of the
harassing conduct, he instructed the complainant to close her eyes and imagine pink
elephants in a parade holding onto each other's tails with their trunks. See id. at 198.
He then snapped his fingers in front of her closed eyes and instructed her to forget the
pink elephants. See id. He advised her to respond in the same way to the harass-
ment-to just put it out of her mind. See id. From that point on, whenever she again
complained, he snapped his fingers to remind her of his proposed way of handling the
harassment. See id.
180. Courts have recognized that the employer's duty to take some action arises
once it has knowledge of a complaint, regardless of whether the harassment contin-
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At the other end, employers who guarantee that the harassment will
not recur by immediately discharging the harasser will undoubtedly
avoid liability.181 However, what type of remedial action short of dis-
charging the harasser will be considered "appropriate" for the pur-
pose of limiting Title VII liability is unclear."a
In determining whether the employer's action was reasonably calcu-
lated to end the harassment, courts generally consider the severity and
pervasiveness of the harassment; whether the harshness of the em-
ployer's action is reasonable in light of the level of severity or perva-
ues. For example, in Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1525-28 (9th Cir. 1995),
the victim was subjected to harassing conduct for a number of months by a co-worker
who had previously been her boyfriend. After concluding that the conduct, which was
severe and pervasive enough to be actionable, had ceased before the employer had
knowledge, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless imposed liability on the employer, which
had conducted a half-hearted investigation and found the complaints unfounded. See
id. at 1528-29. While noting that the corrective action must be reasonably calculated
to end the harassment, the court reasoned that determining whether the harassment
has stopped is merely a "test for measuring the efficacy of a remedy" and does not
excuse the employer's obligation to take some action. Id. at 1528 (emphasis omitted).
According to the court, once an employer learns of the harassing conduct-present or
past-"a remedial obligation kicks in" and the only question is whether the employer
is relieved of liability for the harasser's actions because it took sufficient disciplinary
and remedial action in response to the complaints. Id.
181. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to impose liability based on the employer's immediate discharge of the al-
leged harasser). While taking this drastic action will certainly avoid liability for sexual
harassment, such summary discharge is more likely to trigger an "angry male" action.
See infra Part IV. Further, courts do not generally require discharge of the alleged
harasser. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Barrett v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984)). However, because discharge is
occasionally the only appropriate remedy, such as when the harassment is particularly
severe or threatening, it is properly identified as the outer limit of "appropriate" cor-
rective action.
182. It is not completely clear whether the action must be disciplinary. Neverthe-
less, in Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992), Judge Hall clearly believed
that disciplinary action was needed, writing, "[wle interpret the phrase 'appropriate
corrective action' to require some form, however mild, of disciplinary measures." Id.
at 778 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1998)); see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 ("Em-
ployers send the wrong message to potential harassers when they do not discipline
employees for sexual harassment."). Not all courts, however, require that the action
be disciplinary. Some courts have refused to impose liability when the harassment,
though severe and pervasive enough to be actionable, was not egregious, and in fact
stopped due to some non-disciplinary action promptly taken by the employer. See,
e.g., Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1997) (ruling that a non-
disciplinary conversation with harasser was sufficient because it was reasonably calcu-
lated to stop the harassment, regardless of its actual effects). In fact, in his concurring
opinion in Intlekofer, Judge Keep argued that because Title VII is remedial, not puni-
tive, the employer's obligation is met so long as it effectively ends the harassment. See
Intlekofer, 973 F.2d at 783 ("[A] 'mere request to stop' unlawful conduct may be suffi-
cient to alter the unlawful behavior of some harassers, and therefore sufficient to
discharge the employer's duty under Title VII.").
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siveness of the harassment. 183 In a somewhat contradictory fashion,
they also consider the action's actual effectiveness in eliminating the
hostile environment.' s4 Thus, when some action has been promptly
taken and the harassment stops, liability usually is not imposed.8 5
Employer action at either extreme thus yields predictable results.
Discharge, demotion or removal of supervisory authority is usually
enough to shield the employer from liability even in cases of outra-
geous conduct. 86 Sham investigations followed by a slap on the wrist
or no action whatsoever will generally lead to a finding of liability.187
Some employers, however, whose reasonable investigations reveal
that the harassment likely took place, take only moderate corrective
steps-because the instances of the harassment were not fully corrob-
orated or not viewed as severe enough to warrant greater action, or
the employer did not follow progressive discipline' or want to lose a
top manager. Such employers are simply gambling that the harass-
ment will not be repeated or that their actions will be considered to
have been "reasonably calculated" to end the harassment, even
though unsuccessful.
183. The discipline should be "assessed proportionally to the seriousness of the of-
fense." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (quoting Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828
F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987)).
184. In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit summed up the standard by referring to its actual
effectiveness: "In essence, then, we think that the reasonableness of an employer's
remedy will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in
harassment." Id. The standard has backward-looking overtones because actual effec-
tiveness is a key component in assessing reasonableness.
185. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding no liability where the harasser was told to stop, was put on probation, and
had a promotion temporarily withheld, and the harassment stopped); Saxton v.
AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding no liability because the harasser was
transferred, and thus could no longer harass the victim, despite the victim's dissatis-
faction with the remedy); Dornhecker, 828 F.2d at 309 (noting that the victim quit
before it could be determined if the employer's proposed remedy would have stopped
the harassment); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558-59 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating
specifically that the fact that there was no further harassment was significant).
186. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding no liability where the employer reprimanded and denied promotion to the
alleged harasser); Barrett, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (ruling that placing an offender on proba-
tion with a warning that further misconduct will result in termination was adequate).
187. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995), is illustrative of some of
the factors that influence a court to look behind an investigation and deem it a sham.
The investigator did not interview the alleged harasser until the plaintiff had filed an
EEOC complaint. See id. at 1526. Further, the investigator flatly accepted the alleged
harasser's version of events whenever they conflicted with the victim's account. See id.
at 1529. In addition, the investigator failed to interview other witnesses and failed to
check the alleged harasser's telephone records for the period when the victim had
received numerous harassing hang-up phone calls. See id. at 1526, 1529.
188. Progressive discipline is the principle that unless the offense truly warrants
severe action, the goal should be correction rather than strict penalization. It is often
the basis for a reduction in discipline, particularly when the employee was discharged.
See Frank Elkouri & Edna A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 916-17 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
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Moreover, while courts will determine whether the harassment has
in fact stopped, that fact alone may not be sufficient to protect an
employer from liability. At least one court has held that the employer
is obligated to take some action, even though the actionable harass-
ment ceased before the employer became aware of it.' 8 9
Given the wide variations in the standards defining "sexual harass-
ment" and "prompt and appropriate" corrective action, it appears that
employers seeking to avoid liability for sexual harassment are under
pressure to take severe disciplinary action against a suspected harasser
within days of learning of even questionable misconduct. If the em-
ployer or its supervisors misjudge whether certain conduct is legally
sexual harassment-and thus fail to take corrective action-the em-
ployer could be liable for that conduct. The uncertainties surrounding
the "promptness" requirement may similarly force the employer to act
within hours or days instead of weeks or months. In some instances
an employer may feel pressured to render a decision without a thor-
ough investigation. Further, because a quick investigation with a find-
ing of no harassment may lead to the imposition of liability on the
basis that the investigation was a sham,19 the employer may have an
incentive to conduct a quick investigation and take some action, even
if the investigation is inconclusive. Thus, even when the investigation
does not substantiate the complaint of harassment, the employer feels
pressure to take some action, such as issuing an oral admonishment,
counseling the alleged harasser, or making some notation in his per-
sonnel file.191
Fimally, the employer may be pressured to mete out stiff discipline
in lieu of other corrective actions. Although the determination of the
action's appropriateness turns on whether it is reasonably calculated
to end the harassment, courts evaluated this requirement from a back-
ward-looking point of view, evaluating the actual effect of the action,
not its reasonably foreseeable effect. Moreover, while courts have
held that discharge of the harasser is not required, 92 the employer
that fails to do so risks liability for further harassment because it is
then on notice as to the employee's propensity.1 93
189. See Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528-29.
190. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635-37 (6th Cir. 1987).
191. See Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 756-60 (D.D.C. 1995).
192. Generally, courts adhere to the standard that the remedy must be "reasonably
calculated to prevent further harassment." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Comm., Inc.,
746 F. Supp. 798, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992). Removing
the offensive materials, see Tumis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), affd, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991), written warnings, see Swentek v. USAir, Inc.
830 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1987), and suspensions have all been found adequate, see
Juarez, 746 F. Supp. at 805.
193. The employer may also be subjected to liability in a negligent retention suit.
See, e.g., Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 744 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no
negligent retention claim where employee did not commit a tort or Title VII viola-
tion); see also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994)
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The meting out of swift, stiff discipline, however-sometimes skip-
ping intermediate progressive steps or based on uncorroborated evi-
dence-leads employers into the next level of the labyrinth,
countersuits by "angry men." The forms of these suits vary, depend-
ing largely on whether there is a collective bargaining agreement or
other basis for asserting that the discharge or discipline must be based
on "just cause" '9 4 and on whether the employer is a public agency
subject to due process requirements. Employees have the greatest
success in overturning discipline when there is a collective bargaining
agreement in place. 195 Moreover, while many of the challenges may
ultimately be unsuccessful, the employer can incur substantial legal
expenses merely attempting to comply with Title VII.
The next section of this Article examines angry male countersuits
brought by employees who have direct appeal rights and who enjoy
the protections of a contractual requirement of just cause. Finally,
some solutions are posited.
IV. ANGRY MALE ACTIONS BASED ON DIRECT APPEAL RIGHTS
LINKED TO JUST CAUSE REQUIREMENTS
A. Introduction'19 6
Analysis of arbitrations involving discipline for sexual harassment
reveals that just cause principles applied by arbitrators frequently con-
(ruling that the employer's failure to discharge the offender earlier established
liability).
194. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text; infra Table 1.
196. Any analysis of direct challenges to discipline imposed to correct a sexually
hostile environment must begin by acknowledging that it is impossible to determine
the total number of such challenges, much less their outcome. While the results of
many such challenges are described in reported arbitration opinions, not all opinions
are reported; indeed not all arbitral awards are accompanied by opinions. The
arbitrator's award is that portion of the decision which formally announces the result;
it is the functional equivalent of a judgment. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at
383-84. The opinion, like a judicial opinion, explains the rationale behind the award.
See id. at 384-86. Even for those which are reported, there is no uniform reporting
system. Some of the numerous sources of reported arbitration opinions are Labor
Arbitration (Bureau of National Affairs) (LA (BNA)), Labor Arbitration
Information System (LAIS), American Arbitration Awards (AAA), Arbit, Industrial
Labor Relations Report and Commerce Clearing House Labor Arbitration Reporter
(Arb.). Further, there is overlap among some of the various services, making a single
compilation of all reported decisions difficult, if not impossible. Moreover,
arbitrators' decisions to reverse or reduce disciplinary sanctions imposed by
employers account for only a portion of the reversals and reductions that take place in
the collective bargaining grievance process.
It is impossible to tell how many disciplinary actions in the sexual harassment
context are reversed or reduced when a grievance is settled in the early stages of the
process, but such cases certainly exist. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991),
for example, arose from just such a scenario. In that case, the alleged harasser, Gray,
wrote several ominous letters to the victim, Ellison. See id. at 874. When Ellison
complained to her and Gray's supervisor, Gray was transferred to another facility. See
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flict with standards used by courts in assessing employer liability for
sexual harassment committed by employees. Simply put, arbitrators
reviewing discipline and courts determining sexual harassment liabil-
ity generally review the same evidence with different rules and from
different perspectives. Thus, they often reach opposite conclusions.
For the purpose of this Article, I chose to limit my focus to arbitra-
tions and compiled a data base from a variety of sources reporting
arbitrations. My analysis revealed a number of trends in terms of the
frequency and rationale that arbitrators use in applying general just
cause principles to discipline for sexual harassment. A brief exposi-
tion of just cause principles precedes this analysis.
B. General Principles of Just Cause
An arbitrator's authority to hear and decide disputes derives from a
contractual agreement between the parties. Therefore, the touchstone
of arbitration is the contract granting the arbitrator authority to act.
In the labor-employment context, any agreement to submit certain
claims to arbitration is usually included in the employment contract,
whether individually negotiated or collectively bargained."
id. Three weeks after his transfer, however, Gray filed a grievance seeking to return.
See id The grievance was settled, and Gray was allowed to return to the same facility
where Ellison worked, with the transfer being reduced from being a permanent
change to a six-month cooling-off period. See id. This settlement, like many others, is
simply not reported. It would have remained private and unascertainable had Ellison
not decided to sue once she leaned that Gray was returning. In another case,
Ohiocubco, Inc., Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8394, at 4994 (May 25, 1988), the
employer initially warned the grievant and moved him to another shift, whereupon he
grieved and was returned in settlement. See id. at 4997. The employer's later attempt
to move him again, in response to the victim's complaints about his return was
disallowed by the arbitrator. See id. at 4998-99. Again, absent further action by the
employer, information regarding his initial settlement would not have been reported.
A grievance procedure usually has several steps, ranging from an informal
complaint to arbitration. The number of steps and the time frame and complexity of
the process vary a great deal, particularly between small and large companies. Many
procedures include an initial appeal to the supervisor who imposed the discipline.
Typically, the grievance must be initiated within a specified time period. See Elkouri
& Elkouri, supra note 188, at 232-33.
197. In Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Supreme
Court held that binding arbitration of age discrimination cases was permissible where
there was an individual waiver of judicial remedies. In addition, the Court vacated
and remanded Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930 (1991), a Title VII
case with the same issue, with instructions that the Fifth Circuit reconsider in light of
Gilmer. The Fifth Circuit did so and reversed its position finding that Title VII claims
were subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991). Most circuit courts have now held that
individual agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims are binding. See Rosenberg v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 163 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1998); Benefits Com-
munication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1304-05 (D.C. App. 1994); Bender v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699-700 (11th Cir. 1992). The Supreme
Court has recently revisited the issue, first raised in Ale.rander it Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974), of whether a collectively bargained waiver is binding. See
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 395-96 (1998) (holding that
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Under the common law doctrine of employment-at-will, employers
need not justify adverse employment actions taken against employees.
In general, employers may act for a sound business reason, an un-
sound business reason, an arbitrary reason, or even a hostile reason,
so lcng as they do not violate statutory employment law in the pro-
cess.198 Further, with at-will employment, employees cannot directly
challenge the propriety of the employer's action. 199 There are, how-
ever, several non-statutory sources that, in essence, insert a "just
cause" requirement into the employer-employee relationship.2"0 The
just cause provision prevents management from acting in an arbitrary
manner and requires that certain prerequisites be met before disci-
pline is imposed. Such a provision curtails an employer's right to act
without justification and simultaneously provides an employee with a
right to directly appeal such an action on the grounds that it was not
justified.
First and foremost, the employer can agree to limit disciplinary ac-
tion to cases where just cause can be established and to provide the
employee with specific channels and procedures to challenge em-
ployer decisions, including disciplinary actions. While such agree-
ments are sometimes made as part of an individual employment
contract,20 they occur most commonly in the context of collective
there was no waiver of the employee's rights under the Americans with Disabilities
Act because the terms of the waiver were general and broad and declining to answer
the question of whether a specific waiver of such rights would ever be valid). The
discord in this area, however, has no effect on whether an employer's discipline of
alleged sexual harassers may be arbitrated, because the authority to arbitrate such
cases does not depend on the authority to arbitrate Title VII cases. Id. at 394 (distin-
guishing between what was needed to mandate arbitration of substantive Title VII
claims and other contract-based arbitration).
198. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 884-85. Thus, an employer may
discharge an employee out of personal animosity, even if the individual was a superb
performer. On the other hand, the employer may not discharge an employee on any
of the bases prohibited by Title VII or by other federal, state, or local antidiscrimina-
tion laws.
199. Even those employees without direct appeal rights have not been stopped
from collaterally challenging employer actions, with occasional success. See supra
notes 17-21 and accompanying text. While there is some uniformity in the subset of
these cases decided on the basis of other employment statutes, such as those involving
a challenge that persons of color are disciplined more harshly for harassment than are
white males, the remaining cases-based on state common law-are very individual
in nature and beyond the scope of this Article.
200. I use the term "just cause" throughout this Article to cover the various rendi-
tions of the term found in collective bargaining agreements, such as "cause," "proper
cause," and "justifiable cause." All of these terms have the same meaning and serve
the same purpose-to prevent arbitrary discipline and discharge. See Elkouri &
Elkouri, supra note 188, at 889.
201. Even when they are not, employees sometimes seek to have such a clause
implied from employee handbooks. See William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech,
Employment Termination: Rights and Remedies 33-45 (1993). In fact, by 1989, more
than 45 states had accepted theories that eroded the "at-will" doctrine, including the-
ories relying on implied contracts. See Finegan, supra note 14, at 66.
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bargaining. Further, additional general limitations on the employer's
right to act exist when the individual is a public employee. While fed-
eral and state government employees may, of course, be members of
collective bargaining units with all the concomitant rights, these em-
ployees also enjoy direct appeal rights based on constitutional due
process concepts. 20 2 Finally, although it is explicit in the overwhelm-
ing majority of collective bargaining agreements,20 3 the principle of
just cause is so well established that it is sometimes implied in the
absence of a contractual provision disavowing it.20 4
The particular contract may define just cause, or it may rely on the
definition of the term that has evolved through numerous arbitrations.
The latter formulation is most frequently summarized as having the
seven elements enumerated by Arbitrator Daugherty in Enterprise
Wire Company:2 s
202. See Holloway & Leech, supra note 201, at 482-90 (explaining how the Four-
teenth Amendment confers due process rights in public employees). In addition to
constitutional due process rights, many public-sector employees also have statutory
rights providing for direct appeals in various forums. For example, certain federal
employees have direct appeal rights to the Merit Systems Protection Board. State
employees frequently have equivalent rights using a wide variety of forums and pro-
cedures. See, eg., Bexar County v. Davis, 802 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1990) (holding that
there is no governmental requirement to notify the employee of the witnesses accus-
ing him). These state and federal appeal rights certainly can lead into the labyrinth;
consider the decade long saga of the unsuccessful attempt to fire Phillip Hillen for
sexual harassment. See Hillen v. Department of the Army, 72 M.S.P.R. 369, 370
(1996). The initial attempt to remove Hillen from federal service occurred in 1985.
See id. In 1997, the case was finally put to rest, with Hillen receiving a 90-day suspen-
sion. See King, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. Hillen, 108 F.3d 1391
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Because the appeal right varies so widely under federal and state
law, however, the differences are not analyzed in this Article.
203. Ninety-four percent of all collective bargaining agreements contain just cause
or equivalent clauses. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of
"Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 Duke LJ. 594, 594 n.1.
204. While not all arbitrators will imply just cause when it is not bargained for,
many will, reasoning that an employer's ability to arbitrarily terminate employees
would render seniority protections meaningless. See, e.g., Herlitz, Inc., 89 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 436, 441 (1987) (Allen, Arb.) (holding that just cause limitation on discharges
is implied in labor agreements).
205. 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.). Although this formulation
of just cause has been called the "most widely accepted and applied standard,"
Anchorage Hilton Hotel, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 55, 58 (1993) (Landau, Arb.), other
definitions exist. For instance, in Armstrong Industries, Inc., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 227
(1982) (Morgan, Arb.), Arbitrator Morgan noted that the specific attributes of just
cause cannot be stated categorically but must be determined on the facts of each case.
See id at 228. In the context of that arbitration-which involved a challenge to a
discharge-Morgan described just cause as consisting of three steps: first, determin-
ing whether the offense charged was serious enough to warrant discharge; if so, then
determining whether the employee actually committed the offense charged; and fi-
nally, examining mitigating or extenuating circumstances that might call for a reduc-
tion in penalty. See id. at 228-29. A two-step inquiry has also been endorsed. See
Fairweather's Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration 327 (Ray J. Schoonhoven
ed., BNA 3d ed. 1991) (inquiring whether cause for discipline existed under the facts
as presented and whether the discipline imposed was appropriate).
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(1) Did the company give to the employee forewarning or fore-
knowledge of the possible or probable disciplinary consequences of
the employee's conduct? ....
(2) Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related
to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the- company's
business and (b) the performance that the company might properly
expect of the employee? ....
(3) Did the company, before administering discipline to an em-
ployee, make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact
violate or disobey a rule or order of management? ....
(4) Was the company's investigation conducted fairly and objec-
tively? ....
(5) At the investigation, did the [factfinder] obtain substantial evi-
dence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged? ....
(6) Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties even-
handedly and without discrimination to all employees? ....
(7) Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a
particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the em-
ployee's proven offense and (b) the record of the employee in his
service with the company? 20
6
Arbitrator Daugherty also announced a strict standard for applying
the test: failure to comply with even one factor would preclude a find-
ing of just cause.2 °7
When assessing the appropriateness of a particular penalty, the
closely related principle of "progressive discipline" is frequently im-
puted. This principle provides that lesser penalties should be used in
an attempt to correct a problem before more serious penalties are
used.20 8 For example, penalties imposed under a progressive disci-
pline approach might follow a path, from lightest discipline to harsh-
est, such as:
counseling->oral admonishment--written admonishment--written
reprimand--short-term suspension--long-
term suspension---discharge.2 °9
Under progressive discipline systems, discharge is viewed as a penalty
of last resort, and usually will not be imposed unless lesser measures
have failed to improve the employee's overall conduct. 210 Under most
progressive discipline systems, however, it is not necessary that each
step be applied to every employee, regardless of the offense, and in
206. See Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 363-64.
207. Id. at 362.
208. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 916.
209. See id.
210. The employee's overall conduct is considered because discipline for different
types of misconduct may be considered simultaneously. The employee's overall disci-
plinary record may be considered, regardless of whether all the discipline was im-
posed for similar violations. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 925-929; see also
infra Part IV.C.2 (analyzing a number of arbitration cases and providing examples of
specific arbitrations which reduced penalties).
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certain limited instances a summary discharge will be permitted even
if the employee otherwise has a clean record." Indeed, some of-
fenses, such as striking a supervisor, are universally accepted as appro-
priate grounds for summary dismissal, even under a progressive
discipline scheme.212
C. Application to Discipline for Sexual Harassment
At first blush, it appears that an employer should be able to comply
with its duty under Title VII to eliminate a hostile environment-by
imposing discipline "reasonably calculated to end the harass-
ment" 21 3-without violating the principles of just cause and progres-
sive discipline. Each of these principles is aimed at ensuring that a
disciplined employee stops the offensive conduct or does not repeat it,
and they do not appear so overtly contradictory that compliance vith
one would necessarily undermine the other. Nevertheless, the cases
clearly illustrate that arbitrators do modify the penalties imposed by
employers in responding to sexual harassment,1 4 even in egregious
circumstances, thus undermining the goals of Title VII and the at-
tempts to create and implement a workable doctrine. It is necesssary,
therefore, to determine the degree to which such penalties are modi-
fied, as well as to examine the circumstances that lead to such
modification.
1. Compiling the Data
In order to determine whether changes in the current system were
needed or even desirable, I first attempted to determine the frequency
with which arbitrators modify the discipline imposed by employers in
response to sexual harassment and what influenced their decisions. To
accomplish this, I constructed a database of arbitration opinions con-
cerning the discipline of alleged sexual harassers.1 5
211. See, eg., Santa Catalina Island Co., No. 92-3-160, 1993 WL 787981, at *2-3
(Feb. 16, 1993) (Winograd, Arb.) (holding a four-month [full-season] suspension ap-
propriate because the grievant did not respond to counseling); Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group, 93-1 Arb. T 4051 (1993) (Cantor, Arb.) (finding a discharge without
progressive discipline proper in light of the severity of the conduct); Social Sec. Ad-
min., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 459, 460-61 (1983) (Cox, Arb.) (requiring no lock step
progressive discipline and noting that discipline is not only to correct but may also fit
the crime).
212. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers,
959 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that extremely serious offenses, such as strik-
ing a supervisor, are grounds for a summary discharge).
213. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
214. See, eg., Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d at 689 (declining to reverse an arbi-
trator's decision to reinstate an employee who "grabbed" a co-worker's breasts be-
cause the arbitrator determined that discipline short of discharge would be a sufficient
deterrent).
215. As previously noted, review of arbitration decisions is difficult because of the
lack of a uniform reporting requirement or system. The sources for reported arbitra-
tions vary widely, with some sources containing a wide variety of decisions, and others
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While the vast number of arbitrations located involved the disci-
pline of the employee for sexual harassment, arbitrations involving
somewhat related topics were also retrieved. These included victim
claims, 16 discipline for consensual sexual behavior on the work prem-
ises,217 and discipline for supervisor malfeasance. 18 In my study, vic-
tim claims and claims by consensual actors were not included because
they do not directly contribute to the dilemma2 9-the conundrum of
taking action to remedy an environment of sexual harassment, and the
susceptibility of retaliation from the "angry man."
In addition, some arbitrations-particularly older ones-did not re-
fer to "sexual harassment" but involved conduct which would possibly
be considered harassment under Title VII standards.2 20 These arbitra-
tions were usually based on violations of work rules against immoral
conduct or obscene language.21 They were included if they were de-
being very limited. Because the idiosyncracies of limited reporting systems might
have distorted the analysis, I decided not to use them to search for arbitrations.
Therefore, I compiled data only from four major general sources of arbitration opin-
ions: the Bureau of National Affairs Labor Arbitration Reporter; the Commerce
Clearing House Labor Arbitration Reporter; the Labor Arbitration Information Sys-
tem; and the Westlaw database of "unreported" decisions. Even within these sources,
there was significant overlap-the same arbitration might be reported in two or even
three of these sources, as well as appearing in other sources. Subsequent to the com-
pilation of the database, all duplicates were eliminated.
216. This occurs when a victim of sexual harassment files a grievance because of
some adverse employment decision and alleges that the sexual harassment in some
way impacted the decision.
217. See, for example, Vermont, Department of Corrections, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
701 (1994) (McHugh, Arb.), where the arbitrator upheld discipline for engaging in
sexual misconduct with a female employee while on duty. See id. at 708-09. Such
cases, of course, do not meet the legal definition of sexual harassment since voluntary,
non-coerced actions are not "unwelcome." The concept that an employer can pro-
hibit consensual workplace conduct which is not legal sexual harassment, however, is
important for the system outlined in the next part.
218. These include arbitrations where a supervisor who did not participate in the
alleged harassment had been disciplined on the bases of not reporting, investigating,
or eliminating sexual harassment.
219. Some arbitrations, however, defy easy classification. For example, in General
Dynamics, Ft. Worth Division, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 180 (1992) (Francis, Arb.), the
company charged the victim with sexual harassment based on her sending a letter
detailing the harasser's actions toward her to the harasser's wife. See id. at 181. While
victim actions were generally excluded, this particular one was included because the
company classified the action as sexual harassment. Supervisor malfeasance was in-
cluded because the failure of the supervisor to act (and discipline based on this) im-
pacts on the employer's liability, thus contributing to the dilemma. See id. at 186-88.
220. For example, in Powermatic/Houdaille, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 54 (1978)
(Cocalis, Arb.), the grievant's discharge for "immoral conduct" was reduced to a sus-
pension. See id. at 56. While the words "sexual harassment" do not appear in the
arbitration, the conduct at issue-grievant sticking his finger through the zipper of his
pants, approaching a female co-worker, and telling her what he "had for her"-would
today be classified conduct creating or contributing to hostile environment sexual har-
assment. See id. at 55-56.
221. In the language area, I also drew a distinction between "garden variety" exple-
tives and language which could possibly be considered sexual harassment under Title
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cided after sexual harassment was recognized by circuit courts as a
claim, but not before then. Again, the deciding factor was whether
the arbitrator's treatment of the grievance would contribute to the
employer's dilemma.
The resulting database contains 316 arbitrations.2" It is important
to note, however, that even with this methodology, some relevant ar-
bitration opinions were not included.3
2. What the Data Revealed
Generally, almost half of all discipline issued for sexual harassment
(or conduct which could constitute sexual harassment under Title VII
standards) is altered by the arbitrator. Of the 316 arbitrations ex-
amined: discipline in 42 instances was completely reversed-leaving
no penalty; while discipline in 110 instances was reduced-with some
lesser penalty allowed. Further, some amount of back pay was
awarded to the grievant in 66% of the arbitrations reversing or alter-
ing the employer's penalty. 24 While penalty modification in almost
half of the arbitrations is troublesome, the positive side is that some
penalty is almost always allowed. 225 Thus, arbitrators generally recog-
nize that some discipline is appropriate when sexually harassing con-
duct occurs.
Like the courts considering Title VII cases,26 however, arbitrators
tend to require no particular level of discipline for any particular type
of harassment." 7 Discharge was the most frequent choice of disci-
pline for employers, consisting of approximately 71% of the arbitra-
VII. The task of sorting language reveals, at least in part, the difficulty with harass-
ment law. In general, I eliminated cases which involved language which is neither
sexualized nor directed (that is, not stated to another person, or made about another
person). For example, the term "bitch," even muttered under one's breath, but in the
presence of another, and arguably about that individual, would be included, while a
similar muttering of "Life's a bitch," would not be included.
222. These arbitration cases are listed in the Appendix.
223. For example, the opinion in the Chrysler arbitration, which overturned a dis-
charge, and was subsequently upheld in district court, was not reported in any of the
search sources. There are sure to be others similarly not reported. The search was
extensive enough, however, to reach some general conclusions, and identify the gen-
eral trends discussed here.
224. Back pay was awarded in 96 of 152 reversals and reductions. Further, back
pay was not imputed in eight reductions because the original penalty did not disrupt
pay.
225. A very slight majority (52%) of the arbitrations upheld the original penalty.
When combined with the number of arbitrations in which some penalty was allowed,
more than 86% of cases resulted in a penalty of some sort.
226. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
227. Not even uncontested, unwelcome, overt sexual touching automatically yields
discharge. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus.
Workers, 959 F.2d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that it is within the arbitrator's
power to reinstate an employee charged with sexual assault). Indeed, not even lesser
penalties were consistently upheld in instances of overt sexual touching. See, e.g.,
General Electric Co., No. 93-09863, 1994 WL 837646, at *6-7 (Jan. 5, 1994) (Millious,
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tions studied. A somewhat surprising fact, however, was that
discharges were upheld (54%) to a greater degree than were lesser
penalties (47%).221
TABLE 1: TOTAL REVIEWED ARBITRATIONS BY RESULT
AND VICTIM TYPE
Employee Student Customer Public Total
Total 259 25 29 3 316
Reversed 33 3 6 0 42
Reduced 92 11 6 1 110
Upheld 134 11 17 2 164
(52%) (44%) (59%) (67%) (52%)
Interestingly, discipline was most likely to be upheld when a cus-
tomer or member of the public was involved. Arbitrators, perhaps
TABLE 2: REVIEWED ARBITRATIONS BY PENALTY TYPE, VICTIM
TYPE, AND RESULT
Employee Student Client Public Total
Total Discharges 182 16 25 2 225
Reversed 18 2 4 0 24
Reduced 67 7 5 1 80
Upheld 97 7 16 1 121
Total Lesser Penalties 77 9 4 1 91
Reversed 15 1 2 0 18
Reduced 25 4 1 0 30
Upheld 37 4 1 1 43
more attuned to business than civil rights considerations, placed great
weight on a company's need to maintain customers and a good reputa-
tion in the community at large. For example, in South Central Bell
Telephone,2 9 the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a telephone in-
staller who had propositioned a customer, stating that he was "unwill-
ing to ... reinstate this man and send him into the homes of...
subscribers. 2 30 More recently, in Taylor Beverage Co.,231 Arbitrator
Fullmer similarly refused to reinstate a discharged employee in part
because the employee's harassing behavior would have serious com-
mercial effects. z 2
Arb.) (reducing a reprimand to a warning, even though the victim testified that she
felt something between her legs as the grievant passed behind her).
228. I also analyzed the data to determine how, if at all, other factors affected
whether the penalty was upheld. I initially reviewed the arbitrations by type of vic-
tim, type of penalty and type of employer. These results are presented in Tables 1-3.
229. 71-1 Arb. T 8297 (1971) (Ray, Arb.).
230. Id. at 4044.
231. 97-1 Arb. 3131 (1996) (Fullmer, Arb.).
232. Id. at 3727-28.
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TABLE 3: REVIEWED ARBITRATIONS BY TYPE OF ENTITy
AND RESULT
Private Public/State Federal Total
Total Discharges 159 64 2 225
Reversed 20 4 0 24
Reduced 49 29 2 80
Upheld 90 31 0 121
Total Lesser Penalties 27 52 12 91
Reversed 7 9 2 18
Reduced 6 22 2 30
Upheld 14 21 8 43
Total Arbitrations 186 116 14 316
All Reversed 27 13 2 42
All Reduced 55 51 4 110
All Upheld 104 52 8 164
Private sector employers also fared much better than governmental
entities in having their selected discipline sustained-nearly 60% of
private sector penalties were upheld, compared to 46% of public sec-
tor penalties.3 3
The role of prior discipline, the type of harassment, and the ap-
proval rate of discipline over time were also reviewed.3 As might be
expected, prior discipline played a significant role in whether the pen-
alty assessed by the employer was upheld. 35 Prior discipline was dis-
cussed in some form in 215 cases. When there had been a prior
occurrence of discipline, the discipline at issue was upheld in 62% of
the cases. In contrast, when there had been no prior discipline, the
discipline at issue was upheld in 38% of the cases. Despite this rela-
tively low rate, there were twenty-five instances of upheld discharges
even when the grievant had had no prior discipline.
Among those cases in which there had been prior discipline, there
was very little difference based on the cause of the prior discipline.
Where the grievant had been previously disciplined for sexual harass-
ment (with or without additional unrelated discipline) the employers'
choice of discipline was upheld 64% [61/96] of the time. When there
was only unrelated discipline (not related to sexual harassing con-
duct), the approval rate-62% [16/26-remained high. In compari-
son, when the grievant had no prior discipline at all, approval of the
employer's discipline plummeted to 39% [33/85].
233. See supra Table 3.
234. Additional factors of interest were discussed too infrequently in the arbitra-
tions to reach even tentative conclusions. These included the longevity of the grievant
and his overall work, as opposed to disciplinary record, geographic location, and dis-
crimination against the alleged harasser on other bases.
235. In 111 arbitrations, the issue of prior discipline was not discussed at all; thus,
no assumptions can be made as to whether there was such discipline. For those cases,
the employers' choice of discipline was upheld 49% of the time.
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The type of sexual harassment also had an impact on whether the
arbitrator upheld the imposed discipline. For example, 61% of all
levels of discipline were sustained when the conduct involved overt
sexual touching, followed very closely by 60% of discipline sustained
for all physical harassment. The highest rate of upheld discipline oc-
curred, however, when the alleged harasser engaged in some type of
stalking activity-such as inappropriate following, isolating, or threat-
ening the victim. A much lower rate of upholding penalties occurred
when only verbal harassment was involved (about 50%), and even
lower when non-verbal gawking, staring, or pestering occurred
(45%).236
Lastly, I attempted to discern if there were any trends developing
over time. In light of the heightened awareness of sexual harassment,
some changes would be expected as arbitrators become sensitized to
the issue and aware of the liability the employer faces if it fails to take
action to eliminate known sexual harassment. Overall, the percentage
of instances in which arbitrators upheld the employer's choice of disci-
pline increased over time. While slightly fewer penalties were upheld
in 1990 than in 1995, the percentage of penalties upheld after 1990
(55% of discharges and 48% of lesser penalties) was dramatically
greater than the percentage of penalties upheld before 1990 (45% of
discharges and 44% of lesser penalties).
TABLE 4: ARBITRATION RESULTS BY YEAR
1969-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98
All Penalties 11 33 59 132 81
Reversed 1 7 10 16 8
Reduced 5 10 25 38 32
Upheld 5 16 24 78 41
Discharges 11 25 39 91 58
Reversed 1 3 5 11 4
Reduced 5 10 19 27 19
Upheld 5 12 16 53 35
Lesser Penalties 0 8 19 41 23
Reversed 0 4 5 5 4
Reduced 0 0 6 11 13
Upheld 0 4 8 25 6
In addition to looking at overall trends, I attempted to cull out arbi-
trations where the key basis for the decision was a failure of proof due
to credibility issues, since under my proposed reforms the arbitrator
would retain the duty to weigh credibility and find facts 37
236. In the arbitrations examined, visual harassment, including gestures, always oc-
curred along with some other type of harassment, and thus is not analyzed separately
here.
237. This was done because any reform of the system would leave intact the arbitra-
tor's duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Under any system, it is likely
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This analysis shows only general trends, as arbitrators would fre-
quently cite multiple reasons for their actions. In the forty-two in-
stances where no penalty was allowed, due process considerations
were cited twelve times,28 and proof failure-including failure of the
victim to testify-was cited nineteen times.?39 In fourteen instances,
the arbitrator determined that the conduct at issue was not sexual har-
assment.2' Lack of notice, former laxity on the part of the employer,
and inconsistency in treatment were cited six times. 241 When the pen-
that reversals, and even reductions in penalties, occur because the arbitrator disbe-
lieves the complaining victim, or the victim fails to appear at the hearing.
238. See Contico Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 865254 (July 1996) (Crider, Arb.); National
Educ. Ass'n, 23 LAIS 3710 (1995) (Bloodsworth, Arb.); Delta Beverage Group, Inc.,
1995 WL 707557 (June 12, 1995) (Singer, Arb.); Headquarters Space & Missile, 103
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1198 (1995) (McCurdy, Arb.); Earle M. Jorgensen Steel & Alumi-
num Co., FMCS No. 93-12897, 1994 WL 854694 (Apr. 5, 1994) (Goldstein, Arb.);
Pennyrile Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., FMCS No. 93-10232, 1993 WL 788392 (Aug. 24,
1993) (Wren, Arb.); City of Riviera Beach, FMCS No. 91-28226, 1992 WL 732099
(Mar. 26, 1992) (Mayer, Arb.); Stroehman Bakeries, 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873 (1990)
(Sands, Arb.); Heublein, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1292 (1987) (Ellmann, Arb.);
DeVry Inst. of Tech., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1149 (1986) (Berman, Arb.); Kidde, Inc.,
86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681 (1985) (Dunn, Arb.); Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 82 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 25 (1984) (Dallas, Arb.).
239. See County of Santa Clara, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1092 (1996) (Levy, Arb.);
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 23 LAIS 3703 (1996) (Crane, Arb.); Metropolitan Council
Transit Operators, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 68 (1996) (Daly, Arb.); Benzie County Cent.
Schs., 1995 WL 852208 (Jan. 16, 1995) (Borland, Arb.); City of San Antonio, 1995 VL
707528 (June 28, 1995) (Moore, Arb.); AFSME Dist. Council 81, Local 218, 1994 WL
875876 (Dec. 12, 1994) (DiLauro, Arb.); Indiana Univ., 94-2 Arb. 91 4543 (1994)
(Heekin, Arb.); Saginaw Intermediate Bd. of Educ., 95-1 Arb. 5049 (1994) (Ipson,
Arb.); Pennyrile Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., FMCS No. 93-10232, 1993 WL 788392
(Aug. 24, 1993) (Wren, Arb.); Duke Univ., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 316 (1993) (Hooper,
Arb.); City of Riviera Beach, FMCS No. 91-28226, 1992 WL 732099 (Mar. 26, 1992)
(Mayer, Arb.); City of Pembroke Pines, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 365 (1989) (Cantor,
Arb.); City of Seattle, 15 LAIS 3629 (1987) (Snow, Arb.); Clover Park Sch. Dist. 89,
89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 76 (1987) (Boedecker, Arb.); Akron Metro. Reg'l Transp. Auth.,
13 LAIS 2122 (1986) (Strasshofer, Jr., Arb.); Shell Oil Co., 85-1 Arb. 1 8130 (1984)
(Coffey, Arb.); Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 25 (1984) (Dallas,
Arb.); Dodds Liverno Am. High Sch., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 761 (1983) (Zack, Arb.);
Port Huron Area Sch. Dist., 80-1 Arb. 1 8174 (1980) (Lipson, Arb.).
240. See Fleming Foods, Inc., Houston Div., FMCS No. 96-25543-8, 1997 WL
585677 (May 30, 1997) (Bankston, Arb.); National Educ. Ass'n, 23 LAIS 3710 (1995)
(Bloodsworth, Arb.); Genesee County, Friend of the Court, 1994 WL 861447 (June
21, 1994) (Elhmann, Arb.); Georgia Pac. Corp., FMCS No. 92-20643, 1993 WL 788325
(Jan. 28, 1993) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1993 WL 801302 (June
21, 1993) (Oldham, Arb.); Prudential Insurance Co. of Am., 1993 WL 801372 (Nov.
16, 1993) (Heinsz, Chairman); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 93-2 Arb. 1
3440 (1992) (Fisher, Arb.); Nuclear Fuel Servs., 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1204 (1989)
(Clarke, Arb.); City of Seattle, 15 LAIS 3629 (1987) (Snow, Arb.); Independent Sch.
Dist., No. 833, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 713 (1987) (Gallagher, Arb.); Shell Oil Co., 85-1
Arb. 1 8130 (1984) (Coffey, Arb.); Washington Scientific Indus., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
824 (1984) (Kapsch, Sr., Arb.); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 730
(1983) (Stonehouse, Jr., Arb.); Southern New England Tel. Co., 9 LAIS 1270 (1982).
241. See Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 1995 WL 707557 (June 12, 1995) (Singer, Jr.,
Arb.); Earle M. Jorgensen Steel & Aluminum Co., FMCS No. 93-12897, 1994 WL
854694 (Apr. 5, 1994) (Goldstein, Arb.); City of Minneapolis, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
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alty was reduced, due process issues-other than lack of notice, for-
mer laxity and inconsistency-were cited only eight out of 110
arbitrations. 42 Concerns that the punishment was simply too severe
for the conduct was cited thirty times,2 43 and the need for progressive
discipline was cited twenty-four times (including eight instances where
severity was also cited). 2 "
1006 (1993) (Daly, Arb.); RMS Tech., 17 LAIS 3686 (1990) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); King
Soopers, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 254 (1985) (Sass, Arb.); Kentucky Textile Indus.,
Inc., 70-1 Arb. 8127 (1969) (Williams, Arb.).
242. See University of Mich., 1997 WL 753691 (Jan. 9, 1997) (House, Arb.); USAF,
107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1089 (1997) (Stephens, Arb.); Avis Rent a Car Shuttlers, 105
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057 (1995) (Wahl, Arb.); Dow Chem. Co., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 510
(1990) (Sartain, Arb.); Ohiocubco, Inc., 88-2 Arb. 8394 (1988) (Savage, Arb.); Santa
Clara County, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1226 (1987) (Concepcion, Arb.); Weber Aircraft,
Inc, 13 LAIS 3344 (1985) (Dunn, Arb.); Vons Grocery Co., 11 LAIS 1259 (1984)
(Kaufman, Arb.).
243. See Safeway, Inc., 108 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 787 (1997) (Staudohar, Arb.); Depart-
ment of Corrections, D.C., 1996 WL 658897 (May 19, 1996) (Rogers, Arb.); County of
San Joaquin Sheriff's Dep't, 1995 WL 600998 (Feb. 13, 1995) (Bogue, Arb.); Avis
Rent a Car Shuttlers, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057 (1995) (Wahl, Arb.); Michigan Dep't
of Transp., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1196 (1995) (Kelman, Arb.); Norfolk Naval Ship-
yard, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 991 (1995) (Bernhardt, Arb.); City of Harper Woods, 21
LAIS 2080 (1994) (Sugerman, Arb.); United Foods & Commercial Workers Union,
Local #653, 1993 WL 797829 (Apr. 9, 1993) (Berquist, Arb.); Springfield Local Sch.
Dist., 93-2 Arb. 3524 (1993) (Curry, Jr., Arb.); United Tel. Co., FMCS No. 92-12531,
1992 WL 726466 (Oct. 2, 1992) (Richard, Arb.); State of Wash. Printing Dep't, 98 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 440 (1992) (Griffin, Arb.); Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 1991 WL 693196 (Sept. 4, 1991) (DiLauro, Arb.); Dow Chem. Co., 95 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 510 (1990) (Sartain, Arb.); GTE Fla., Inc., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090
(1989) (Cohen, Arb.); National Oats Co., Inc., 17 LAIS 3765 (1989) (Smith, Arb.);
Stater Bros. Mkts., 16 LAIS 4238 (1989) (Wilmoth, Arb.); City of Corpus Christi, 16
LAIS 3951 (1988); Ohio Dep't of Transp., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 783 (1988) (Duda, Jr.,
Arb.); Washoe County Sherrif's Deputies Ass'n, 88-2 Arb. % 8415 (1988) (Staudohar,
Arb.); Rockford Sch. Dist., 88-2 Arb. 8367 (1987) (Traynor, Arb.); County of Ram-
sey, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1986) (Gallagher, Arb.); Mobil Oil, 14 LAIS 3707
(1986) (Ellmann, Arb.); Steams County, Minn., 13 LAIS 2093 (1986) (ARB); Todd
Shipyards Corp., 13 LAIS 3442 (1985) (Koven, Arb.); Meijer, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
570 (1984) (Ellmann, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 940 (1982)
(Stoltenberg, Arb.); Hayes Int'l Corp., 81-2 Arb. 8603 (1981) (Carson, Arb.);
Perfection Am. Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 520 (1979) (Flannagan, Arb.); Campbell
Soup Co., 78-2 Arb. 8293 (1978) (Weiss, Arb.); Powermatic/Houdaille, Inc., 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 54 (1978) (Cocalis, Arb.).
244. See Madison County (Ind.) Youth Ctr., 1997 WL 706680 (Feb. 6, 1997) (Brun-
ner, Arb.); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 1996 WL 578202 (Mar. 7,
1996) (Goldberg, Arb.); Department of Corrections, D.C., 1996 WL 658897 (May 19,
1996) (Rogers, Arb.); Fairfield City Sch. Dist., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 669 (1996) (Duff,
Arb.); Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 276 (1996)
(Koenig, Arb.); County of Hennepin, Minn., 1995 WL 600954 (May 20, 1995)
(Boganno, Arb.); Medical College of Ohio, 1995 WL 852272 (Dec. 1, 1995) (Duda,
Jr., Arb.); Avis Rent a Car Shuttlers, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057 (1995) (Wahl, Arb.);
Michigan Dep't of Transp., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1196 (1995) (Kelman, Arb.); City of
Troy, 1994 WL 853738 (May 13, 1994) (Daniel, Arb.); Cass County Bd. of Comm'rs,
1994 WL 854715 (May 31, 1994) (Fogelberg, Arb.); Independent Sch. Dist. 255, 21
LAIS 4012 (1994) (Daly, Arb.); Nob Hill Foods, 1993 WL 814033 (Sept. 9, 1993) (Sil-
ver, Arb.); King County Dep't of Adult Detention, 21 LAIS 2084 (1993) (McCaffree,
Arb.); Flushing Community Sch., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 444 (1992) (Daniel, Arb.);
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3. The Arbitrators' Analysis: The Seven Just Cause Factors
While the numbers show the general trends and demonstrate in
broad terms why arbitrators are not sustaining nearly half of all em-
ployer imposed penalties for sexual harassment, a closer look at their
written analysis reveals that courts in sexual harassment cases and ar-
bitrators deciding the appropriateness of discipline look at discipline
from different perspectives. In the context of Title VII cases, courts
do not analyze whether the level of discipline imposed by the em-
ployer exceeded what was needed to constitute prompt and appropri-
ate corrective action. Rather, courts determine whether the employer
has taken sufficient steps-including disciplining the harasser 245 -to
eliminate the hostile environment. Thus, under Title VII, courts do
not acknowledge the possibility of imposing too much discipline 46
Arbitrators, on the other hand, ask whether the discipline was exces-
sive-either under the principle of progressive discipline or under the
general requirement of just cause.247
In determining whether to sustain a grievance, the primary function
of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce the terms of the contract,
Ralphs Grocery Co., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 63 (1992) (Kaufman, Arb.); Green Bay
Packing Co., FMCS No. 90-25109, 1991 WL 716705 (June 13, 1991) (Fogelberg, Arb.);
KIAM, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 617 (1991) (Bard, Arb.); Dow Chem. Co., 95 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 510 (1990) (Sartain, Arb.); Honeywell, Inc., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1097 (1990)
(Gallagher, Arb.); National Oats Co., Inc., 17 LAIS 3765 (1989) (Smith, Arb.); Ohio
Dep't of Transp., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 783 (1988) (Duda, Jr., Arb.); Washoe County
Sherrif's Deputies Ass'n, 88-2 Arb. 8415 (1988) (Staudohar, Arb.); County of Ram-
sey, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1986) (Gallagher, Arb.); Sugardale Foods, Inc., 86 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1017 (1986) (Duda, Jr., Arb.); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 13 LAIS 3630
(1985) (Kaufman, Arb.); Hyatt Hotels Palo Alto, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 11 (1985) (Oes-
treich, Arb.); David R. Webb Co., 84-1 Arb. 9[ 8290 (1984) (Kossoff, Arb.).
245. As previously noted, the employer's action must be "reasonably calculated to
end the harassment," and the lack of discipline may lead to a finding that the action
was not reasonable. See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)). In Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991), for example, the employer's ultimate decision to settle the grievance and
have a six-month separation and cooling-off period was deemed insufficient because
there was no discipline of the harasser. See id. at 881-83.
246. To the contrary, where courts address the issue of discipline, they do so for the
purpose of determining whether there was enough discipline. See Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). In reversing a summary judgment for the
defendant, the Ninth Circuit noted that the delayed discharge of the harasser was not
prompt and appropriate action which would relieve the employer of liability. See id. at
1464. Rather, the court wondered why the employer had not fired the harasser "out-
right and early on." Id.
247. The sixth and seventh factors identified by Arbitrator Daugherty in Enterprise
Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359, 362 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.), as relevant to a
determination of just cause pertain to the reasonableness of the penalty, even in the
absence of a progressive discipline requirement. See Hyatt Hotels Palo Alto, 85 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 11 (1985) (Oestreich, Arb.) (reducing a discharge penalty to a fifteen day
suspension without pay). In reducing a discharge, Arbitrator Oestreich stated that,
"[o]ne of the underlying philosophies of progressive discipline is that the purpose of
the disciplinary action is rehabilitation." Id. at 15.
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not to enforce Title VII.24 8 Thus, the arbitrator's duty is to look to the
terms of the contract and related work rules to determine whether
there has been compliance. 49 In a Title VII case, by contrast, the
court's primary focus is on interpreting and enforcing that statute.
Moreover, a closer look at the seven factors identified by Arbitrator
Daugherty as relevant in determining whether an employer had just
cause for disciplining an employee 25  reveals that all but the second
factor-was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably re-
lated to (a) the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the business
and (b) the performance that the company might expect of the em-
ployee-may lead an arbitrator making a just cause determination to
reach a different conclusion than a court analyzing the same facts in a
Title VII case. Thus, the possibility of conflict under six of the seven
factors-especially combined with Arbitrator Daugherty's admonition
that the employer's failure to comply with even one factor forecloses a
finding of just cause-means that at least the potential for conflicting
decisions is ever present.
a. Factor 1: Warning the Employee About the Consequences of
His Actions
The first component of just cause requires that the employee have
knowledge of the rule that he is alleged to have violated and of the
consequences of violating it. Although arbitrators sometimes uphold
discipline for severe forms of harassment in the absence of a policy,25'
248. In upholding an arbitrators' reinstatement of an employee dismissed for sexual
harassment, the court in Communications Workers v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc.,
27 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 1998), addressed the dilemma of apparent conflicts be-
tween Title VII and the just cause requirement of a collective bargaining agreement.
Noting that the company knew of its Title VII obligations at the time the contract was
negotiated, the court refused to read a more stringent requirement into the contract.
That 1996 agreement established rights and obligations concerning the 'just
cause' required to support the dismissal of a six-month employee, without
any specific reference to the company's rights and obligations regarding the
prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace. If the 'just cause' stan-
dard as embodied in the agreement fails to shield Bell Atlantic to its satisfac-
tion from its future liabilities under Title VII, it is a dilemma of the
company's own making.
Id. at 71.
249. Even where the arbitrator recognized the difference, it usually did not influ-
ence the decision. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of Transp., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1196,
1201 (1995) (Kelman, Arb.) (reducing a three-day suspension to a written warning in
keeping with the contract's requirement for progressive discipline, despite the em-
ployer's fear that it would be sued by the victim); County of Ramsey, 86 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 249, 254 (1986) (Gallagher, Arb.) (reducing a discharge to a thirty-day suspen-
sion because penalty was too severe for the conduct and employer's fear of liability
did not matter).
250. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
251. In Alaska, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 897, 900 (1985) (Krebs, Arb.), the arbitrator
upheld a five-day suspension, noting that the grievant would not need a warning to
know that breast grabbing could lead to discipline.
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many view the lack of a policy, or the failure to define sexual harass-
ment clearly, as not providing sufficient notice of what behavior will
lead to discipline. Thus, an employer who has no sexual harassment
policy, or who has failed to fully inform its employees of what the plan
means, increases the likelihood that an arbitrator will reverse its disci-
plinary action." 2 In fact, lack of notice was a recurring reason for
reversing discipline 53
For an employer that has no sexual harassment policy, the only
hope of avoiding Title VII liability is to act quickly and forcefully
upon knowledge of conduct that constitutes legal sexual harass-
ment.' If the discipline exacted in such situations is light, courts are
likely to view such an employer as one that does not take sexual har-
assment seriously but merely metes out a late "slap on the wrist" in
order to avoid liability- 5 By contrast, an employer that imposes se-
vere discipline in the absence of a sexual harassment policy cannot
realistically expect to persuade an arbitrator that it has satisfied the
requirement, under the first factor, that the employee know of the
employer's sexual harassment policy.
Arbitrators have also found, however, that even where a policy ex-
ists, it must be sufficiently detailed to inform the employee of what
conduct is improper. This is especially true where the conduct is am-
252. For example, in Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 1995 WL 707557, at "15 (June 12,
1995) (Singer, Arb.), a discharge was reversed because the employer did not dis-
tribute its sexual harassment policy until after the incident upon which the discharge
took place.
253. A frequent problem was that the policy was too vague, or the conduct was
innocuous so as not to fit clearly within the policy. In American Mirrex Corp., 1992
WL 698140 (Feb. 5, 1992) (Edgett, Arb.), the grievant's conduct of walking around
with his pants noticeably below his waist was held to be sexual harassment, but his
discharge was reduced because the grievant had not received a prior warning. In
KIAM, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 617, 630 (1991) (Bard, Arb.), the arbitrator similarly
reduced the discharge of the grievant, because the policy was vague, and it was not
clear whether the grievant was committing harassment or simply trying to date the
victim. In RMS Technologies, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297, 300-02 (1990) (Nicholas,
Arb.), the arbitrator found the policy too vague, and also raised First Amendment
questions regarding the conduct (bringing in a magazine) with which grievant was
charged.
254. Compare Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343-44 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding that warning the harasser of potential future discharge was an insuffi-
cient token effort and criticizing the employer for not having a sexual harassment
policy), with Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407,413-14 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a
non-disciplinary conversation which warned of the further consequences of harass-
ment was sufficient where the harassment stopped and where the company had an
open door policy on sexual harassment).
255. The court in Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributors noted, -Although we recog-
nize that the 'mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimina-
tion,' does not necessarily 'insulate [an employer] from liability[,]' if Tri-State had had
an effective sexual harassment policy in place, the results of this case may have been
different." 981 F.2d at 344 (citations omitted).
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biguous2 5 6 and the policy simply mirrors Title VII case language or
EEOC regulations.257 As noted in part II, courts have struggled with
that language, and, aside from overtly sexual conduct or words, it can
be unclear what type of conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 58
Finally, the notice requirement includes notice of the consequences
of the conduct. While this factor somewhat overlaps the requirement
relating to reasonableness of penalty, in some instances discipline was
modified not on the ground that the penalty was unreasonable in an
objective sense, but on the basis that the grievant had insufficient no-
tice of the consequence. 59 Moreover, even when the policy provides
for the penalty, such penalty may not be assessed if the authorization
is vague.26 °
256. As noted, conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the levcl
of actionable sexual harassment. Employers and employees alike may be quick to
recognize severe conduct as sexual harassment. They may be less likely to recognize
the potential illegal status of lesser conduct, which is also legal sexual harassment if it
occurs with sufficient frequency to be considered pervasive. Notice that this type of
conduct is grounds for discipline even before it rises to that level of pervasiveness. If
the employee waits until the activity becomes pervasive enough to be considered legal
sexual harassment, it may well find itself simultaneously liable, since that same perva-
siveness may provide the victim with a basis for arguing that the conduct was public
and ongoing, and thus the employer "should have known" about it and taken correc-
tive action.
257. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 1993 WL 801372 (Nov. 16, 1993)
(Heinsz, Chairman), the employer had a sexual harassment policy that parroted in
large part the EEOC guidelines. The grievant received a warning letter after engag-
ing a female co-worker in conversation that she considered sexual in nature. See id. at
*3. In ordering a warning letter rescinded and allowing no penalty, the arbitrator
noted that while the company was free to implement rules more stringent than Title
VII, it had not clearly done so. See id. at *7. "The problem lies in its failure to put its
employees, including Grievant, on sufficient notice that the kind of acts charged to
Grievant is within the scope of the conduct which is not tolerated under its sexual
harassment policy." Id. at *8; see also KIAM, 97 Lab. Arb. at 625-30 (reducing a
discharge to a written warning because, inter alia, the sexual harassment policy was
vague, and providing a thorough discussion on the relationship between Title VII and
the arbitrator's role).
258. Prudential Insurance, 1993 WL 801372, at *8, is an example of just such a prob-
lem. See also note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the range of perspectives
used to evaluate conduct in sexual harassment situations).
259. This is particularly a problem when the penalty assessed is discharge. For ex-
ample, National Oats Co., Inc., 90-1 Arb. 8257 (1989) (Smith, Arb.); Vons Grocery,
88-2 Arb. 8611 (1987) (Prihar, Arb.); Boys Markets, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1304
(1987) (Wilmoth, Arb.); Sugardale Foods, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1017 (1986)
(Duda, Arb.); and David R. Webb Co., 84-1 Arb. $ 8290 (1984) (Kossoff, Arb.), all
involved discharges reduced to lesser penalties because the policies at issue failed to
specify sexual harassment as being subject to summary discharge.
260. In Ralphs Grocery Co., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 63 (1992) (Kaufman, Arb.), the
sexual harassment policy authorized penalties up to discharge. In reducing a dis-
charge for explicit verbal harassment, the arbitrator noted that while the policy au-
thorized discharge, it did not call for discharge in every instance. See id. at 66.
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b. Factor 2: Reasonable Business Relatedness of the Rule
The second factor-which asks whether the company's rule is rea-
sonably related to the efficient operation of the business-would ap-
pear not to create tension between the arbitrator's role in evaluating
the reasonableness of the employer's rules and the court's role in de-
termining whether the employer has complied with its duty to prevent
and eliminate sexual harassment. Certainly, a rule designed to pre-
vent the employer from breaking a federal law and from incurring
expenses and loss due to sexual harassment261 would seem to meet the
just cause standard for business relatedness, and arbitrators generally
find that anti-harassment rules are reasonable.262 Even before sexual
harassment was recognized as a separate cause of action under Title
VII, arbitrators found work rules pertaining to "immoral conduct"
and "abusive language" to be reasonable and upheld discipline based
on violations of such rules.26 3 Thus, employers had the right to regu-
late conduct, regardless of whether the conduct constituted sexual
harassment or had other legal implications, or whether the conduct
simply affected the efficient operation of the business.
Arbitrators dealing with rules violations, however, sometimes face
interpretational difficulties dissimilar to judges in sexual harassment
cases. In Underwood Glass,264 the arbitrator noted that foul and pro-
fane language must be viewed in the totality of the circumstances.
From an arbitrator's viewpoint, these circumstances include consider-
ation of the prevailing atmosphere at the company-and, in some in-
stances, in the industry-as a basis for finding the conduct reasonable
and not subject to discipline.265 When a judge in a sexual harassment
261. In addition to the obvious and substantial legal costs directly attributed to sex-
ual harassment, employers suffer losses due to lost productivity and similar issues.
One estimate is that sexual harassment costs for a Fortune 500 company are approxi-
mately $6.7 million annually, in the form of reduced productivity, absenteeism, em-
ployee turnover, and the use of internal complaint processes. Carrie A. Bond, Note,
Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment Disputes in the Workplace, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 2489, 2499-500 (1997).
262. Employers are free to institute reasonable work rules unilaterally, so long as
they are not inconsistent wvith law or the collective bargaining agreement. See Elkouri
& Elkouri, supra note 188, at 764. Rules banning sexual harassment, or even conduct
which is arguably "only" a precursor to sexual harassment, cannot be said to conflict
with the law. Furthermore, collective bargaining agreements routinely contain anti-
discrimination language.
263. In Cincinnati Cleaning & Finishing Machinery Co., 73-2 Arb. 8397 (1973)
(Chalfie, Arb.), the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a grievant who rubbed the sides
and patted the buttocks of two female co-workers-whom the arbitrator referred to
as "girls"-on the ground of immoral conduct.
264. 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1139, 1142 (1972) (Hon, Arb.).
265. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 776 (1996) (Borland, Arb.)
(taking into consideration the all-male environment in deciding to reduce a dis-
charge); Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360, 364 (1996) (lines,
Arb.) (holding a supervisor's participation as sexual horseplay and a reason to reduce
discharge); City of Minneapolis, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1006, 1008 (1993) (Daly, Arb.)
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case looks at the totality of circumstances to assess the existence of
sexual harassment, however, the fact that the employer has allowed a
hostile environment, replete with jocular activities, to exist over a pe-
riod of time is likely to cut against that employer.
Another example of dissimilar interpretational problems is illus-
trated in Powermatic,266 where the contract at issue provided that im-
moral conduct was a dischargeable offense.26 7 There, the arbitrator
struggled with defining the word "immoral" and ultimately reduced a
discharge after finding that the conduct at issue was improper, but not
"immoral. '268 In the context of sexual harassment, however, the em-
ployer, in need of removing a harassing employee from the workplace,
may not be concerned with the nuances which distinguish improper
from immoral conduct. Indeed, many forms of sexual harassment
might not be considered "immoral" as such.26 9
Further, there is a need to understand the double-edged nature of
such discipline: under sexual harassment law, the primary purpose of
discipline is not to rehabilitate the harasser, but to eliminate the hos-
tile environment or potentially face legal liability. Further, whether
the environment ceases to be hostile is viewed, at least in part, from
the perspective of the victim. Thus, the selected discipline must not
only prevent the conduct from recurring, but also give some level of
assurance to the victim that it will not recur.2 70 Arbitrators, however,
do not always understand this distinction or the need to adhere to this
tenet.271 Indeed, in County of Ramsey,272 the arbitrator even sug-
gested that the employer could use the arbitrator's action-modifying
the imposed discipline-as a defense in a subsequent sexual harass-
ment case. 73 In that case, the arbitrator reduced a discharge and
noted that fear of liability for sexual harassment was not a factor for
his consideration in determining the appropriateness of the penalty
(noting that all employees at the 911 facility cursed to relieve stress and, thus, decid-
ing to reverse suspension and allow no penalty).
266. 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 54 (1978) (Cocalis, Arb.).
267. Id. at 55.
268. Id. at 55-56. In that instance, immoral conduct was a dischargable offense
under the contract, so the interpretation governed whether the discharge could stand.
269. For example, in Ellison v. Brady, the harassment consisted of sending "love
letters," which, although the sender "could be portrayed as a modern-day Cyrano de
Bergerac," were contextually frightening and threatening. 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir.
1991).
270. This is because a victim's environment can continue to be hostile, even in the
absence of continued action, if the victim is unaware that the harasser is not going to
act again. At least for some length of time, the atmosphere will continue to be
poisoned by the fear that the abusive conduct will recur.
271. The point is that the need to reassure the victim-which should be considered
in sexual harassment cases-is not a tenet of arbitration. Thus, the arbitrator need
not consider that factor when evaluating the propriety of the discipline imposed by
the employer. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
272. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1986) (Gallagher, Arb.).
273. See id. at 253-54.
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because the employer could defend any subsequent action by showing
that it tried to discharge the grievant but was overturned in arbitra-
tion. 74 While this may indeed protect the employer from liability, it
does not consider whether removal of the harasser was necessary to
actually end the hostile environment and protect future victims.
The trend in the reviewed arbitrations shows that lesser penalties
were modified more frequently than discharges, and this was often
because the arbitrator viewed the conduct too trivial to warrant disci-
pline.275 Arbitrators should recognize, however, the employers' legal
need to impose discipline where conduct is ambiguous. Low levels of
discipline for sporadic, ambiguous conduct may be necessary to keep
the conduct from growing into harassment, either because the har-
asser's conduct becomes more blatant in the absence of discipline,2 76
or simply because continuation of the same conduct over time be-
comes sufficiently pervasive to constitute harassment. Thus, in addi-
tion to recognizing the inherent reasonableness of employer rules that
specifically prohibit "sexual harassment," arbitrators should assess the
reasonableness of all related conduct by the employer which seeks to
preclude or eliminate sexual harassment.
c. Factor 3: The Pre-Discipline Investigation
The third factor in determining just cause focuses on whether the
employer made an effort to determine that the employee was in fact
guilty of the alleged misconduct before imposing discipline. Here, an
arbitrator assessing just cause and a court assessing Title VII liability
look at the existence and timing of the employer's investigation from
different perspectives. Indeed, the very reasons for the respective in-
vestigations are different.
Discipline imposed without a prior investigation of the alleged mis-
conduct normally will not satisfy the just cause requirement and will,
therefore, be reversed by the arbitrator.217 In contrast, the employer
must take prompt action reasonably calculated to end the harassment
in order to avoid liability under Title VII. s78 Although to avoid Title
VII liability an employer's investigation must almost always be fol-
274. See id at 253.
275. See supra Table 2.
276. In Medical College of Ohio, FMCS No. 95-06172, 1995 WL 852272, at *34
(Dec. 1, 1995) (Duda, Arb.), the arbitrator reduced a discharge of grievant for touch-
hag the buttocks of a co-worker and simulated oral sex to a sixty-day suspension, on
the grounds that the company's failure to discipline him for earlier less serious of-
fenses may have lulled the grievant into committing this more serious offense. Prior
lax enforcement is also a basis that arbitrators use to reduce or disallow penalties. See
In re Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 776, 780 (1996) (Borland, Arb.).
277. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 919; see also Weber Aircraft, 86-1
Arb. 8200 (1985) (Dunn, Arb.) (noting that grievant was suspended before the com-
pany obtained his version of events and that his later discharge was tainted even
though he had a prior record of similar behavior).
278. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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lowed by the imposition of some form of discipline if the investigation
shows the charges are true, there is no Title VII requirement to inves-
tigate before acting.2 79 An employer who immediately discharges an
alleged harasser has acted in a way which would certainly end the har-
assment and, thus, fulfills its Title VII obligation.28
The thoroughness of the investigation also impacts differently on
sexual harassment liability and just cause determinations. A cursory
or sloppy investigation with no discipline will likely lead to liability
under Title VII.28 1 Thus, it seems to follow that the employer who
conducts a cursory investigation may feel some pressure to also disci-
pline the alleged harasser. Discipline issued after a cursory or sloppy
investigation, however, is not likely to be sustained by an arbitrator. 82
In contrast, where an investigation is too long, some courts may find
that the employer's action was not sufficiently prompt to avoid Title
VII liability.283
d. Factor 4: The Fairness of the Investigation
The fourth factor, which evaluates the fairness of the employer's
investigation, again involves substantive differences between the inter-
ests of an arbitrator and the interests of a court. Just cause mandates
that the investigation must be fair to the accused employee. 84 On the
other hand, Title VII does not take into account the rights of the ac-
279. Title VII does not impose any substantive responsibilities on employers.
Rather, it prohibits the employer from making distinctions based on certain bases,
including sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995). Thus, it does not require an
investigation.
280. While Title VII does not require that an employer discharge the harasser in
order to avoid liability in every instance, see Waymire v. Harris County, 86 F.3d 424,
429 (5th Cir. 1996), in some instances failure to discharge does lead to liability. See
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover,
where the mere presence of the harasser perpetuates the hostile environment, dis-
charge may also be required. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that "[tjo avoid liability under Title VII for failing to remedy a hostile envi-
ronment, employers may even have to remove employees from the workplace if their
mere presence would render the working environment hostile").
281. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying in part on
problems in the investigation as a basis for finding the employer liable for sexual
harassment)-
282. See Firestone Rubber & Latex Co., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 276, 283-84 (1996)
(Koenig, Arb.) (reducing discharge to long-term suspension in part because the em-
ployer did not fairly and objectively investigate the employee accused of racial, eth-
nic, and sexual harassment; the employer did not consider the problems that
prompted co-workers' complaints or the veracity of those complaints, nor did it seek
verification from grievant that he actually committed the complained of actions);
Earle M. Jorgensen Steel & Aluminum Co., FMCS No. 93-12897, 1994 WL 854694, at
*13 (Apr. 5, 1994) (Goldstein, Arb.) (finding no just cause in part due to a poor inves-
tigation where the employer first made only general and discreet inquiries and later
asked leading questions).
283. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
284. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 918-19 (explaining the due process
and procedural requirements for disciplinary actions taken by employers).
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cused harasser. The contradiction contained in these two positions is
obvious. For example, the accused has a right to know the identity of
his accuser and must have a meaningful opportunity to answer the
charges. ,85 In contrast, sexual harassment policies frequently guaran-
tee the confidentiality of the complainant. When the identity of the
alleged victim is -withheld, or even when its release is delayed, arbitra-
tors have not hesitated to vacate the imposed discipline. 21
Employers must also be mindful of the timing of the investigation.
An employer may -wish to separate the accuser and accused while the
investigation is pending. 87 Moving the victim may result in Title VII
claims of retaliation or otherwise result in employer liability for sexual
harassment. 88 Because an investigation is normally expected to pre-
cede any disciplinary decision,289 moving the accused prior to an in-
vestigation may prevent an employer from successfully imposing a
penalty.
e. Factor 5: Burden and Standard of Proof
The fifth factor-which requires substantial evidence that the em-
ployee was guilty of the alleged misconduct-results in one of the
most critical differences between the arbitrator's role in determining
285. For a discussion on the issue of confidentiality, see Whitaker v. Carney, 778
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1985). In response to a former city employee's mandamus action to
enforce a request for access to sexual harassment complaints filed with the city against
him by certain female employees, the court concluded that there was no support for
the proposition that Title VII's regulations required employers to maintain a confi-
dential grievance procedure. See id. at 220-21. For a discussion on the issue of a
meaningful opportunity to answer charges, see Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 1995 VL
707557, at *15 (June 12, 1995) (Singer, Arb.) (reversing a discharge because grievant
was not interviewed before the discharge), and Pennyrile Rural Electric Cooperative
Corp., FMCS No. 93-10232, 1993 WL 788392, at *14 (Aug. 24, 1993) (Wren, Arb.)
(reversing a discharge because employer did not conduct any investigation and took
complaint at face value).
286. In some instances, the employer may receive an -off the record" complaint.
See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. Although unofficial, the complaint
creates actual employer knowledge. If the allegation includes harassing conduct to-
wards others in addition to the complainant, the employer may nonetheless have to
investigate, and again, may not do so confidentially, without offending the just cause
requirement for a fair and impartial investigation. See Great Midwest Mining Corp.,
Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, Local 541, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 52, 55 (1984) (Mikrut, Arb.).
287. See 3 Employment Discrimination, supra note 2, § 46.07[5][b], at 46-108.
288. In Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987), for example, the
court was concerned with the employer's having placed the victim on continuing sick
leave, as opposed to administrative leave, a practice which left the victim with no
record of the real reason for the leave and in fear that she was endangering her posi-
tion as an employee. The need to protect the victim's employment status, even during
the investigation, is consistent with the EEOC's position that an employer's corrective
action is appropriate when it "fully remedie[s] the conduct without adversely affecting
the terms or conditions of the charging party's employment in some manner (for ex-
ample, by requiring the charging party to work ... in a less desirable location)."
EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615A(a)(9)(iii), at 3213 (1991).
289. See Kidde, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681, 682 (1985) (Dunn, Arb.).
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just cause and the court's role in determining whether the employer
took adequate corrective action to avoid Title VII liability. In arbitra-
tion, an employer defending its disciplinary action bears the burden of
persuasion on the question of whether the alleged misconduct actually
occurred.290 Moreover, disciplinary action, particularly discharge, for
acts of immorality has been characterized as constituting "economic
capital punishment" because of the "enormous social stigma." 9' As a
result, many arbitrators have imposed an enhanced standard of proof
on the employer in such cases, requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence, 292 and sometimes even proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
293
Of the eighty reviewed arbitrations in which the standard of proof was
specified, proof by a preponderance of the evidence was approved
only nineteen times.294 The most prevalent standard was clear and
290. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 905. In Indiana Michigan Power Co.,
103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 248 (1994) (Alexander, Arb.), the arbitrator described the em-
ployer's burden for discharging an employee as having to prove: (1) notice of the
rule; (2) notice of the consequences; (3) violation of the rule; and (4) that progressive
discipline is futile. See id. at 255.
291. See King Soopers, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 254, 262 (1985) (Sass, Arb.). Indi-
viduals discharged for such reasons are assumed to have little chance of obtaining
similar employment. Indeed, plaintiff tort theories of negligent hiring, sometimes
coupled with sexual harassment cases, add credence to this assumption.
292. See Madison County (Ind.) Youth Ctr., 1997 WL 706680, at *7 (Feb. 6, 1997)
(Brunner, Arb.); Kroger Co., FMCS No. 96-21600-8, 1997 WL 585693, at *6 (May 16,
1997) (Nicholas, Arb.); Hughes Family Mkts., Inc., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 331, 333
(1996) (Prayzich, Arb.); George Koch Sons, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 737, 742
(1994) (Brunner, Arb.).
293. All but one of the arbitrators using this standard were discharges of the case.
In some instances the standard was used in tandem with the level of penalty. For
example, an arbitrator might hold an employee to the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for discharge for sexual harassment but to the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard for a suspension. Under this formulation, not meeting the proof stan-
dard will not necessarily result in no penalty, but most likely, a reduced penalty.
Thus, in Benzie County Central Schools, 1995 WL 852208, at *18 (Jan. 16, 1995) (Bor-
land, Arb.), a discharge was reduced to a long-term suspension (reinstatement with no
back pay) because sexual harassment was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the grievant, a bus driver, had engaged in inappropriate behavior with a
student, the student did not view the conduct as harassment. The employer thus
could not prove sexual harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at *17.
294. See Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., FMCS No. 96-11046, 1996
WL 901984 (July 2, 1996) (Giblin, Arb.); City of Flint, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 124
(1995) (House, Arb.); DC Pub. Schs., 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1037 (1995) (Johnson,
Arb.); Potlatch Corp., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 691 (1995) (Moore, Arb.); USS, Div. of
USX Corp., 1994 WL 853785 (Aug. 5, 1994) (Dybeck, Arb.); Independent Sch. Dist.
255, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 993 (1994) (Daly, Arb.); Superior Coffee & Foods, 103
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 609 (1994) (Alleyne, Arb.); Georgia Pac. Corp., FMCS No. 92-
20643, 1993 WL 788325 (Jan. 28, 1993) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); The Clorox Co., FMCS
No. 93-15077, 1993 WL 800921 (Aug. 4, 1993) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); U.P.S., FMCS No.
93-04244, 1993 WL 801403 (Nov. 18, 1993) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); Vermont State Col-
lege, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA)1193 (1993) (McHugh, Chairman); University of Mich.,
1992 WL 717113 (July 20, 1992) (House, Arb.); Dayton Newspapers, 100 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 48 (1992) (Strasshofer, Arb.); Clover Park Sch. Dist. 89, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
76 (1987) (Boedecker, Arb.); Kraft, Inc., Sealtest Foods, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27
(1987) (Goldstein, Arb.); Akron Metro. Regional Transp. Auth., 13 LAIS 2122 (1986)
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convincing proof used in thirty-three of the studied arbitrations, 95
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt approved in eight instances.2 96
In addition, three cases stated that the evidence met both enhanced
standards without specifying which standard was required.29
On the other hand, the victim of sexual harassment who files a Title
VII suit against an employer is held only to a preponderance of the
evidence standard.2 98 The employer thus faces a Hobson's choice in
cases where there is significant but less than compelling evidence of
harassment. If the employer imposes stiff discipline, a grievance will
(Strasshofer, Jr., Arb.); Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 405 (1986)
(Yarowsky, Arb.); Houston Lighting & Power, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 941 (1983) (Bai-
ley, Arb.); United States Army Signal, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 120 (1982) (Hall, Arb.).
295. See Schuylkill Metals, Inc., 1997 WL 585656 (Apr. 18, 1997) (Nicholas, Jr.,
Arb.); The Kroger Co., FMCS No. 96-21600-8, 1997 WL 585693 (May 16, 1997)
(Nicholas, Jr., Arb.); Metropolitan Council Trans. Operations, 1996 WL 881639 (Feb.
5, 1996) (Berquist, Arb.); Hoechst Celanese Corp., 97-1 Arb. 1 3176 (1996) (Nolan,
Arb.); Veterans Admin. Med. Hosp., 95-2 Arb.7 5402 (1995) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.);
Vista Chem., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 819 (1995) (Nicholas, Jr.. Arb.); General Elec.
Co., FMCS No. 93-09863, 1994 WL 837646 (Jan. 5, 1994) (Millious, Arb.); City of
Troy, 1994 WL 853738 (May 13, 1994) (Daniel, Arb.); DOA, Sixth Infantry Div., 94-1
Arb. 4170 (1994) (Landau, Arb.); Ecolab, Inc., 1993 WL 788049 (June 9, 1993)
(Goldstein, Arb.); Nestle Beverage Co., FMCS No. 93-14178, 1993 WL 788801 (Dec.
6, 1993) (Traynor, Arb.); Vision-Ease, BMC Indus., FMCS No. 93-18058, 1993 WL
801382 (Dec. 31, 1993) (Mathews, Arb.); Chief Judge, 17th Judicial Circ., 94-1 Arb. j1
4126 (1993) (Nathan, Arb.); Duke Univ., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 316 (1993) (Hooper,
Arb.); Ferro Corp. , 93-2 Arb.7 3501 (1993) (Curry, Arb.); Michigan Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 93-2 Arb. T 3454 (1993) (Girolamo, Arb.); Quaker Oats Co., 95-1 Arb. q1 5038
(1993) (Berstein, Arb.); Sullivan's New Mkt., 1993 WL 797829 (1993) (Berquist,
Arb.); City of Riviera Beach, FMCS No. 91-28226, 1992 WVL 732099 (Mar. 26, 1992)
(Mayer, Arb.); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 196, 1992 WL 724758 (Oct. 27, 1992) (Ber-
quist, Arb.); Central Mich. Univ., 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA)134 (1992) (McDonald, Arb.);
Flushing Community Sch., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 444 (1992) (Daniel, Arb.); Green
Bay Packing Co., FMCS No. 90-25109, 1991 WL 716705 (June 3, 1991) (Fogelberg,
Arb.); Colonial Sch. Dist., 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1122 (1991) (DiLauro, Arb.); Shell
Pipe Line, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 957 (1991) (Baroni, Arb.); Port Huron Area Sch.
Dist., 80-1 Arb. 1 8174 (1990) (Lipson, Arb.); GTE Fla., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090
(1989) (Cohen, Arb.); Ohio Dep't of Transp., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 783 (1988) (Duda,
Jr., Arb.); Sugardale Foods, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1017 (1986) (Duda, Jr., Arb.);
Tampa Elec. Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 791 (1986) (Vause, Chairman); Veterans Ad-
min. Med. Ctr., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 25 (1984) (Dallas, Arb.); Care Inns, Inc., 81 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 687 (1983) (Taylor, Arb.); University of Mo., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 417
(1982) (Yarowsky, Arb.).
296. See Benzie County Cent. Schs., 1995 WL 852208 (Jan. 16, 1995) (Borland,
Arb.); Beloit Manhatten, 1991 WL 693196 (Sept. 4, 1991) (DiLauro, Arb.); King
Soopers, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 254 (1985) (Sass, Arb.); Town of Winchester, 9
LAIS 2002 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.); Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 76-2 Arb. 1 8409 (1976)
(Laybourne, Arb.); Cincinnati Cleaning & Finishing Machinery Co., 73-2 Arb.1 8397
(1973) (Chalfie, Arb.); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 71-1 Arb.1 8297 (1971) (Ray, Arb.).
297. See International Mill Serv., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1995) (Marino, Arb.);
Penmyrile Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., FMCS No. 93-10232, 1993 WL 788392 (Aug. 24,
1993) (Wren, Arb.); Defense Logistics Agency, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1391 (1989)
(Duda, Jr., Arb.).
298. See, e.g., McCue v. Department of Human Resources, Nos. 96-3412, 97-3004,
97-3238, 1999 WL 5064, at *4 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying a preponderance standard).
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likely follow and may be sustained by the arbitrator because the em-
ployer does not have the proof to satisfy an enhanced standard of
proof. If the employer chooses to impose a lesser form of discipline,
or no discipline whatsoever, it may be found liable under Title VII and
its lower standard of proof because it did not take appropriate action.
f. Factor 6: Fairness and Even-Handedness of the Penalty
The sixth factor relevant in determining just cause-the fairness and
even-handedness of the discipline-has no counterpart in assessing
the existence of a hostile environment or the appropriateness of the
employer's response under Title VII. In determining whether the
penalty is fair, the arbitrator will compare the employer's treatment of
other employees who violated the rule. When the employer has previ-
ously been lax in enforcing its anti-harassment rules, the arbitrator
will likely consider a harsh penalty unfair and reduce the penalty.299
In the Title VII context, however, the employer's prior failure to en-
force a sexual harassment policy will probably increase the likelihood
that the court will find a hostile environment and impose liability. 300
The earlier unchecked harassment becomes part of the "totality of cir-
cumstances" that the court examines to determine whether the acts
alleged by the plaintiff were part of a pattern of pervasive behavior.3 1
At the same time, the existence of unchecked harassment tends to put
the employer on notice that a hostile environment exists, increasing
the chances that a court will impose Title VII liability-even in the
absence of a formal complaint by the employee-on the grounds that
the employer should have known about the harassment.30 2
In assessing the fairness of the discipline imposed on the employee,
arbitrators also take into account whether the employer has complied
with the principle of progressive discipline.3 "3 Again, this considera-
299. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, FMCS No. 94-20428, 1995 WL 793810, at *10-
11 (Jan. 16, 1995) (Hoh, Arb.) (reducing a discharge to thirty-day suspension because
the employer condoned raucous behavior for years); Earle M. Jorgensen Steel & Alu-
minum Co., FMCS No. 93-12897, 1994 WL 854694, at *19 (Apr. 5, 1994) (Goldstein,
Arb.) (reversing a discharge because employer tolerated considerable shop talk and
horseplay); City of Minneapolis, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1006, 1008-09 (1993) (Daly,
Arb.) (reversing a two-day suspension because the employer was lax in enforcement).
Even discharge for severe conduct can be reduced on this basis. In King Soopers Inc.,
101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 107, 112-13 (1993) (Snider, Arb.), a bargaining unit employee's
discharge for repeated instances of patting the buttocks of one co-worker and at least
one instance of touching the breast of another co-worker was reduced to a twenty-day
suspension because the company had treated management employees with similar of-
fenses less severely.
300. See supra Part III.B.1.
301. See supra Part II.B.4.
302. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Fairfield City Sch. Dist., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 669, 672 (1996) (Duff,
Arb.) (reducing a one-day suspension to a written warning); Firestone Synthetic Rub-
ber & Latex Co., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 276, 284 (1996) (Koenig, Arb.) (reducing
discharge to a long-term suspension); City of Troy, 1994 WL 853738, at *12 (May 13,
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tion plays no role in the context of a Title VII suit filed by the victim
of the harassment, where the court is concerned only with whether the
employer took appropriate corrective steps to end the hostile environ-
ment and not with the fairness of those steps from the harasser's
perspective.
g. Factor 7: Mitigation of Penalty
Finally, the seventh component of just cause-the relationship of
the discipline to the seriousness of the employee's offense and the em-
ployee's overall employment record-also has no counterpart in a
court's evaluation of a Title VII claim. In applying this seventh factor,
arbitrators take into account many factors that are totally unrelated to
the existence of a hostile environment. Among the considerations rel-
evant to an arbitrator are the employee's work record-" and length of
service.3 °5 While these factors are not controlling, and there are cer-
tainly instances where even employees with long, unblemished work
records are discharged for sexual harassment, 306 an arbitrator's con-
sideration of factors such as these is clearly inconsistent with a court's
singular focus on whether the employer has taken sufficient steps to
eliminate a hostile environment.
In one instance, for example, an employer demoted a supervisor
who had created a hostile environment.3 7 From the standpoint of Ti-
tle VII, this action was clearly appropriate, since courts more readily
impose liability on employers for hostile environments created by su-
pervisors, 08 and the possibility of vicarious liability looms whenever a
supervisor is involved in harassing conduct. In contrast, when the su-
pervisor filed a grievance, the arbitrator found that he could not be
demoted because demotions are appropriate only for employees
whose job performance is poor.0 9
1994) (Daniel, Arb.) (reducing 10 hours of lost holiday pay to a written reprimand
because a warning was needed before a suspension); Nob Hill Foods, 1993 WL
814033, at *9 (Sept. 9, 1993) (Silver, Arb.) (reducing a discharge to a written warning).
For a discussion on the principle of "progressive discipline," see supra note 188 and
accompanying text.
304. See, &g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc., 89-2 Arb. ' 8435 (1988) (Duff, Arb.)
(ruling that the discharge was not warranted in light of grievant's good record).
305. See, e.g., Dayton Power & Light Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 19, 21-22 (1982)
(Heinsz, Arb.) (reducing a discharge for a breast pinching incident in light of long
service and an unblemished record).
306. See, eg., George Koch Sons, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 737, 741-43 (1994)
(Brunner, Arb.) (sustaining grievant's discharge despite recognizing that the dis-
charge was economic capital punishment and the grievant had a thirty-seven-year un-
blemished record).
307. City of Key West, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 652 (1996) (Wolfson, Arb.).
308. This is particularly true now that the Supreme Court has established vicarious
liability for sexual harassment by supervisors. See supra notes 126-56 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Faragher and Burlington).
309. See, e.g., City of Key West, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 652, 654 (1996) (Wolfson,
Arb.) (noting that demotions must be based on performance, not misconduct). Simi-
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In sum, it is clear that arbitrators applying the seven factor test of
Enterprise Wheel must frequently address different issues than either
an employer or a court analyzing a claim of sexual harassment. While
not the sole explanation for reductions and reversals of employer im-
posed penalties for sexual harassment, the seven factors clearly con-
tribute to the disparities.
D. Appeals to the Courts
An employer can attempt to reinstate disciplinary action taken
against a sexual harasser that has been reversed or reduced by an arbi-
trator's decision by appeal. The right of reverse is limited, with one
narrow exception that courts shall not enforce arbitration awards that
are contrary to public policy.31 0 Nevertheless, the possibility of judi-
cial review of arbitral decisions does not alleviate the conflicts out-
lined above that arise between arbitrators assessing just cause and
courts evaluating Title VII claims. In fact, employers that have ap-
pealed to the courts to reverse an arbitration decision obtained mixed
results, largely because of the limited role courts play in reviewing
arbitral decisions,311 and the disagreement among the courts regarding
the scope of the public policy exception. 312 In addition, the varying
degrees which courts deem the prevention and elimination of sexual
lar results have occurred when the employer tried to place an employee on probation
for harassment. See Brevard County Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., FMCS No. 95-
02404, 1995 WL 791624, at *5 (May 8, 1995) (Wolfson, Arb.).
310. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Work-
ers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). The public policy at issue "must be well defined and domi-
nant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not
from general considerations of supposed public interest."' Id. at 766 (quoting Mus-
chany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). Therefore, arbitral decisions in con-
travention of some broad notion of the general public interest will not be disturbed.
Moreover, in determining whether the public policy exception applies, the court may
not second-guess the arbitrator's fact-finding and must refrain from drawing factual
inferences not made by the arbitrator.
311. Court reviews reflect a "preference for arbitration" and "a desire to promote
the benefits of labor arbitration." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993
F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, the arbitrator's decision must be enforced if it was
based on an arguable interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and may be vacated only if it lacks any support in the record. The Supreme
Court has stated, "[a]s long as the arbitrator's award 'draws its essence from the col-
lective bargaining agreement,"' a court is bound to enforce the award and is not enti-
tled to review the merits of the contract dispute. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
312. See Stephen Buehrer, A Clash of the Titans: Judical Deference to Arbitration
and the Public Policy Exception in the Context of Sexual Harassment, 6 Am. U. J.
Gender & L. 265, 287-89 (1998) (contrasting the restrictive and expansive interpreta-
tions of the public policy exception that have developed after the Supreme Court's
decision in United Paperworks, 484 U.S. at 29).
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harassment as established public policy further restrict the effective-
ness of judicial review.313
Only four circuit courts have considered the propriety of an arbitra-
tion decision ordering reinstatement of an employee who had been
discharged by the employer for sexual harassment; 314 two of the
courts upheld the arbitration decision, and the other two vacated it.315
One of the two courts that upheld the arbitrator's order to reinstate
noted that there is a "well recognized" public policy against sexual
harassment.316 Further, the facts presented in those cases leave no
doubt that the employees' conduct was harassing. 317 Nevertheless, the
courts upheld the arbitrators' decision to reinstate the employees be-
cause the courts refused to second guess the arbitrators' decisions,
which in both cases was premised on the fact that it was the em-
ployee's first offense and progressive discipline mandated a suspen-
sion rather than a discharge. 318 As seen in the preceding part, even
when the existence of harassment is established, there simply is no
"well-established" or "dominant" rule pertaining to what corrective
action or discipline an employer must take to meet its legal obligation
to take "appropriate" corrective action.319 Indeed, the courts' ap-
proval of a wide range of discipline demonstrates that there is no
313. See Jeffrey Sarles, The Case of the Missing Woman: Sexual Harassment and
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 17 Harv. Women's L.J. 17, 17-18 (1994) (argu-
ing that national labor public policy includes the prohibition of workplace sexual har-
assment and suggesting the means by which courts could ensure the recognition of
this policy by arbitrators); Chris Baker, Comment, Sexual Harassment v. Labor Arbi-
tration. Does Reinstating Sexual Harassers Violate Public Policy?, 61 U. Cin. L Rev.
1361, 1370-74 (1993) (reviewing laws and legal precedents that establish a -well de-
fined and dominant" public policy against sexual harassment).
314. There were no private sector cases relating to arbitrators' reducing penalties
for sexual harassment other than discharge. One federal sector case, King v. Frazier,
77 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1996), related to an arbitrator's reversal of a sixty-day
suspension. Its holding, however, turned on an application of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), the
standard for discipline in the federal service. Id. at 1363. Thus, the case is not applica-
ble to the principles discussed here.
315. Compare Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Work-
ers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding the arbitrator's decision), and Communi-
cation Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989) (same),
with Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Bd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d
1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (vacating the arbitrator's decision), and Newsday, Inc. v. Long
Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
316. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d at 687.
317. For example, in Chrysler Motors, the harasser grabbed a co-worker's breasts
and announced "Yup, they're real." 959 F.2d at 686 n.l. In Communication Workers,
the employee sexually assaulted a customer in her house. See 882 F.2d at 468. This
might not be so in other cases: for example, where the conduct at issue is less egre-
gious, or where the employee's conduct might be found to constitute harassment in
one circuit, under a reasonable woman standard, but not by another circuit using a
reasonable person standard.
318. See Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d at 688-89; Communication Workers, 882 F.2d at
468.
319. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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dominant rule, and the courts have specifically held that discharge is
not required.32 °
Undoubtedly, the discipline should reflect the severity of the har-
assment, and inappropriate employer action is therefore easy to de-
fine at the extremes: it would certainly be insufficient as a matter of
law to issue only an oral admonishment to an employee who sexually
assaulted a co-worker, or even to issue a written admonishment for
touching a co-worker in a sexual manner. It does not follow, however,
that a discharge-as opposed to a substantial suspension, a demotion,
or a permanent separation-is required, or is even the "dominant"
policy. The preference for a discharge in such circumstances may well
be a logical assessment of "supposed public interests, 3 21 but this does
not meet the standard for applying the public policy exception be-
cause the imposition of any particular discipline is not mandated by
law. Thus, when an arbitrator interprets a contract-which likely al-
lows for progressive discipline-and reduces a penalty from a dis-
charge to a long suspension, the reduction does not offend any
dominant rule of law.
The courts which have overturned the arbitrator's award do not
stand in direct contradiction to that point. For example, in
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,32 2 the critical point for the court was that the reinstatement
occurred without consideration of whether the harassment actually
took place-the arbitrator reinstated the alleged harasser because of
an insufficient investigation.323 Only Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Ty-
pographical Union, No. 915324 and its progeny325 are directly at odds.
In Newsday, the arbitrator reinstated the alleged sexual harasser on
the grounds that progressive discipline had not been applied.3 26 The
320. See Terex Corp. v. International Union, U.A.W., No. CIV.A.2:97CV243-D-B.,
1998 WL 433948, at *7-9 (N.D. Miss. June 17, 1998) (upholding an arbitrator's reduc-
tion of a discharge penalty and noting that there is no Title VII requirement for
discharge).
321. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49,
66 (1945)).
322. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).
323. See id. at 1438. A similar result was reached by a district court considering the
propriety of the arbitrator's award vacating a discharge on procedural grounds. See
United Transp. Union v. Burlington N. R.R., 864 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. Or. 1994)
(vacating awards which reinstated an alleged sexual harasser because it violated pub-
lic policy).
324. 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990).
325. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison v. Utility Workers' Union, No. 95 CIV. 1672
JGK., 1996 WL 374143, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1996) (vacating an arbitrator's award
which reinstated an employee who was discharged for sexually harassing coworkers);
United Transp., 864 F. Supp. at 142 (finding that a referee's award required review
because it reinstated an employee who was discharged for sexual harassment "con-
trary to well-defined and explicit public policy").
326. 915 F.2d at 843.
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grievant had previously been disciplined for sexually harassing con-
duct by being charged with "disorderly conduct. '327 When investiga-
tion of the second charged incident revealed other unreported
sexually harassing conduct, the employer discharged the grievant.3'
The arbitrator found specifically that the employer had not followed
progressive discipline, noting that "if Waters had been disciplined af-
ter either of the two previously-unreported incidents, then discharge
might have been appropriate following the 1988 incident. '3 9 The
court, however, upheld the lower court's decision to vacate the arbi-
trator's award.330 It found that in light of Waters's prior notice and
warning and the employer's duty to maintain an environment free of
sexual harassment, the arbitrator's reinstatement award was contrary
to public policy.3 31 Thus, while there is no answer to whether a certain
level of discipline must be imposed by law, it appears that employers
may find support in the case law for discharging a sexual harasser if
the harasser has been disciplined earlier for sexual harassment. 332
V. THE WAY OuT: BRIGHT LINE RULES, A TABLE OF PENALTIES,
AND TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY
The problems facing the employer, the accused, and the victim are
caused by two overriding factors: the ambiguous nature of the Title
VII standards defining sexual harassment; and the conflict between,
on the one hand, judicial proceedings designed to determine employer
liability for sexual harassment and, on the other, arbitration proceed-
ings designed to evaluate the appropriateness of disciplinary sanc-
tions. With the ever increasing cost-direct and indirect-of sexual
harassment, employers need to find a quick and efficient way to deal
327. In fact, the grievant, Waters, had originally been discharged by Newsday for
the first incident, but Newsday voluntarily reinstated him, converting the discharge to
a suspension. See id. at 842. Waters grieved the suspension, but this was upheld and
Waters was specifically warned about sexual harassment. See id.
328. See id
329. ld. at 843.
330. See id. at 845.
331. See id.
332. Similar results were reached in two recent unreported cases. In Consolidated
Edison v. Utility Workers' Union, No. 95 CIV. 1672 JGK., 1996 WL 374143, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1996), the court, following Newsday, overturned an arbitrator's rein-
statement of a second offender. The court specifically noted that, "[t]his is not to say
that an arbitration award of reinstatement after a discharge for sexual misconduct
must always be vacated as contrary to public policy," and it continued by noting that
discharge might not be appropriate in the absence of an earlier discipline. Id. at *4. It
obviously would also not be appropriate to vacate an award of reinstatement because
of failure of proof or similar concerns. See Terex Corp. v. International U.A.W., No.
CIV.A. 2:97CV243-D-B., 1998 WL 433948, at *9 (N.D. Miss. June 17, 1998) (uphold-
ing arbitrator's decision to reinstate the grievant upon concluding that the complained
of conduct did not constitute sexual harassment). Of course, the arbitrator's failure to
see certain conduct as sexual harassment is tied to the difficultly of recognizing sexual
harassment. See supra Part II.
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with harassment when they become aware of it. Yet, this is not occur-
ring because alleged harassers are challenging-through the arbitra-
tion process-their employers with moderate success.
An employee's right to challenge discipline is important and should
not be altered lightly.333 Further, the significant success rate of chal-
lenges indicates that perhaps employers are in some instances acting
in a manner which infringes on the rights of the accused.33 4
As was demonstrated in part II, what constitutes sexual harassment
varies widely, and similar conduct may or may not be considered sex-
ual harassment by different courts. In general, the courts have applied
a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, what constitutes sexual harassment.335  In the almost
twenty years since sexual harassment has been recognized, this totality
of the circumstances test has led to inconsistent results. This ambigu-
ous, backward-looking approach causes a plethora of problems: it
cannot fully insulate an employer from liability for sexual harassment
because the employer may not recognize the conduct as harassment; it
allows alleged harassers engaging in less blatant conduct to claim lack
of notice as a defense against discipline;336 and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, it makes it difficult for victims to determine whether the con-
duct they are being subjected to is prohibited by company policy. 337
In light of Burlington and Faragher, employers must institute har-
assment policies in order to avail themselves of the affirmative de-
333. Employees have been successful in having their penalties for sexual harass-
ment modified or overturned at rates comparable to other types of misconduct. See
generally Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 188, at 945-68 (reporting statistics). In fact, it
appears that the employer's choice of discipline for sexual harassment is being upheld
at a higher rate than other types of discipline, except those associated with dishonesty.
Nonetheless, since failure to respond "appropriately" where allegations of sexual
harassment are involved could lead to employer liability, there is a Hobsons' nature
to the choice employers face here when compared to other disciplinary situations.
334. See supra Table 1 (showing that only 51% of arbitrations upheld the penalty
assessed by the employer).
335. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (stating that all the
circumstances surrounding the conduct must be considered to determine whether it
constituted sexual harassment).
336. Lack of notice as to what constitutes the charged misconduct is a factor arbi-
trators consider when determining whether to mitigate discipline. See supra Part
IV.C.3.a.
337. The lack of a specific definition of harassment is difficult for victims in the
sense that many of them, particularly those working in a male-dominated setting, may
well "go along to get along." If they believe that the offensive conduct is part of the
culture of the workplace, they may be less likely to complain because they want to fit
in. A policy that states that "harassment" based on all the circumstances is prohibited
does not help the victim because she is not likely to know what this means. Indeed,
the courts cannot even agree on what it means. See supra Part II. Thus, absent overtly
sexual behavior, the victim is likely to, and indeed must, tolerate the behavior, at least
initially, because she is unlikely to know at the outset whether it will continue until it
reaches the level of pervasiveness needed to constitute actionable harassment. Clear
indications of specifically what is prohibited will help alleviate this problem for all
involved.
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fense made available by these decisions. I recommend that these
policies specify particular acts as employee misconduct, regardless of
whether they would be sufficient to sustain a harassment suit under a
Title VII standard. The policy should also contain a catch-all provi-
sion in the form of a totality of the circumstances test in order to en-
able the employer to impose discipline for conduct that is likely to be
deemed sexual harassment under Title VII standards, but which is not
specifically included in the rules and table of penalties.
The underlying policy should be clear and detailed-simply prohib-
iting "sexual harassment" is insufficient due to the wide variation in
the meaning of that term-and it should contain a table of penalties
specifying the consequences of engaging in harassing conduct. While
courts may be bound by the "totality of the circumstances" test in
determining whether harassment violative of Title VII has occurred,
employers can and should enact rules of conduct that go beyond le-
gally actionable sexual harassment. As a number of courts have
noted, the purpose of Title VII is not to change the nature of the
workplace, but only to eliminate sexual harassment that rises to a cer-
tain intolerable level.3 38 Employers devising a harassment policy are
not bound by the more limited goals of Title VII, but can take addi-
tional steps to ensure that all of their employees are able to work in an
environment free from sexual degradation and insult.
A harassment policy along these lines is not without precedent, for
companies currently have and enforce work rules and rules of conduct
that cover a wide variety of employee behavior. For example, many
companies authorize immediate discharge for striking a supervisor.339
An employer could similarly authorize immediate discharge for spe-
cific types of harassing conduct. Further, employers should negotiate
to have penalties imposed under this "table of penalties" reviewable
only for arbitrariness and discrimination.
Moreover, some types of conduct should be grounds for summary
dismissal34 and should be uniformly recognized as such. Outside of
the area of sexual harassment, grounds for summary dismissal have
existed for years.34' As noted, conduct such as striking a supervisor,
338. "[E]mployers are not under a legal duty enforceable by suits under Title VII to
purify the language of the workplace." Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General
Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Rabidue v. Osceola Refin-
ing Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that Title VII was not meant to
change the rough language, sexual jokes, and conversations that abound in certain
work environments).
339. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
340. By "summary dismissal" I mean dismissal without progressive discipline. Ob-
viously, summary dismissals must meet "industrial due process" standards.
341. One arbitrator explained:
Offenses are of two general classes: (1) those extremely serious offenses
such as stealing, striking a foreman, persistent refusal to obey a legitimate
order, etc., which usually justify summary discharge without the necessity of
prior warnings or attempts at corrective discipline: (2) those less serious in-
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theft of company property, use of illegal drugs on company property,
and bringing a firearm onto company property are all recognized
grounds for summary dismissal.
Similarly, sexual touching of a co-worker, defined as touching the
breast, buttocks, crotch or genitals, or causing another to purposefully
contact the harasser's body in such a fashion, 34 z should become
grounds for summary dismissal, regardless of intent or effect. 3 4 3 It
should be beyond argument that this type of action is unacceptable
and dischargable-regardless of whether a court determining the
existence of sexual harassment would conclude that an occasional slap
on the buttocks is acceptable.4n At the other end of the spectrum,
angry words between former paramours should ordinarily be subject
to mediation-not discipline-in the early stages.345
fractions of plant rules or of proper conduct such as tardiness, absence with-
out permission, careless workmanship, insolence, etc., which call not for
discharge for the first offense (and usually not even for the second or third
offense) but for some milder penalty aimed at correction.
Huntington Chair Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 490, 491 (1955) (McCoy, Arb.).
342. This would occur, for example, if the harasser forced the victim to touch her or
his breasts, genitals, buttocks, or crotch, as opposed to the harasser touching the vic-
tims body on those areas.
343. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., however, the Supreme Court
made clear that all such touching would not be considered sexual harassment and
distinguished non-harassing touching, such as a football coach slapping the buttocks
of his players, from a boss patting the buttocks of his secretary. 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1998). Of course, these are extreme examples that are easy to discern. As I noted
earlier, there will always be a few easy calls. Distinguishing the lanes of the super-
highway in between, however, is not easy.
344. The scenario derives from Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1986), and is more representative of the dilemma employers face trying to deter-
mine what conduct would subject them to liability than the two examples cited by the
Supreme Court in Oncale. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
345. While the table of penalties should generally be enforced in any case of unwel-
come conduct, a difficult situation exists where the conduct involves co-workers who
were previously involved in a dating relationship. While unrequited physical or emo-
tional attraction may indeed be the basis of a sexual harassment action when the
victim never encouraged the alleged harasser-as indeed it was in Ellison-the same
situation does not exist, at least initially, when the harasser's behavior was not only
accepted in the past, but was also desired and encouraged. The employer should not
automatically bear the burden of liability when such a relationship sours. Unless the
alleged misconduct involved violent physical touching, the first step should be media-
tion or counseling, which would ensure that the complainant's position has been made
clear to the harasser without unduly jeopardizing his work record based on either a
mistake or personal animosity. In Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 780 (9th Cir.
1992), the court found that the Veteran's Administration had not taken sufficient ac-
tion to end harassment of the plaintiff by her former boyfriend because it never
moved beyond informal counseling and attempts to separate them. In his dissent,
Judge Wiggins observed:
I do not, of course, maintain that sexual harassment can never occur after a
failed relationship between employees. Rather, I believe that the relation-
ship is a factor to be considered both in determining if there was in fact
sexual harassment and in determining what should properly be done by an
employer to remedy the situation.
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The actual gradations between those two points may vary from em-
ployer to employer depending on the structure of their progressive
discipline system: what type of action fits into which tier of the system
would obviously depend on the total number of tiers in the system. 6
Having a standardized system also means that various types of harass-
ment would be generally categorized according to their severity and
would provide harassers and their victims with clear notice of the con-
sequences for each type of action.
The following sample table of penalties is comprised of five levels.
While a company could and should adapt the intermediate levels to
conform with their overall disciplinary system, I submit that conduct
in category I should always, under all systems, be a basis for summary
discharge. In Campbell Soup Co., 8 the arbitrator reduced the pen-
alty from discharge to a one-year suspension for a harasser who lifted
the complainant off the ground, rubbed his body against her and re-
fused to release her. The arbitrator's rationale was that since the har-
asser had not committed the ultimate offense-rape-he should not
be subjected to the ultimate punishment-discharge.349 Fifteen years
later, a man boldly grabs his female co-worker's breasts, and still is
not subjected to the ultimate punishment.350 I say this should never
happen again.
A. Sample Table of Penalties:
CATEGORY I (summary discharge):
Sexual touching: touching of the breast, crotch, upper thigh, geni-
tals, or buttocks of victim or causing victim to touch harasser in sim-
ilar fashion.
Id. at 785. Discipline for more serious conduct would be determined on the basis of
the more serious conduct. Also, directed words in the absence of a former paramour
situation would not lead to mediation. Former paramours, in my view, require special
treatment because the employee engaging in a consensual on-the-job relationship has,
in effect, introduced into the workplace an otherwise private matter.
346. For example, in General Electric Co., FMCS No. 93-09863, 1994 WL 837646
(Jan. 5, 1994) (Millious, Arb.), the arbitrator reduced the penalty in part because
under the particular system at issue, only two reprimands during an employee's entire
tenure resulted in instant discharge. Classification under such a system, therefore,
may result in only more serious conduct being used as the basis for a reprimand. The
point, however, is that all parties know in advance precisely what penalties will be
administered for particular conduct.
347. In some instances the victim will not feel her complaint has been acted on
because she is unaware of the consequences the harasser suffers. For example, if a
harasser receives a written reprimand, the victim, because of privacy requirements,
would not be notified of the action. However, if such terms are published and known
to be enforced whenever an allegation is sustained, the victim would enjoy a certain
amount of confidence concerning what has happened to the harasser-which would
instill confidence that the harassment will not recur-the key to eliminating the vic-
tim's perception of hostility.
348. 78-2 Arb. 8293 (1978) (Weiss, Arb.).
349. See id at 4406-07.
350. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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" Restraining or blocking/isolating: serves as an aggravating factor
with other types of conduct, and will elevate it to a Category I
penalty.
" Stalking: actions such as, persistently following, calling, or present-
ing gifts, combined with stated threats to the victim or himself.
" Repeat of Category II conduct.
CATEGORY II (long-term suspension (30-60 days) and permanent
transfer; demotion of supervisors):
" Quasi-sexual touching: touching the neck, shoulders, knees, legs in
a lingering or massaging fashion.
" Directed, sexually explicit language in the context of propositions,
requests for sexual favors, or epithets.
* Pre-stalking: actions such as, persistent following, calling, or
presenting gifts without stated threats, but which is contextually
threatening (showing up at residence, parking lots, or obtaining un-
listed phone numbers).
CATEGORY III (short-term suspension (1-29 days)):
* Display of sexually explicit photos or posters (depicting genitalia of
either sex, full breasts of females).
" Directed sexual gestures.
CATEGORY IV (written warning):
" Undirected sexual gestures.
" Undirected sexual expletives.
" Undirected sexually explicit language.
* Demeaning statements regarding particular body parts.
* Directed sexual language in the context of expletives.
" Display of sexually provocative photos or posters (depicting scantily
clad individuals of either sex).
CATEGORY V (oral counseling):
* Repeated requests for dates.
" Compliments referencing particular body parts.
" Directed and demeaning gender-based language, such as, girl, dar-
ling, honey, sweetie.
CATEGORY VI (mediation):
* Former paramour actions involving Category III violations or less.
Such a system has obvious advantages over the typical system which
defines all harassment and provides for penalties from admonishment
to discharge for the first offense.351 The table of penalties, however,
does not work in the abstract. A detailed policy with the following
features should be adopted. The central feature of this policy is the
concept of total responsibility. All supervisors are given the responsi-
351. See, e.g., USAF, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1089, 1090 (1997) (Stephens, Arb.)
(stating the agency's position to substitute a more appropriate discipline for a grievant
who had been found guilty of five separate offenses).
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bility to accept complaints of sexual harassment and to pass them on
to appropriate personnel for investigation. A harassed employee
should not have to figure out to whom she must complain, and she
should be able to complain to any supervisor with whom she feels
comfortable.
In return for this rigorous policy, victims, under the concept of total
responsibility, must report all instances of conduct covered by the pol-
icy that they consider unwelcome. If the victim is assured that the
complaint will be taken seriously and knows what the consequences of
the complaint will be, she must be willing to assume her responsibility
and complain. The idea of victim responsibility has been endorsed by
the Supreme Court in its creation of affirmative defenses in Faragher
and Burlington that will prevent employers from being held vicari-
ously liable for otherwise unknown harassment committed by its su-
pervisors, where the employer can prove, among other things, that the
victim unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or correc-
tive opportunities provided by the employer. In explaining how an
employer might meet this burden, the Court explained:
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to show-
ing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure pro-
vided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second
element of the defense.352
Thus, a victim who fails to complain will normally lose her claim.
Although this standard applies to harassment by supervisors, victims
of harassment by anyone should ordinarily be expected to alert the
employer to the problem, especially if the employer has consistently
taken an aggressive stand in eliminating sexual harassment.
A requirement of victim responsibility will also result in increased
fairness for the accused, who will have an early opportunity to stop
the conduct, especially innocuous conduct, while the table of penalties
informs the employees clearly of the consequences of certain actions.
B. Policy Basics
1. Complaints should be investigated by a central person/office with
special training.
Ensures that the person making determinations about whether the
conduct constitutes sexual harassment is knowledgeable.
2. All supervisors with knowledge of an allegedly harassing situation,
whether through a complaint or otherwise, have a duty to notify the
designated central person, or be subject to disciplinary action for
failure to notify.
352. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
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This resolves the problem of the putative victim complaining to the
"wrong" person.
3. All known and potentially harassing situations must be investigated.
A judgment on the merits of the complaint cannot be made until after
an investigation; thus, no complaint can be dismissed as trivial or wel-
come prior to an investigation. This also means, however, that em-
ployee requests that no action be taken cannot be honored because the
employer has a duty to act promptly when it receives knowledge.
4. Investigations must normally commence within two business days,
with permissible variations depending on factors such as the sever-
ity of the alleged harassment (same day for touching, up to five
days for language only).
Ensures prompt investigations and prevents victim from believing no
response is being taken, since investigations are not always visible.
5. The complainant and the accused must be separated during the in-
vestigation. This may be accomplished by moving one of them, or
by placing one of them on administrative leave, with pay. This is a
temporary measure and should not serve as the basis for either a
retaliation charge by the complainant or a grievance by the accused.
Serves to immediately stop the harassment. By separating the ac-
cused and the accuser, it is less likely that such a move will be consid-
ered as an indication of either a "hardening" of a position against the
accused or as retaliation against the victim.
6. The investigation is to be completed in a specified number of days.
If the charge is substantiated, disciplinary action is imposed in ac-
cordance with the table of penalties.
Ensures timely completion of the investigation and consistent
discipline.
7. In the event that a hearing follows imposition of discipline, the stan-
dard of proof should be a preponderance of the evidence, consistent
with the victim's burden against the employee in sexual harassment
cases.
Eliminates problem of differing standards faced by employers.
CONCLUSION
Certainly, the proposed system will not eliminate all of the
problems associated with the labyrinth that the employer must ma-
neuver when attempting to comply with the conflicting Title VII and
labor principles of eliminating hostile environment sexual harassment
and complying with just cause and progressive discipline mandates. It
cannot and will not eliminate all employee challenges to discipline for
sexual harassment, nor should it eliminate the employee's right to
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make such challenges. In many instances, sexual harassment will con-
tinue to occur without witnesses, and arbitrators will continue to be
neutral fact-finders in those instances.
This system, however, should eliminate the proof problems associ-
ated with the many ambiguities in sexual harassment law, as well as
solve many of the problems associated with establishing just cause,
such as providing clear notice, consistent enforcement, and consistent
levels of penalties.
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APPENDIX OF ARBITRATIONS
I. EMPLOYER-IMPOSED PENALTIES REDUCED IN ARBITRATION
[Vol. 67
Arbitration Cite Employer Penalty Final Penalty
Underwood Glass 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
1139 (1972)
Campbell Soup Co. 78-2 Arb. 8293 discharge suspend-i year
(1978)
Powermatic/Houdaille, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Inc. 54 (1978)
Kroger Co. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
540 (1979)
Perfection Am. Co. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
520 (1979)
New York Air Brake 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-3 months
Co. 875 (1980)
Winchester, Town of 9 LAIS 2002 (1981) discharge suspend-l.5 months
Hayes Int'l Corp. 81-2 Arb. 8603 discharge suspend-30 days
(1981)
Consolidated Coal Co. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-60 days
940 (1982)
Dayton Power & 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-7 months &
Light 19 (1982) last chance letter
Houston Lighting & 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Power 941 (1983)
DOD Dependent 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-1 month
Schs. 761 (1983)
David R. Webb Co. 84-1 Arb. 8290 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1984)
Vons Grocery Co. 11 LAIS 1259 (1984) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Meijer 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-no back pay
570 (1984)
Hyatt Hotels Palo 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-15 days
Alto 11 (1985)
Weber Aircraft, Inc. 13 LAIS 3344 (1985) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Greyhound Lines, Inc. 13 LAIS 3630 (1985) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Steams County 13 LAIS 2093 (1986) discharge suspend-unknown
duration
Ramsey, County of 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-30 days
249 (1986)
Sugardale Foods, Inc. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
1017 (1986)
Minnesota Dep't of 86-2 Arb. 8591 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Revenue (1986)
Mobil Oil 14 LAIS 3707 (1986) discharge suspend-i week
Boys Mkt. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
1304 (1987)
Ramsey County 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-30 days
10 (1987)
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Vons Grocery Co. 88-2 Arb. 8611 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1987)
New Hope, City of 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
427 (1987)
Howmet Aluminum 15 LAIS 3363 (1987) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Corp.
Rockford Sch. Dist. 88-2 Arb. 8367 discharge suspend-6 months
(1987)
Pan Am Support 89-1 Arb. 8306 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Servs. (1988)
West Virginia Univ. 16 LAIS 4245 (1988) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Hosp.
Stater Bros. Mkts. 16 LAIS 4238 (1989) discharge reinstate-no back pay
GTE Fla., Inc. 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
1090 (1989)
National Oats Co. 17 LAIS 3765 (1989) discharge suspend-6 weeks
Port Huron Area 80-1 Arb. 8174 discharge suspend-I veek
Schs. (1990)
Pacific Union Club 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-2 wveeks
1217 (1990)
Dow Chem. 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-with back
510 (1990) pay
Honeywell, Inc. 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
1097 (1990)
MacKay Envelope 92-1 Arb. 1 8040 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Corp. (1991)
Green Bay Packing 1991 WL 716705 discharge suspend-6 months
Co. (1991)
Beloit Manhatten 1991 WL 693196 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1991)
KIAM 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge warning -written
617 (1991)
American Mirrex 19 LAIS 3984 (1992) discharge suspend-3 weeks
Corp.
Mackay Envelope 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Corp. 863 (1992)
State of Wash. 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge demoted
Printing Dep't 440 (1992)
Cass County 20 LAIS 3247 (1992) discharge suspend-10 days
United Tel. 1992 WL 726466 discharge suspend-30 days
(1992)
Ralphs Grocery 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
63 (1992)
Flushing Community 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Seli. 444 (1992)
Duke Univ. 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
316 (1993)
Springfield Local Sch. 93-2 Arb. 3524 discharge reprimand
Dist. (1993)
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King Soopers, Inc. 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-20 days
107 (1993)
Sullivan's New Mkt. 1993 WL 797829 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1993)
Nob Hill Foods 1993 WL 814033 discharge warning-written
(1993)
King County Dep't of 21 LAIS 2084 (1993) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Adult Detention
Nestle Beverage Co. 1993 WL 788801 discharge suspend-4 weeks
(1993)
Kelly Springfield Tire 94-2 Arb. 4338 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Co. (1994)
Indiana Univ. 94-2 Arb. 4543 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1994)
Cass County 1994 WL 854715 discharge suspend-4 months
(1994)
Independent Sch. 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge last chance letter
Dist. 255 993 (1994)
New York Dep't of 21 LAIS 2096 (1994) discharge suspend-90 days
Corrections
Benzie County Schs. 1995 WL 852208 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1995)
Federal Bureau of 1995 WL 793810 discharge suspend-30 days
Prisons (1995)
Associated Wholesale 1995 WL 869841 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Groceries (1995)
D.C. Public Schs. 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-i day
1037 (1995)
Medical College of 1995 WL 852272 discharge suspend-60 days
Ohio (1995)
Hennessy Indus. 23 LAIS 3703 (1996) discharge warning
Coca-Cola Bottling, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
N. Ohio 776 (1996)
Metropolitan Council 1996 WL 881639 discharge suspend-5 months
Transit (1996)
Metropolitan Transit 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Comm'n 360 (1996)
Safeway, Inc. 1996 WL 578202 discharge suspend-10 days
(1996)
American Crystal 1996 WL 807568 discharge suspend-90 days
Sugar Co. (1996)
Firestone Synthetic 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Rubber 276 (1996)
Penn Hill Sch. Dist. 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-4 months
566 (1996)
Nebraska Dep't of 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge suspend-6 months
Corrections 910 (1996)
Berrien Springs Pub. 24 LAIS 3883 (1997) discharge reinstate-no back pay
Schs.
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University of Mich. 1997 WL 753691 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(1997)
Madison County 1997 WL 706680 discharge reinstate-no back pay
(Ind.) Youth Ctr. (1997)
Safeway, Inc. 108 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge reinstate-no back pay
787_(1997)
Minnesota Dep't of 1997 WL 706666 discharge reinstate-no back pay
Corrections (1997)
Maine, State of 20 LAIS 3372 (1992) demotion suspend-3 days
Harper Woods, City 21 LAIS 2080 (1994) demotion suspend-30 days
of
Austin, City of 1994 WL 854713 demotion suspend-30 days
(1994)
San Joaquin Sheriff's 1995 WL 600998 demotion reinstate-no back pay
Dep't (1995)
Key West, City of 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) demotion suspend-30 days
652 (1996)
Titusville, City of 1995 WL 791624 probation suspend-4 weeks
(1995)
Summit City Bd. 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) reassign reassignment
Mental Health 4 (1992)
General Elec. Co. 1994 WL 837646 reprimand warning
(1994)
Todd Shipyards Corp. 13 LAIS 3442 (1985) suspend-3 days suspend-i day
Santa Clara County 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days warning-witten
1226 (1987)
Corpus Christi, City 16 LAIS 3951 (1988) suspend unknown waming-%ritten
of duration
Ohio Dep't of Transp. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-30 days suspend-5 days
783 (1988)
Washoe, County of 88-2 Arb. 8415 suspend-1 day reprimand
(1988)
San Diego Police 1991 WL 701926 suspend-80 hours suspend-40 hours
Dep't (1991)
Niagara Frontier 93-1 Arb. 3004 suspend-3 days waming-witten
Transit (1992)
St. Paul, City of 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days suspend-2 days
105 (1992)
Troy, City of 1994 WL 853738 suspend-10 hours reprimand-written
(1994)
Christina Sch. Dist. 1994 WiL 875876 suspend-3 days & transfer-60 days
(1994) training
Hennepin, County of 1995 WL 600954 suspend-4 days suspend-i day
(1995)
Norfolk Naval 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-i day reprimand
Shipyard 991 (1995)
Michigan Dep't of 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days reprimand
Transp. 1196 (1995) 1 1
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American Mail-Well 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days warning-verbal
Envelope 1209 (1995)
Metropolitan Council 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-30 days suspend-15 days
Transit 68 (1996)
D.C. Dep't of 1996 WL 658897 suspend-15 days reprimand-written
Corrections (1996)
Fairfield City Sch. 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-i day warning-written
Dist. 669 (1996)
Houston. City of 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-10 days suspend-4 days
1070 (1996)
USAF 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days admonishment-oral
1089 (1997)
Avis Rent a Car 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-30 days, demotion-limited
Shuttlers 1057 (1995) demotion
Cub Foods 88-2 Arb. 8394 suspend-30 days, counseling & transfer
(Ohiocubco) (1988) transfer
Madison Metro. Sch. 17 LAIS 4122 (1990) threat specific directive
Dist.
II. EMPLOYER-IMPOSED PENALTIES REVERSED IN ARBITRATION
Kentucky Textile 70-1 Arb. 8127 discharge none
Indus., Inc. (1969)
Godchaux-Henderson 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
Sugar Co. 377 (1980)
Southern New 9 LAIS 1270 (1982) discharge none
England Tel. Co.
Washington Scientific 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
Indus. 824 (1984)
Kidde, Inc. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
681 (1985)
Akron Metro. Transit 13 LAIS 2122 (1986) discharge none
Auth.
DeVry Inst. of Tech. 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
1149 (1986)
Hublein, Inc. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
1292 (1987)
Clover Park Sch. Dist. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
89 76 (1987)
RMS Techs. 94 LAIS 297 (1990) discharge none
Stroehman Bakeries 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
873 (1990)
Georgia Pac. 1993 WL 788325 discharge none
(1993)
Carleton College 93-1 Arb. 3104 discharge none
(1993)
King Soopers. Inc. 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge none
900 (1993)
Michigan Dep't of 93-2 Arb. T 3454 discharge none
Soc. Svcs. (1993)
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Bethlehem Steel Corp. 1993 WL 801302 discharge none
(1993)
Pennyrile Rural Elec. 1993 WL 788392 discharge none
Coop. Corp. (1993)
Vision-Ease, BMC 1993 WL 801382 discharge none
Indus. (1993)
Earle M. Jorgensen 1994 VL 854694 discharge none
(1994)
Saginaw Intermediate 95-1 Arb. 5049 discharge none
Bd. of Educ. (1994)
Delta Beverage 1995 WL 707557 discharge none
Group, Inc. (1995)
Contico Inter'l, Inc. 1996 WL 865254 discharge none
(1996)
Schuylkill Metals, Inc. 1997 WL 585656 discharge none
(1997)
Fleming Foods, Inc. 1997 WL 585677 discharge none
(1997)
Pembroke Pines, City 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) reprimand none
of 365 (1989)
Naperville, City of 93-2 Arb. 3440 reprimand none
(1992)
Headquarters Space & 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) reprimand reconsideration
Missile 1198 (1995)
National Educ. Ass'n 23 LAIS 3710 (1995) reprimand none
U.S. Customs Serv. 82-1 Arb. 8073 suspend-3 days none
(1981)
Louisville Gas & Elec. 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-7 hours none
730 (1983)
VA Med. Ctr. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-14 days none
25 (1984)
Shell Chem. Div. 85-1 Arb. 8130 suspend-lU da,. none
(1984)
King Soopers. Inc. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-2 weeks none
254 (1985)
Independent Sch. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days none
Dist # 833 713 (1987)
Seattle, City of 15 LAIS 3629 (1987) suspend none
Nuclear Fuel Servs. 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days none
1204 (1 989)
City of Riviera Beach 1992 WL 732099 suspend-5 days none(1992)
Minneapolis, City of 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-2 days none
1006 (1993)
Genesee County 1994 WL 861447 suspend-3 days none
(1994)
San Antonio, City of 1995 WL 707528 suspend-3 days none
(1995)
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Cincinnati Cleaning & 73-2 Arb. 8397 discharge same
Finishing Machinery (1973)
Co.
CPC Int'l 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1272 (1974)
Youngstown Hosp. 76-2 Arb. 8409 discharge same
Ass'n (1976)
Champion Papers 80-1 Arb. 8198 discharge same
(1979)
St. Regis Paper 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1281 (1980)
Southern Bell 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
409_(1980)
Kaiser Aluminum & 81-1 Arb. 8123 discharge same
Chem. (1981)
Pima Community 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
College 1133 (1981)
University of Mo. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
417 (1982)
Anacona Copper Co. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
690 (1982)
Borg-Warner Corp. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
985 (1982)
Care Inns, Inc. 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
687 (1983)
Norwalk, Bd. of Ed. 11 LAIS 2176 (1984) discharge same
Zia Co. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
640 (1984)
United Elec. Supply 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Co. 921 (1984)
Nabisco Foods Co. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1186 (1984)
New Indus. 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Techniques, Inc. 915 (1985)
Vernitron 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Piezoelectric 1315 (1985)
Rockwell Int'l Corp. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
246 (1985)
Porter Equipment 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1253 (1986)
Stockham Valves & 13 LAIS 1141 (1986) discharge same
Fittings I I I
1999] MANEUVERING THROUGH THE LABYRINTH 1603
Arbitration Cite Employer Penalty Final Penalty
Hobart Corp. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
512 (1986)
Schlage Lock Co. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
75 (1986)
Tampa Elec. Co. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
791 (1986)
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
& Cor. 1019 (1987)
Martin Marietta 14 LAIS 1097 (1987) discharge same
Energy Sys.
IBP, Inc. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
41 (1987)
Cuyahoga County 15 LAIS 3392 (1987) discharge same
Hosp.
Pittsburgh Press Club 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
826 (1987)
Harsco Corp., Can- 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Tex Indus. 1230 (1988)
Hannaford Bros. Co. 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
721 (1989)
McDonnell Douglas 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Corp. 585 (1989)
Cub Foods, Inc. 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
771 (1990)
Ohio Power Co. 92-1 Arb. 1 8073 discharge same
(1991)
Cub Foods, Inc. 1991 WL 702015 discharge same
(1991)
Michigan Consol. Gas 92-2 Arb. 1 8328 discharge same
(1991)
Houston Metro. 92-1 Arb. 8041 discharge same
Transit (1991)
Steuben Rural Elec. 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Corp. 337 (1991)
Interstate Brands 1991 WL 693105 discharge same
(1991)
Shell Pipe Line 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
957_(1991)
Northern States Power 1991 WL 701859 discharge same
Co. (1991)
King Soopers, Inc. 1992 WL 732275 discharge same
(1992)
Central Mich. Univ. 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
134 (1992)
Saginaw Valley State 19 LAIS 2073 (1992) discharge same
Univ.
Musicland Group 1992 WL 715549 discharge same
(1992)
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Unixersity of Mich. 1991 WL 717113 discharge same
(1992)
Owens-Brockway 93-1 Arb. 3032 discharge same
Plastics (1992)
Stop & Shop, Inc. 1991 WL 715558 discharge same
(1992)
Fry's Food of Az. 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1161 (1992)
Plain Dealer Publ'g 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Co. 969 (1992)
DFT Lighting, Inc. 93-1 Arb. 3185 discharge same
(1992)
Northeast Ohio Reg'l 1993 WL 800854 discharge same
Sewer (1993)
Bradlees, Inc. 1993 WL 788577 discharge same
(1993)
Quaker Oats Co. 95-1 Arb. T 5038 discharge same
(1993)
Ferro Corp. 93-2 Arb. 1 3501 discharge same
(1993)
Container Corp. of 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Am. 568 (1993)
Lord Aerospace 1993 WL 800902 discharge same
Prods. (1993)
Independent Sch. 1993 WL 801318 discharge same
Dist. # 14 (1993)
Stop & Shop, Inc. 1993 WL 788624 discharge same
(1993)
Ecolab, Inc. 1993 WL 788049 discharge same
(1993)
Chief Judge, 17th 94-1 Arb. $ 4126 discharge same
Judicial Circ. (1993)
Michigan Dep't of 1993 WL 765309 discharge same
Natural Res. (1993)
Clorox Co. 1993 WL 800921 discharge same
(1993)
Orville Redenbacher 94-1 Arb. 91 4149 discharge same
Popcorn (1993)
Burlington N. R.R. 1993 WL 801369 discharge same
(1993)
Boeing Commercial 21 LAIS 3453 (1993) discharge same
Airplane
Dominick's Finer 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Foods 982 (1993)
Eureka Co. 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1151 (1993) 1 -1
UPS 1993 WL 801403 discharge same
(1993) 1
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Lohr Distributing Co. 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
1217_(1993)
International Paper 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Co. 1106 (1993)
Grant County Public 21 LAIS 3819 (1994) discharge same
Utility
American Protective 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Servs. Inc. 161 (1994)
Environmental 94-2 Arb. 4322 discharge same
Protection (1994)
Chicago Transit Auth. 94-1 Arb. 1 42245 discharge same
(1994)
George Koch Sons 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
737 (1994)
Rockford Bd. of 1994 WL 901832 discharge same
Educ. (1994)
Seattle Sch. Dist. 1994 WL 851212 discharge same
(1994)
Indiana Mich. Power 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Co. 248 (1994)
Franklin County 1994 WL 853736 discharge same
Children Servs. (1994)
Superior Coffee & 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Foods 609 (1994)
USS, Divion of USX 1994 WL 853785 discharge same
(1994)
Minnesota Dep't of 1994 WIL 854703 discharge same
Transp. (1994)
Beloit Corp. 22 LAIS 1076 (1994) discharge same
Modemfold, Inc. 1994 VL 899036 discharge same
(1994)
Morton Salt 95-1 Arb. 1 5096 discharge same
(1994)
National Beef Packing 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Co. 1004 (1995)
Flint, City of 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
124 (1995)
Hopkinton Sch. Dist. 22 LAIS 3763 (1995) discharge same
Las Vegas, City of 1995 WL 710722 discharge same
(1995)
Loral Vought Sys. 1995 WL 791639 discharge same
(1995)
Armstong World, 1995 WL 862046 discharge same
Beaver Falls (1995)
UPS 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
417 (1995)
Detroit Bd. of Educ. 1995 WL 831532 discharge same
(1995)
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Abtco Inc. 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
551 (1995)
Potlatch Corp. 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
691 (1995)
International Mill 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Serv. 779 (1995)
Vista Chem. 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
819 (1995)
MKM Machine Tool 1995 WL 793799 discharge same
Co. (1995)
Stark County Sheriff 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
304 (1995)
Safeway, Inc. 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
718 (1995)
Erie, City of 23 LAIS 3738 (1996) discharge same
International 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
Extrusion 371 (1996)
Fort Wayne, City of 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
242 (1996)
Hughes Family Mkt. 1996 WL 658901 discharge same
(1996)
AMG Indus. 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
322 (1996)
Simkims Indus. 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
551 (1996)
Taylor Beverage Co. 97-1 Arb. 3131 discharge same
(1996)
Women & Infants 23 LAIS 1054 (1996) discharge same
Hosp.
Fruehauf Corp. 1996 WL 875973 discharge same
(1996)
Birmingham-Jefferson 1996 WL 901984 discharge same
Transit (1996)
Las Vegas, City of 1996 WL 929948 discharge same
(1996)
Hoechst Celanese 97-1 Arb. 3176 discharge same
Corp. (1996)
Las Vegas, City of 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
654 (1996)
Hughes Family Mkt. 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
331 (1996)
Ohio Turnpike 1996 WL 865292 discharge same
(1996)
Golden States Foods 97-2 Arb. 3238 discharge same
(1997)
Kroger Co. 1997 WL 585693 discharge same
(1997)
Washoe County Sch. 24 LAIS 2030 (1997) discharge same
Dist.
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Fort Worth, City of 108 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
924_(1997)
Pepsi Cola 108 Lab. Arb. (BNA) discharge same
993 (1997)
Scott Paper 1991 WL 693104 demotion same
(1991)
Renton Sch. Dist. 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) demotion partial
854 (1994)
New York Dep't of 23 LAIS 2007 (1995) fine, reprimand same
Youth
Snhomish Sch. Dist. # 1991 WL 693084 reprimand same
201 (1991)
Vermont State College 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) reprimand same
1193 (1993)
Iowa Dep't of Transp. 94-2 Arb. 4442 reprimand same
(1993)
Hutchinson-Willmar 1994 WL 854718 reprimand same
Reg'l Tech. (1994)
San Jose Unified Sch. 1995 WL 736748 reprimand same
Dist. (1995)
Monsanto Chem. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-30 days same
Intermediates 592 (1980)
United States Army 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days same
Signal 120 (1982)
Social See. Admin. 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-2 days same
459 (1983)
Redstone Arsenal 84-2 Arb. 1 8422 suspend-3 days same
(1984)
Alaska, State of 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days same
897 (1985)
Fairmont General 12 LAIS 1208 (1985) suspend-unknown same
Hosp. duration
Island Creek Coal 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days same
844 (1986)
VA Med. Ctr. 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-20 days same
405 (1986)
Kraft Inc., Sealtest 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days same
Foods 27 (1987)
Ohio Dep't of 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days same
Rehabilitation 478 (1987)
Michigan State Univ. 15 LAIS 4330 (1988) suspend-unknown same
duration
Defense Logistics 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-10 days same
Agency 1391 (1989)
Michigan Dep't of 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-5 days same
Corrections 253 (1990)
DHS, State of Minn. 1991 WL 702009 suspend-3 days same
(1991) 1 1 1
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Hertz Corp. 1992 WL 738567 suspend-5 days same
(1992)
Harve, City of 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days same
866 (1992)
Dayton Newspapers 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 weeks same
48 (1992)
Independent Sch. 1992 WL 724758 suspend-3 days same
Dist. # 196 (1992)
Memphis Light & Gas 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend- same
291 (1993) indefinite
Norwich, City of 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-10 days same
6 (1993)
Santa Catalina Island 1993 WL 787981 suspend-4 months same
Co. (1993)
Fruehauf Trailer Corp. 93-2 Arb. T 3584 suspend-5 days same
(1993)
Phoenix, City of 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-4 days same
879 (1994)
DOA, Sixth Infantry 94-1 Arb. 4170 suspend-3 days same
Div. (1994)
Minn. Dep't of 1994 WL 861388 suspend-3 days same
Human Servs. (1994)
Santa Cruz Transit 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-10 days same
Dist. 167 (1994)
Ray-o-Vac 1994 WL 901835 suspend-5 days same
(1994)
VA Med. Hosp. 95-2 Arb. 5402 suspend-14 days same
(1995)
D.C. Dep't of 1995 WL 852250 suspend-30 days same
Corrections (1995)
General Mills 97-2 Arb. 3206 suspend-3 days same-partial back
(1997) pay
Colonial Sch. Dist. 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA) suspend-3 days, same
1122 (1991) transfer
American Bldg. 1997 WL 349472 transfer same
Maintenance (1997)
Philip Morris 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) warning same
8226_(1990)
